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1. INTRODUCTION 
The optimal ownership structure of a firm changes over its life. During some phases of the its 
development it is optimal to keep the company private, lately, as the firm progresses through 
different stages of its life cycle, the optimal ownership structure also changes. Nevertheless 
the change in ownership structure does not only depend on what is optimal for the firm life 
cycle, but also on the interests of the various owners.  
A fundamental step in the life of a firm is the Initial Public Offering (IPO), which not only 
allows firms to raise new capital to finance growth, but it allows also current investors to 
divest completely or partially their participation. This important step has many benefits and 
drawbacks, that need careful examination. Moreover  for a public firm there is an information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, which in private firms does not occur, so the 
valuation and pricing process of firm’s shares has a fundamental importance. 
This thesis will present a study of the determinants influencing the Initial Public Offering 
(IPO), analyzing the influences that this change has on the firm, the different pressures of the 
equity holders of  the firms and the valuation done on the company by the market. Once those 
forces will be understood, a practical case will be analyzed: the IPO of Technogym, an Italian 
based company which went public in May 3rd 2016.  
Firstly, I will draw attention to the benefits and costs of both the going public process and of 
the fact of being a public held company instead of a private one.  The main benefits of 
becoming a publicly traded company will be presented, putting emphasis on the possibility of 
raising new capital to finance growth’s projects, and how this is influenced by market 
conditions. More in detail, a firm will be more willing to go public if market tends to 
overvalue firm’s peer group, because in this way it will be able to raise more capital, while, in 
case of a market “cold” period, it will tend to wait, because in this case it will raise much less 
capital (Lucas and McDonald, 1990). Later I will highlight how this way of raising capital has 
the major benefit of maintaining the control over the hands of the entrepreneur, since market 
shareholders are widely dispersed (Zingales, 1995).  After this the theory of Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri (1999) will be explained: they state that there are several ways to finance the firm, 
in fact it is costly to go public for a young firm, which has very high costs of producing 
information for shareholders, so in this case the best way of financing is a venture capital. The 
venture capital will own a great stake on the company, so it will be more interested in 
monitoring firm performance and operating strategy, but will require high grow rates. Later, 
when the company will had reached an higher stability, cost of producing information for 
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shareholders will be lower, and on the contrary  it will be difficult to respond to venture 
capital requirements of high growth, so going public will represent a good option. There are 
many other benefits deriving from the public market, analyzed by Pagano et al. (1998), like 
the possibility of reducing bargaining power of banks or debt holders in general, the chance to 
monitor widely managers’ behavior enhanced by market analyst and professional investors 
and the perspective of reaching an higher reputation in the global market thanks to the indirect 
advertising deriving from the IPO process. Different  dynamics of the industry such as scales 
economies also influence IPO convenience according to Schultz & Zaman (2001).  
Later also costs of being a public company and of the IPO process will be presented, putting a 
particular emphasis on the underpricing cost. The starting framework for analyzing costs of 
IPOs will be the guidelines of EY (2015). 
The thesis continues with the analysis of the influence of the presence of a private equity firm 
inside the company’s proprietary structure. Private equities, for their nature, invest in a 
portfolio firm for a limited period of time. So the way of divestment is a fundamental step to 
study, because it influences both the private equity profitability and the portfolio firm’s 
growth path. This is particularly important because it could happen that a portfolio firm 
decides to go public with the primary scope to allow the investor to sell its shares.  Jenkinson 
& Sousa (2015) analyzed in detail some factors that could make the exit via an IPO more or 
less likely and profitable for the private equity. In particular they found macroeconomic 
conditions such as low cost of debt make less likely an IPO  and more likely a leveraged 
buyout, or a secondary sale, instead, when equity market is particularly favorable an IPO is 
more probable and profitable. Also private equity history and characteristic has a strong 
influence: the need to build up a positive reputation, for example, supports an IPO, which 
allows to have an higher visibility in the market than an LBO. Also portfolio firm’s 
characteristic influence exit way: a company with high level of debt will be less likely to go 
public, for example.  
It is also useful to analyze from an entrepreneur’s perspective: LBOs or trade sales as way of 
divestment of the private equity could harm their power of controlling the firm. So it is likely 
that if the founder/entrepreneur is still present in the company, an IPO would occur. 
Later the techniques most widely used to access firm value are presented, highlighting their 
usefulness and significance in IPO valuation: Multiples of peer group, Discounted Cash Flow 
and Economic Profit. After their presentation, it is explained how underwriters pass from fair 
value assessment to pricing of the IPO, analyzing the fair value discount practiced in order to 
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attract investors in the road show phase and the subsequent underpricing resulting in the first 
days after the IPO.  Finally, it is also pointed out that in many cases IPO firms result in low 
performance in the long run, and it is highlighted that this could depend on the fact investors, 
when a firm has low profitability but very high growth perspectives, give too much 
importance on growth paths, ignoring actual profitability. To avoid this long term 
underperformance it would be important to give greater importance to actual profitability.  
Lastly those issues are examined in the analysis of Technogym, an Italian based company 
founded in 1973 by the entrepreneur Nerio Alessandri and his brother. This firm, which 
produces and commercializes premium gym and wellness equipment, went public in the 
Milan stock exchange on May 3rd 2016. The IPO was aimed at allowing Arle Capital Partner, 
a private equity who invested in 40% of firm equity, to divest. The various influences of 
private equity firm and of the entrepreneur, together with the benefits deriving from the IPO 
will be presented. Finally a firm valuation will be done, and the issues on market pricing will 
be analyzed. 
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2. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE IPO PROCESS 
Taking a company public is a long process that requires much time and effort. So deciding to 
start this process is a fundamental decision during the company life.  
There are several costs that must be taken into considerations, which are not only the costs 
related to the process of going public- such as stock exchange fees, road show costs, advisors 
fees and so on- but also costs related to changes that has to be done inside the firm to respond 
to extra requirements of the public firms- such as extra personnel, additional accounting and 
reporting required. A consistent cost that also needs to be taken into consideration is related to 
the underpricing phenomenon, that entails a low amount of money to be raised by the firm 
going public. 
Being a public firm ensures many advantages for the firm: such as agility in raising new 
capital, flexibility in investor liquidation, high visibility in the market, higher ability in 
attracting valuable employees. Anyway many factors make the IPO more or less a convenient 
option for a firm in a certain moment. Those factors are related to market conditions (such as 
IPO windows), to industry factors (such as first mover advantage), particular risk factors 
typical of an industry, or needs to maintain control together with the need to cash the 
investment. 
The proceeds of this chapter is organized as follows: firstly the benefits of going public are 
presented, together with some conditions that can make this process being more convenient 
for the firms. Secondly the costs related with the IPO process and public status versus the 
private status are discussed. Finally the problem of the underpricing, together with an 
explanation of the phenomenon is discussed. 
2.1. Benefits and factors influencing the decision of going public 
The IPO process has the major advantage of answering to the need of raising new capital for 
the firm. It also creates a liquid market for the firm’s shares, allowing funders and 
shareholders to convert part of their participation in cash. EY (2015) explained briefly that 
major benefits of the IPO are the following: 
• Better access to capital markets to raise money through equity and bond offerings 
• Flexibility to trade shares with high liquidity and daily valuation 
• Greater visibility and brand recognition with consumers 
• Higher valuations as greater disclosure of information reduces uncertainty regarding 
performance 
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• Potential to diversify wealth on shareholder side 
• Enhanced ability to attract, retain and reward valued employees through share option 
plans 
• Opportunity to bond and incentivize key people in your business with long-term 
incentive plans 
It is interesting to notice that motivation to do an IPO is stronger in certain situations and 
times, more than others (Ritter & Welch, 2002). Many times literature focused on these 
different situations that influences the benefits related to the IPO, which are the following: 
• Market undervaluation/overvaluation influence in timing of the IPO 
• Possibility to raise capital and maintain corporate control 
• Firm’s lifecycle stage and its effect in market investors’ information asymmetry  
• Industry influences, such as innovation possibilities or first mover advantage 
• Influence of firm characteristics such as: high leverage and high growth potential 
• Possibility for diversification of investments for entrepreneurs and ability to monitor 
managers 
• Possibility of indirect advertising 
• Ability to gain market share and create a disadvantage for investors. 
These issues will be analyzed more in detail in the following paragraphs. 
2.1.1. Raising capital and timing influence 
Ritter and Welch (2002) pointed out that in most cases firms go public in order to raise new 
equity capital to finance growth, and over 70% of the CFOs confirm that. Therefore, the 
investment opportunity is the most important benefit of going public. Also Lucas and 
McDonald (1990) assumed that the major benefit of going public is the possibility to raise 
capital to finance new projects. Nevertheless an IPO is not always convenient, and its benefits 
can vary a lot according to the situation . In particular asymmetric information have a strong 
influence on choosing the moment to go public. 
Lucas and McDonald (1990) analyzed how information asymmetry,  in particular, the adverse 
selection problem influences the decision on the moment of starting the initial public offering 
process. Few issues were relevant for their model: firstly in a considerable number of cases 
firms experience a decline in price before the issue of the new stocks; secondly, the fact that 
issues on average follow the market trends. 
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The idea behind their model is the following: managers have an information advantage over 
the investors and this implies that they will not identify correctly the real value of the firm. 
They can estimate a higher value for the firm than the real one, so they overvalue the firm, or 
they can estimate a lower value for the firm, which turns out to be undervalued. An 
information announcement helps investors to correct their valuation. After the announcement 
the share price could rise: this implies that the firm was undervalued. On the contrary, if the 
share price falls after the announcement, the firm was overvalued. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) say that if the firm needs an equity increase to finance growth, 
managers will pay attention on how the market values the firm. If the firm is undervalued by 
the market it is likely that managers will wait before starting a capital increase. This implies 
that on average companies have above the average performance before the equity issue, due to 
the fact that they wait for the undervaluation to vanish before issuing. In the other hand 
overvalued firms will issue immediately, if they wait there is the possibility that prices will 
decrease so the firm will lose the opportunity to collect more money.  
Given these two price paths, equity issuers on average have positive abnormal returns 
preceding the issue, and this is the best moment to start the IPO filing process, when the firm 
is overvalued from the market (Lucas and McDonald, 1990). 
The valuation depends also on the general market mood: it is more likely to have equity issues 
when there is a general increase in the market, in this way the firm valuation will be higher 
and the company will collect more funds. To explain this fact Lucas and McDonald (1990) 
supposed that the percentage of firms in the economy that are overvalued or undervalued is 
unsystematic over time. In a period in which an above average number of firms are 
undervalued, when the information about these firms becomes public, it is expected to create 
a general market rise, since the market will notice the real value of those firms. After this 
raise, many firms will raise new capital: managers understand that the market was 
undervaluing the company, so they waited for a market rise. Thus, it is expected an increase in 
equity issues in a period of market growth. This highlights that, because of the information 
asymmetry of investors, the timing of the issuing is fundamental to have a successful 
operation. 
2.1.2. Cash flow rights and corporate control 
Zingales (1995) pointed out that also corporate control is an important factor to consider: by 
going public the initial owner can change the proportion of cash flow rights and control rights 
he retains. Therefore, the initial owner uses the IPO to optimize the structure of ownership of 
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the company and to maximize his profit from an eventual sale. There are two sources that 
increase a buyer’s valuation: the increase in cash flow, which is enjoyed by all shareholders, 
and the increase in private benefits of control, which is captured only by the controlling 
shareholder.  
In addition the markets for these two benefits are different: the first one is populated by many 
small investors and it is fully competitive, while the second one is restricted to a few large 
investors and is not fully competitive. Therefore, the incumbent in general will not be able to 
extract the buyer's full reservation value through direct bargaining. As a result these two 
components are better sold through two separate selling techniques: cash flow rights should 
be auctioned off to dispersed shareholders, private benefits of control should be bargained 
over a direct negotiation. With the sale of cash flow rights to dispersed shareholders without 
selling control, the initial owner can divest part of her investment and will gain some free cash 
flow. However, by retaining control, the incumbent succeeds in extracting some of the surplus 
deriving from the buyer's larger private benefits in a direct negotiation (Zingales, 1995). 
2.1.3. Influence of life cycle stage 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1999) analyzed that in different stages of a firm’s life there can be 
optimal or non-optimal moments to go public. Selling the shares to a single large investor (the 
"venture capitalist") has an advantage: that it minimizes the information production cost. 
However, the disadvantage is that the venture capitalist, which remains less than fully 
diversified and exercises considerably more bargaining power against the entrepreneur than 
public shareholders, will demand in equilibrium a significantly greater rate of return. On the 
other hand selling shares to a large number of investors in the equity market has the advantage 
that each investor is fully diversified and has almost no bargaining power relative to the 
entrepreneur, but there is some duplication in information production and consequently a 
larger aggregate information production cost is burned by the firm.  
The resolution of this trade-off depends on the magnitude of outsiders' information production 
costs: older firms have more stable and predictable free cash flow, therefore also for outside 
investors it is less costly to gather information about an older firm’s fair value and 
performance. In addition the accumulation of as much information possible about the firm by 
the market helps the valuation. This implies that older firms, with a sufficient amount of 
information about them accumulated in the public domain, will be more likely to be publicly 
traded. Younger firms, which entail a greater information acquisition cost, choose the venture 
capitalist as investor. Moreover while some amount of duplication in information acquisition 
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is unavoidable, the price in the equity market conveys information across investors so that 
only a fraction of these investors will incur the information production cost, thus lowering the 
extent of such duplication. 
2.1.4. New markets and investors perception 
Maksimovic & Pichler (2001) analyzed the initial public offerings in technological firms, 
studying the forms of financing in developing industries. They found that innovating firms 
face the following dangers: the risk that a new technology will make their investment 
outdated and the risk that new entrants can reproduce a similar technology and can reduce 
their profit. Moreover the timing and kind of financing depends on: the public perception that 
the industry is viable, the probability that a superior technology will appear, and the cost of 
research and development, that must be paid by new entrants.  
In earlier stages of the firm it is likely to have private financing. This is when industry is 
perceived to be risky, with high development investment but low probability of entry of new 
competitors. Instead, in this stage of firm life cycle, it is likely to have a public financing 
when industry is perceived to be feasible and less risky, and initial investment is not of high 
amount, but also the probability of being displaced by new entrants is low. 
In addition a public offering creates a secondary market for firm’s securities that reveal much 
information not known by the issuer. This additional information is revealed also to potential 
entrants and can benefit also the incumbent: more information available in the market will 
make more clear the viability of the industry, so it will avoid both an excess and an 
insufficient number of entries (Maksimovic & Pichler, 2001). As a conclusion an IPO in new 
markets will widespread information, and this can reduce problems of information 
asymmetry: competition will develop in a more equilibrate way. The IPO has another benefit 
that cannot be exerted by the incumbent firm: the widespread of information will reduce the 
risk for investors, so the underpricing will be lower, especially if compared with private 
financing. 
2.1.5. Growth opportunities and size 
According to Pagano et al. (1998) the determinants of the decision to go public depends from 
the ex ante characteristics of the companies that go public and from the ex post consequences 
of this decision. They summarized the benefits that previous research had highlighted and 
then looked if those were determinants of the decision of going public. 
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The first benefit that literature pointed out and that they analyzed is the overcoming of 
borrowing constraints, in particular to find sources alternative to banks. Following this way of 
reasoning IPOs should be fitting for companies with large current investments and future 
investment opportunities, with high leverage and high growth.  
Second implication of the IPO should be the possibility of reducing the high bargaining power 
of banks: the widespread of information regarding the company can increase the proposal of 
bargaining from other lenders, and competition at the end ensures a reduction in credit cost. 
So companies facing higher interest rates and having more concentrated credit sources should 
be more likely to go public to make their credit cheaper.  
Thirdly, the decision to go public should influence the liquidity of firm’s stocks. Shares of 
private companies can be traded only by informal searching for a counterpart, at considerable 
cost while in an organized market it is possible to exchange cheaply and on short notice. 
However, the liquidity of a company’s shares is an increasing function of their trading 
volume, so that this liquidity benefit may be effectively reaped only by sufficiently large 
companies, and also for this reason there should be a positive relationship between size and 
likelihood of an IPO. Moreover going public increases the possibilities of diversification for 
the founders both directly, by divesting from the company and reinvesting in other assets, and 
indirectly, because the company with new equity after the IPO can acquire stakes in other 
companies. If diversification is an important motive in the decision to go public riskier 
companies should be more likely to go public, and also the probability that controlling 
shareholders  sell a large portion of their shares at the time of the IPO or soon afterward 
should increase. 
Another benefit should be the instrument of monitoring that the market provides and that is 
not present in private firms: both through the possibility of hostile takeovers and through the 
opportunity of market assessment of managerial decisions. Moreover, in a public firm, the 
shares’ trading is influenced by the information about firm. Thus, linking the managers’ 
compensation plans to the stock performance can improve their behavior and their effort in 
enhancing firm value production. Unfortunately Pagano et al. (1998) were not able to test this 
hypothesis since their sample was made by Italian firms, and at the time of the study, the 
information about the management compensation was not mandatory information for the 
disclosure.   
A benefit for the firm is the indirect advertising deriving from IPO: most investors hold 
portfolios that contain a small fraction of the existing securities, often because they simply 
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ignore that a certain company exists, but listing works as an advertisement for the company. 
This is very important because the more a firm is known, so the higher is the number of 
investors, the higher is the stock price. This is confirmed for example by the fact that when a 
company already listed announces to list in New York Stock Exchange its stock price 
experience an abnormal return of 5%. 
Another situation creating positive benefits for the firm is the presence of a window of 
opportunity: companies recognizing that other companies in their industry are overvalued 
have an incentive to go public because managers can exploit the overvaluation by the market 
to raise more capital. A measure of the willingness to overvalue of the market is the median 
market-to-book-ration of public companies in the same industry, so if this measure is high 
firms should be more likely to go public. A high market-to-book ratio can also indicate that 
market considers that the firm has a high potential of growth for the future.  To discriminate 
between these two hypotheses are needed some ex post evidences: if newly listed companies 
invest at an abnormal rate and earn large profits, then the relationship between market-to-
book and IPOs is likely to be driven by expectations of future growth opportunities; 
otherwise, it is likely to reflect the desire to exploit a window of opportunity. 
Analyzing the sample they found that main factor affecting the probability of an IPO is the 
market-to-book ratio at which firms in the same industry trade: an increase in market-to-book 
ratio augment the possibilities of an IPO. This positive relationship can be caused by the 
increase in growth opportunities in an industry, which is reflected in market prices, and which 
has as therefore the augmented the need of investments. A second could be that entrepreneurs 
wait to issue new stocks when market overvalue stocks, and this is in line with the previously 
explained theory of Lucas and McDonald (1990). Pagano et al. (1998) suggest that this 
second explanation is the most plausible. 
The second most important determinant is the size of the company: larger companies are more 
likely to go public. IPOs also tend to involve companies that before the IPO grew faster and 
were more profitable. Regarding other hypothesis taken from the literature that were tested it 
emerges the following: both the variables that measure a firm’s financing needs—i.e., 
investment and growth—increase the probability of listing, but not in a statistically significant 
way. The proxies for the cost and availability of credit didn’t resulted to have much 
explanatory power: the relative cost of bank credit and a firm’s leverage have a negative 
impact on the likelihood of an IPO, but neither is statistically significant. By contrast, the 
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concentration of bank credit appears to increase the likelihood of an IPO, but this effect also is 
not statistically significant (Pagano et al., 1998) 
2.1.6. Industry influences: the case of technology market 
Another benefit deriving from IPO is studied by Schultz and Zaman (2001) who noticed that 
firms go public to gain the first mover advantage. They analyzed a sample of Internet 
companies that included all stocks that went public between January 1996 and March 2000 
that are in the Internet Stock List. They found that this is particularly true in Internet industry. 
Between January 1999 and March 2000, 321 Internet companies went public, and most of 
them had little revenues. Only 28 of the 321 were profitable in the previous quarter. Many had 
been in business for only a few months: this is particularly unusual since a younger firm going 
public faces an higher underpricing than an older one, simply because there is an higher 
information asymmetry between the firm and the market, so it is more profitable to go public 
later on the firm life cycle. 
According to Schultz & Zaman (2001) there are two commonly offered explanations for this 
uncommon behavior. The first is that managers are hurrying to take their companies public 
because the market was irrationally overpricing Internet stocks. The second explanation is that 
companies were rushing to grab market share in an industry in which economies of scale 
ensure that only a few firms will survive in each niche. 
Nevertheless managers’ behavior does not bring evidences to the thesis that they start the 
Initial Public Offering process to sell overpriced stock. It would be more reasonable for them 
to sell a great stake of their shares and to raise as much capital as possible, if they thought that 
stocks were overvalued at the moment of the IPO. However, insiders sell very few shares and 
this finding is consistent with insiders believing that Internet stocks are fairly priced. 
In contrast, there is a stronger evidence that managers are taking Internet companies public to 
capture market share. It can give to an Internet firm a decisive advantage over potential 
entrants: firstly because it may be able to charge more, and secondly because with higher 
market share economies of scale increases and so costs faced are lower than ones for potential 
competitors.  
In conclusion, from Schultz & Zaman (2001) it is possible to understand that in industry with 
high economies of scale where the first mover has a strong advantage firms can benefit from 
IPOs since they can increase in size and enlarge their market share very fast. 
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2.1.7. Gain market share and disadvantages for competitors 
The competitive effects of IPOs have important implications not only for issuing firms, but 
also for industry competitors and investors. Existing publicly traded firms represent 97.5% of 
the total post-IPO market capitalization occur, while IPO firms comprise only 2.5%. This is 
why it is important for investors to know how an IPO affects the operating and stock market 
performance of existing public firms. Correspondingly, firms competing with a firm that is 
filing for an IPO need to understand how this can affect the competitive environment and 
have to prepare strategic reactions. 
Hsu et al. (2010) tried to measure the performance of the already public firms in periods of 
IPO.  In fact, if IPO firms can successfully compete against publicly traded competitors a 
reduction in performance of firms already traded is expected. So Hsu et al. (2010) wanted to 
test whether stock prices of competing firms react to a large IPO in their industry. While an 
IPO is announced and registered some time before the intended first day of trading, there is 
substantial uncertainty at that point, about whether the IPO will in fact be completed. The IPO 
announcement and its subsequent completion or withdrawal is thus expected to have an 
impact on rivals' stock return.  
So they firstly analyzed if the completion of an IPO has negative effect on price of public 
rival firms, then they checked if the withdrawal of an IPO has positive price impact and then 
they focused also in the initial step of the IPO, analyzing if the initial filing has negative 
impact on public firms in the same industry. They went further testing if operating 
performance of existing firms deteriorates after the IPO. Finally, they tested non-price 
reactions, checking if leverage, certification, and knowledge are significant determinants of 
cross-sectional variation in firm performance around IPOs and so if they are significant 
determinants in firm’s ability to survive. For example competitors with low leverage may be 
more flexible in their investments to compete with the recently recapitalized issuing firms, 
competitors with better certification by investment banks may fare better against recently 
certified issuing firms, and players with more knowledge capital may perform better against 
new entrants with nonfinancial advantages. 
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Exhibit 1: Incumbent firm abnormal returns around completed and withdrawn 
IPOs 
 
Source: Hsu et. al (2010) 
To test the first and second hypothesis, concerning the stock price changes of public rival 
firms at the completion of the IPO, they analyzed the stock returns of industry incumbents at 
and around the completion date or withdrawal date of IPO competitors. It resulted that while 
cumulative abnormal returns are very similar until 20 days before the IPO event, in 
withdrawal case they start to become slightly positive over the next 10 days and close to zero 
in completed IPOs. After day 10 a major difference arises and become completely opposite in 
case of withdrawal or completion: in the first case they show a significantly positive reaction 
that continues for a substantial period of time, while in the second case the reaction is 
significantly negative. This suggests that the market perceives IPOs as bad news for industry 
competitors. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1. 
Accordingly, it is expected to obtain negative evidence also concerning the operating 
performance of incumbents. Hsu et al. (2010) found that operating performance of 
incumbents is significantly lower after IPO: firstly they earn less on existing assets, in fact 
ROA declines significantly; secondly firms invest less, so Asset Growth declines also 
significantly; and leverage increases, so both Interest Coverage Ratio and Leverage Ratio get 
worse. It results are evidenced in Exhibit 2, where they reports the univariate statistics for 
9494 incumbent firms before and after an IPO event in Panel A and before and after a 
withdrawal event in Panel B. 
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Exhibit 2: Incumbent firm ratios 
 
Source: Hsu et al. (2010) 
Finally they analyzed whether cross-sectional differences in IPO-period incumbent 
performance can be explained by three factors previously recognized as influencing IPO 
performance, that are leverage, certification, and knowledge.  
They found that companies perform better, and are more likely to survive, if they are less 
leveraged and thus have more financial flexibility, if their IPO has been underwritten and 
thereby certified by a top investment bank or by a venture capitalist. Moreover, if they spend 
more on research and development and therefore possess a competitive advantage through the 
accumulation of knowledge capital they perform better in case of competitors IPO. 
To summarize, the research of Hsu et al. (2010) suggest that IPOs have competitive effects on 
other companies that operate in the same industry. This research has proven to be useful for 
investors, because, with a new IPO, industry risk changes. It was also useful for incumbent 
companies, that need to understand how to react to competitive changes induced by new 
IPOs. More importantly, this research was significant for the firm that need to raise new 
capital: the IPO has proven to be a method to raise new capital that increase competitive 
advantage of the firm. They explained this fact firstly with the improvement in debt-to-equity 
ratio that generally results from the new issuing: if the IPO firm is less leveraged than 
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industry competitors are, this difference is expected to be an advantage for the issuers. 
Secondly, issuing firms have the advantage to be recently certified by investment banks: this 
enhances investors' willingness to purchase new issues as opposed to shares of other firms in 
the same industry. Thirdly, new entrants may have some nonfinancial advantage over industry 
competitors and this may make issuing firms more attractive to investors. In fact, higher 
quality firms are more likely to go public than lower quality firms are. 
Ergincan et al. (2016) went further in this field of research focused their attention not on 
issuers, investors, or other third parties such as government bodies but on the firm itself. They 
used a sample of 60 Turkish  IPOs starting from 1993. 
Main finding of the study is that going public seems to be a good option if an industrial firm 
needs to improve its relative market share. Thus, it also provides support to the idea that an 
IPO is generally bad news for the rivals. In fact, in many cases, their performance ratios and 
their profitability are negatively affected, and their market share decreases. This can be 
explained in the following way: going public, the firm loosens its financial constraints and 
increases the possibility of improving market share. 
2.2. Costs of going public 
IPO process guarantees many benefits and new opportunities, but also have consistent costs 
and drawbacks. In making the decision of taking their company public, decision makers 
should carefully consider all the potential benefits, as well as the costs. 
EY (2015) analyzed the cons of starting an IPO process as following: 
• The IPO process may become distracting and time-consuming relative to running the 
business 
• Significant IPO project costs 
• Recurring incremental costs associated with the requirements of being a listed 
company 
• New investors with voting rights 
• Greater transparency to all stakeholders 
• Pressure to deliver on your promises 
• Corporate governance duties 
According to PwC (2015) the two kinds of cost that need to be considered are: the cost of 
going public, so the cost of preparing the required financial, marketing, and business 
information, as well as determining the optimal tax and legal structure; and the cost of being 
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public, so preparing the financial reports, which implies many times upgrading firm financial 
reporting capabilities and meeting the governance and internal controls standards and the 
listing requirements of the selected exchange. 
2.2.1. Cost of going public 
There are several cost associated with the listing process. They can be distinguished between 
cost directly attributable to registration (offering costs), and incremental cost incurred in 
preparation for the offering (start-up costs).  
Offering costs are cost incurred in direct connection with registration and distribution of 
company shares. They include the underwriter discount (usually 4-7% of gross proceeds), the 
legal fees of consultants related to draft the registration statement and other advices related to 
the offering, the external auditor, that usually issues the comfort letter, review the registration 
statement ( but doesn’t include the year end auditing), the financial reporting advisor, in 
charge of preparing the pro forma financial statements, advising on the financial statements, 
and help to convert financial reporting from the ones of a private company to the ones of a 
public one, printing of all the documentation, registration fees to state and rating agencies, 
exchange listing fees to the stock exchange, and all the road show expenses (PwC, 2015). 
Start up costs include all the incremental organizational costs such as tax and legal entity 
restructuring costs that occurs before the IPO, additional audit and accounting to make the 
financial statement compliant with stock exchange regulation, valuation reports, costs to draw 
new articles of incorporation, audit committee charter, by-laws and other agreements (PwC, 
2015). 
2.2.2. Cost of staying public 
There are significant expenses related to the public company status: most private companies 
do not have the infrastructure to operate in a public environment. Since they need to satisfy 
the new level of regulatory and reporting rules, they will incur a series of one-time and 
incremental costs. 
PwC uses a framework of the areas that usually private firms need to improve or create to get 
ready to operate into a public market. Many times firms choose to upgrade some of these 
areas and so incur significant incremental costs.  
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Exhibit 3: IPO readiness Framework 
 
Source: PwC (2015) 
Broadly speaking, there are five major sources of additional costs related to the fact of being 
public instead of being private: accounting and reporting effectiveness, additional employees 
need, need of external resources and additional regulatory requirements, audit fees. 
Accounting, reporting and financial effectiveness: A very important change for many 
companies is the need to report publicly their financial results on a rigorous timeline. The firm 
needs to prepare to meet these requirements, because an inability in this field could damage 
investor confidence in the firm and  potentially prohibit the company from completing capital 
market transactions while out of compliance. Adapting to these requirements is a long 
process, it doesn’t happen in one day.  
Adding needs of employees: In many cases the adaptation also requires to hire and retain 
employees with some specific skills, which usually a private company does not have. This 
additional staff requirement accounts for a large portion of the incremental cost of being 
public. For example: 
• Taxation group: the size of taxation team may need to be incremented, since in a 
public company usually there is more emphasis on income tax provision and on tax 
planning strategies. The taxation group is typically responsible for ensuring 
compliance with state and international tax requirements, as well as compliance with 
indirect taxes (sales/use taxes, property taxes, and value-added taxes) and it is 
responsible for quarterly tax provision preparation and interim reporting rules that 
needs to be applied.  
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• Internal Audit: Many stock exchanges as the NYSE requires that listed firms 
establish an Internal Audit (IA) function that has to be developed and requires extra 
staff. This function usually works as independent assurance and consulting 
department with several responsibilities, like internal control and support to the 
accomplishment of strategic objectives, alleviate risks, ensure conformity with 
internal policies, and support financial reporting. Given the cost and time needed to 
hire the company’s IA resources. Many companies will look to hire external 
resources, but the cost to engage external resources could be higher than the cost to 
hire IA resources internally. Anyway this option has several advantages: it allows to 
scale up rapidly and it allows to have specialists that provide significant added value 
that can be transmitted to internal resources (PwC, 2015). 
• Financial planning and analysis (budgeting and forecasting): It is critical for a 
successful IPO and for the life of the public company to have a dependable financial 
planning team, because analysts rely on this information and because firm’s ability to 
meet its own forecast and earnings estimates have a significant impact on stock 
performance (PwC, 2015). 
• Treasury and financial risk management: This function is obligatory for a public 
company and it also helps to adequately manage the liquidity, the foreign currency 
exposure and derivatives to hedge interest rates (PwC, 2015). 
• Human resources: public firms will have increased need of human resources, and so 
human resource function itself will need to be increased(PwC, 2015). 
• Technology support: Companies must also consider the need to increase the number 
of members in their technology function because of becoming a public company. 
Systems and processes must be documented and tested to comply with market 
requirements and that their technology infrastructure adequately supports compliance 
efforts (PwC, 2015).  
• Board of directors: “Public companies can also expect to pay director fees to 
independent members of their board of directors and fees to recruiting firms to 
identify the better people to cover this role” (PwC, 2015). 
• Internal staff assessment: Together with the more specialized employees needed by 
a public company, “more personnel across all functions may be needed to satisfy the 
incremental reporting and analysis requirements that come with public reporting”. 
This requires to verify that current staff is adequate in terms of quantity and quality 
(PwC, 2015). 
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Need of engage external resources: Many companies will need to pay external resources to 
provide technical expertise, which usually include: 
• Company securities counsel: It is engaged during IPO process to deal with 
underwriters, but usually is  retained to assist firm in complying with new regulatory 
requirements and advising about securities-related litigation.  
• Financial reporting advisors: Firms can hire also firms other than their own auditors, 
in to gain extra support, for example in implementing new financial reporting 
protocols, adopting new accounting, reporting and disclosure standards, training 
accounting and finance staff. 
• Compensation advisors: After the IPO these advisors help to integrate the 
compensation committee inside the governance structure of the firm. 
• Investor relations: This team of internal or external advisors works together to build 
relationships with shareholders, investors and analysts, providing relevant information 
to better position the firm in the marketplace. Usually a new public company opts to 
externalize this team or part of it (PwC, 2015). 
Necessity to comply with new regulatory requirements: every stock exchange has its own 
corporate governance listing standards that every firm must fill. These standards deal with 
board of directors, structure and process, and can be sometimes stricter than the national 
regulations and laws. “A private company will be required to evaluate its governance 
structure, especially its committee charters and composition, to ensure it complies with the 
requirements of its chosen exchange. Companies should prepare for the time and costs 
required to create, implement, and maintain stricter corporate governance policies as well as 
retain high-quality members in the committees” (PwC, 2015).  
Audit fees: Public companies find an increase in audit fees, both to meet additional regulatory 
requirements that require more time for auditors. Moreover, when an auditor issues an opinion 
on a public firm it faces a higher risk, and this reflect in higher audit fees (PwC, 2015). 
2.2.3. Perform an IPO readiness assessment 
Since costs related to IPOs take many forms and  remains  present in the firm during the rest 
of its life, it is important to valuate accurately the benefits and costs of this process. In fact, it 
often happens the managers find the costs associated with going and stay in public higher than 
expected, as highlighted by PwC (2015). 
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Exhibit 4: CFO expectation of the costs of going public and being a public 
company 
 
Source: PwC (2015) 
So for firms preparing for an IPO is important to very if they are ready to cope with all the 
challenges and requirements of going and staying public and to avoid unexpected negative 
situations. The right preparation can help companies to reduce costs as they establish a time-
table and work plan based on the offering’s strategic objectives, specific business issues, and 
the actual work that needs to be performed. 
Since the success of the IPO depends also on the execution, PwC (2015) suggests introducing 
a project management system focused on the IPO. The project management principles will 
support IPO leader, to create an IPO plan, monitor the progresses, maintain the timetable and 
keep the overall process and decision making on track. Early identification of emerging 
issues, in particular, can be critical to a successful launch. For example not understand the 
“need to provide an additional  set of financial statements in the registration statement for a 
recent acquisition or the taxation effects of the post-IPO capital structure can derail the IPO 
process” (PwC, 2015). So the understanding the points of strengths and the weaknesses of a 
firm relating to the IPO process, together with an effective planning and monitoring of the 
process are critical for the final success. 
2.3. Money left on the table  
The valuation of shares of an unlisted company is challenging because historical prices are 
missing, so the benchmark for the evaluation lacks. There is an information asymmetry 
between insiders and market investors, and this lead to adverse selection problems, which 
manifests in persistent average initial return in the market.  
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This issue is particularly important for firms going public, because firms usually face an 
underpricing phenomenon when they issue public stocks. Share price increasingly goes up 
after the issuing of stocks and this means that the firm loses a considerable part of the capital 
that it could have raised, or, from another point of view, it could have raised the same amount 
of capital with less share dilution. From the opposite point of view, the investors who buy the 
shares at the issuing have purchased a financial instrument that could provide a very high 
positive return in a short period.  
This factor is particularly important and has to be evaluated and taken into account by firms 
that are considering to go public, because it can influence strongly the convenience of an IPO: 
so this part of the chapter will present several factors influencing the underpricing 
phenomenon and its extent. 
2.3.1. Underpricing  and mispricing phenomenon 
The literature offers three main explanations for the underpricing phenomenon: deliberate 
underpricing in the premarket, mispricing in the early aftermarket as result of trading activity, 
underwriter price stabilization in early aftermarket. (Reber & Vencappa, 2015) 
Deliberate underpricing is described as a method for insiders to signal positive information on 
firm value to outside investors. This can be described as an outcome of the principal-agent 
conflict: the principal (issuing firm) cannot directly observe the marketing and distribution 
effort of the underwriter (agent). Therefore, the underwriter can induce the issuing firm to 
agree to a low offer price . Underpricing is helpful to reduce lemon problem: the issuer is 
more informed than investors are, so they face the lemons problem. Only issuers with worse-
than-average quality are willing to sell their shares at the average price. “To distinguish 
themselves from the pool of low-quality issuers, high-quality issuers may attempt to signal 
their quality”. As in many other signaling models, “high-quality firms demonstrate that they 
are high quality by throwing money away” (Ritter & Welch, 2002). One way to do this is to 
leave money on the table in the IPO. So high quality issuers deliberately sell their shares at a 
lower price than market valuation, so they lose some money at the moment of issuing, but 
expect to recoup some of the sacrifice later with a future issuing activity (Ritter & Welch, 
2002). Moreover IPOs have to be on average underpriced to compensate less informed 
investors for a winner course problem and to induce them to participate in the new issues 
market: a winner course arises because better informed investors only apply for underpriced 
new issues and less informed investors obtain overpriced stocks (Rock, 1986). 
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Mispricing in the aftermarket strain of literature asserts that stocks are correctly priced in the 
premarket but trading activity in the early aftermarket misprices the stocks. This is due to the 
valuations of overoptimistic investors. Loughran & Ritter (1995) said that this happens 
because investors are “betting on long shots”. They assert that, “if the true probability that a 
given IPO will be the next Microsoft is 3 percent, but investors have instead estimated that it 
is 4 percent (resulting in a 33 percent overvaluation)”. Then it will take a very long period 
before they adequately revise their estimates. Therefore, investors seem to be systematically 
misestimating the probability of finding a big winner. Going more deeply, issuing firms 
typically have had recent improvements in their operating performance. The market appears 
to overweight short-term improvement and underweight long-term tendencies. Therefore, 
when the IPO starts “market prices reflect the capitalization of transitory operating 
improvements” (Loughran & Ritter, 1995). When the transitory nature becomes apparent, the 
stocks underperform. However, this underperformance does not start soon  after Initial Public 
Offering. This over optimism leads to an excess demand of shares so prices go up and initial 
return in the aftermarket increases. 
Also Friesen & Swift (2009) analyzed overreaction of investors to new information on the 
initial day of trading and found evidence that long-run returns are negative and are 
unambiguously explained by a pricing above the fundamental value. Going more in detail, the 
returns are positive until 6 months after the IPO and insignificant in the second semester of 
first year: this suggests that prices remain above fundamental value until a year following the 
IPO. From year two, abnormal returns are significantly negative: prices are revised and 
become linked to the fundamental value of the firm.  
Another explanation attributes positive average initial return to underwriter price support. 
Aggarwal (2003) examined in detail what kind of aftermarket activities underwriters do, how 
long these activities last, what costs the underwriters incur, and how the combination of these 
activities helps to provide price support to weak IPOs. These activities are generally referred 
as stabilization activities, because they provide price support for weak offerings that tend to 
trade at or below their offer price. They include exercise of the overallotment option, short 
covering in the aftermarket, and the use of penalty bids to restrict flipping. 
The initial stock price performance of IPOs partly depends also on what investors do with 
these shares. Investment banks have the discretion to allocate IPO shares, and investors have 
the option to hold their allocated shares or to sell them immediately in the aftermarket. 
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Investors who sell their shares in the first few days are called flippers and investment banks 
discourage this activity since it puts downward pressure on the stock price (Aggarwal, 2003). 
2.3.2. Flipping activity and underwriters role 
Flipping is the term used when shares are sold in the immediate aftermarket by investors who 
receive an initial allocation at the offer price, and does not include purchases in the 
aftermarket. The lead underwriter does not disclose the proportion of shares allocated to 
institutions versus individuals. So the public does not know who has flipped shares, but the 
lead underwriter and each syndicate member have these details. High trading volume, that 
usually occurs in IPO aftermarket, is not just due to flipping, which, on average, accounts for 
18.95% of trading volume and 15.00% of shares offered in the IPO. Therefore the original 
investors hold their shares for the most part. However, when this small percentage of shares is 
flipped, the shares are traded several times, resulting in high volume. The high volume does 
not result from the sale of a large proportion of shares by the original owners; instead, it 
results from the same shares being sold repeatedly. Therefore a small percentage of flipped 
share have a large multiplier effect on trading volume. It is partly a result of the buying and 
selling by investors who are not necessarily original buyers, and partly of trading activity 
between market makers (Aggarwal, 2003).  
Market makers have an important role, particularly wholesalers, who are not the original 
investors in IPOs but conduct several transactions to satisfy customers orders so add to 
trading volume. In addition, institutional investors play an important role: it is generally 
argued that large portions of an IPO are allocated to them, since they should not flip IPOs, 
because they are long-term oriented. Actually institutions are found to consistently flip a 
much larger percentage of the shares allocated to them than retail customers do. 
Underwriters also are fundamental in the IPO process: they start by doing the due diligence 
and examining every aspect of the issuing company; they arrange the road show, after which 
the offering is priced. During the road show, the investment bank starts to build the book and 
gets a sense of the demand for the offering and the type of investors interested in buying it. 
Based on information provided by potential investors, the underwriter decides how to price 
the issue and whether to revise the filing range. At this time, investors might also indicate 
what they will do with their shares: a mutual fund with an allocation of only 50,000 may 
decide either buying more shares in the aftermarket or selling them for a quick profit. 
Investment banks keep track of flipping activity by investors because the immediate reselling 
of shares in the aftermarket can exert downward pressure on the stock price, particularly for 
31 
 
weak offerings. The lead underwriter considers the impact of flipping in pricing the offering 
(Aggarwal, 2003). 
The road show and the book-building process help the underwriter to estimate demand for an 
offering. Offerings oversubscribed several times can absorb the flipped shares and still result 
in the aftermarket price rising above the offer price. Investment banks are frequently pleased 
to see flipping in hot IPOs because this generates trading commissions for the firm. However, 
in weak offerings they do not want investors to flip the stock because it creates selling 
pressure that can lower the price even below the offer price and investment banks end up 
buying flipped shares in the aftermarket. Excessive flipping also implies that shares are not 
placed with long-term investors and this disappoints the issuer (Aggarwal, 2003). 
Underwriters use some methods to reduce flipping. One of these is penalizing flippers by 
excluding them in future deals. Another one is imposing penalty bids, which is a portion of 
gross spread they flipped to customers.   
A factor to consider in understanding the variation of flipping activity is the offer price 
relative to filing range. Trading volume varies a lot in the three cases where IPO is priced 
below, above or within the filing range. Trading volume (as a percentage of shares offered) is, 
on average, only 44.13% for IPOs priced below the filing range, 82.71% for IPOs priced 
within the range, and 99.80% for IPOs priced above the trading range. Flipping accounts for a 
somewhat larger percentage of trading volume for IPOs priced below the range: 22.75% of 
trading volume for IPOs priced below the filing range is due to flipping, compared with 
19.12% for IPOs priced within the range, and 17.50% for IPOs priced above the range. 
Anyway, the result that flipping relative to total volume is highest for weak offerings is due to 
the low total volume in weak offerings. By other, more appropriate measures, flipping activity 
is actually lower in cold IPOs. 
From Aggarwal (2003) analysis it emerges that there is more institutional and retail flipping 
in hot IPOs. This is consistent with the idea that underpricing induces flipping: it increases 
revenues for the investors and for the underwriter. For underwriters in fact underpricing 
reduces gross spread income but increases profits from market-making function. In addition 
penalty bids have a stronger impact in case of weak IPOs, while in hot IPO, notwithstanding 
the penalty, flipping is still profitable. 
2.3.3. Selling mechanism and underpricing limitation 
Derrien & Womack (2003) worked on what kind of underwriting procedure might be 
preferred for controlling its amount. “Underpricing is considered almost an universal feature 
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of IPO market” (Derrien & Womack, 2003) and appears to be like an necessary cost for the 
issuers, because it is money not available to the firm issuing the stocks and to the earlier 
investors, however it has some positive sides too.  The question is when it is too much, and 
practitioners suggest that a array of 10-20% underpricing is optimal for first-day.  
Some literature suggests that some selling mechanisms are more efficient than others. For 
example bookbuilding procedure is considered efficient since “it encourages investors to 
reveal their beliefs about issue value” (Derrien & Womack, 2003), while fixed-price 
procedure can cause informational cascades: investors updates their expectations according to 
the choice made by previous investors, and this forces firms to underprice their shares in order 
to create this cascade. 
The main goal of owners when listing a firm is to obtain the maximum potential value from 
the offering, but the typical aim of underwriters is to underprice a little to control the price 
variation after the listing. Taking into consideration these two objectives, an efficient selling 
mechanism will be the one that minimize underpricing . In the US and in the rest of the world, 
the mechanism that dominates is the bookbuilding process, but Derrien & Womack (2003) 
analyzed specifically French market, where 3 different mechanisms of pricing are used: the 
bookbuilding, the auction-like mechanisms, and the fixed price mechanism.  
The fixed-price offering entails that price is set before the IPO day, usually one week before, 
and the day before the IPO potential investors place orders, specifying the number of share 
they want to buy at the fixed price. The shares are then allocated on a pro rata basis. 
In the auction underwriter sets a minimum acceptable price. The day before the IPO, investors 
make bids on price/quantity. In this way the stock market authority can compute the 
cumulative demand curve, and then the issuer and the authority decide for an offer price and a 
maximum price. Investors that have made bids inside this range will receive shares on a pro 
rata basis. If demand is too high, the IPO can be postpones and changed to a fixed-price 
offering. 
In the bookbuilding approach the issuing firm together with the underwriter decides a price 
range, later, in the marketing phase (the roadshow) the firm presents itself to institutional 
investors, who transmit nonbinding indications of interest to the underwriter.  Then the 
issuing firm and the underwriter establish the price, regarding also the indications received, 
and then the underwriter chooses to which investors allot the shares. 
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They evidenced that auction offerings include more information about the current market 
conditions, and so underpricing is lower. Therefore, auctions mechanism is the optimal one 
from the issuing firm perspective, but in reality this pricing method is almost unused. This is a 
strange result, because therefore every market should prefer this method, while basically 
everywhere now is used the bookbuilding mechanism.  
The possible explanation of this preference for this process is that mitigating underpricing is 
not the only purpose of issuers: bookbuilding allows issuers to reveal their quality credibly to 
investors, it allows them to obtain an higher pricing for their share compare to fixed price 
mechanism but still underpricing remains. In particular, it seems that controlling underpricing 
is not the most important issue to underwriters, consequently issuing firms suffer an agency 
conflict. It appears that underwriters prefer to favor investors interests to issuing clients 
interest, and this is because investors are repeated customers, that can buy many times 
investments presented by the underwriter. In this way some funds are left on table for the 
issuing firms, that has to choose the second-best underpricing outcome (Derrien & Womack, 
2003). 
2.3.4. Role of information circulation in IPO underpricing  
Initial public offerings usually have a high level of information asymmetry between potential 
investors and issuers which makes difficult for IPO issuers to easily communicate their 
capabilities and future perspective to market investors. As a result, it becomes difficult for 
investors to price properly the new issue, making IPOs a risky investment. To attract 
investors, IPO firms tend to offer a discount on issue price, but this represent a very high cost 
for the firm, because it gains less money to finance internal operations. Therefore, firms can 
use other signaling channels, to distinguish themselves in the market. Indirect IPO quality 
signaling channels include the retaining of substantial ownership by insiders, hiring quality 
auditors or appointing reputable underwriters. A direct channel to signal IPO quality is the use 
of news stories about the IPO firm (Carey et al., 2016). 
Information flows is a key factor in pricing patterns: stock prices are based on forecasts of 
future performance, and optimal forecasts require weighing both hard and soft information 
about the company, the industry and the overall economy. Given all these factors it is difficult 
to find market’s consensus at one time, but media attention can create consensus: many 
journalists and professionals reflect and shape their idea to reach this consensus. That is why 
having media attention is particularly important during the bookbuilding period. In this 
precise moment, issuers try to convince investors to approve the stock valuation. Since it is 
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not possible to purchase market approval, it is possible and valuable to purchase market 
attention, through media attention (Liu et al., 2013). 
Let us try to understand media behavior. Media sources compete to attract readers (and hence 
advertising revenues). Thus, their goal is not to be "fair" about covering all companies 
equally. They try to identify stories that will be of interest to their readers, which often 
includes companies that are doing better or worse than expected. Editors expect their reporters 
to cover stocks that end up attracting  investors’ attention, so to anticipate future demand. 
What journalists usually do is trying to find opinions of traders, analysts, rating services, and 
other journalists, and if their opinion is in disagreement. They usually try to understand why. 
Therefore, it happens that there is a general leakage of opinion in all directions. When an 
investment bank sets the offer price for a book building IPO, it cannot observe analyst 
attention, but it can observe two other indications: direct feedback from investors during the 
book building process, and the attention that the company has so far managed to attract the 
media. A measure of media attention can be the number of articles mentioning the company 
from the day after the filing date to the day before the offering date. This measure, like 
feedback from investors during book building, is observable by the time the offer price is set 
but not when the initial filing range is chosen. Both investor demand during the road show 
and the number of articles mentioning the company are the aggregations of the opinions of 
many individuals, resulting from many discussions among market participants, so at the end 
there is convergence between them (Liu et al., 2013). 
A legitimate question is whether the underwriter could not, much more cheaply, skip the road 
shows and the rewards for regular investors, and simply monitor media attention for a few 
weeks before setting the price. First, this would be risky, since there is no way to guarantee 
that the media will discover every company that deserves attention. Secondly, bookbuilding 
allows coordinating the entry of investors. Coordination is also important because investors 
prefer to evaluate stocks similarly to other investors, because even if one has identified an 
undervalued stock to take advantage of it, he would have to wait until the rest of the market 
recognize the misevaluation. The underwriter can overcome this coordination problem by 
giving many investors an incentive to become familiar with the stock during the IPO. 
Moreover, the goal of media attention is to attract investors, and many institutional investors 
prefer to analyze the firm by themselves instead of relying on journalists and analysts’ 
opinion. 
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Using all these argumentations Liu et al. (2013) affirmed that media coverage tends to 
coincide to market demand in IPO, and so represent a good proxy for it. Even if it cannot 
substitute the road show to enter in direct contact with institutional investors. Liu et al. (2013) 
also argued that if media coverage is a good proxy for demand, then there should be a 
relationship with price revisions and also with underpricing. 
For what concerns the relationship with price revision, the underwriter should use media 
attention to revise the offer price: it will revise upwards when investors’ demand is high and 
downwards when demand is low. Analyzing their sample Liu et al. (2013) found that when 
the offer price is revised upwards, one extra piece of media attention is related to a 1.9% 
greater offer price increase and to a 2.0% greater initial return. When the offer price is revised 
downwards, one extra piece of media attention is related to a 2.1% greater offer price decrease 
For what concerns relation between media coverage and underpricing Liu et al. (2013) 
defined demand as “high” when offer price is revised upwards and “low” when offer price is 
revised downward. This is because private information of investors will be reflected in price 
revisions. Anyway there can be underpricing also in low demand offerings, when high 
underpricing is needed to induce sufficient information collection, but in these cases 
underpricing should be lower than in cases of high demand. 
Carey et al. (2016) also notice that media information can help uninformed investors to 
overcome adverse selection problems. Uninformed investors may lack specific knowledge of 
the IPO firm’s future cash flow and avoid the risk of investing because of high information 
asymmetry, but news reports , by providing streamlined information through public channels,  
may attract individual investors’ attention and bring them into trading.  
“The media facilitates the formation of opinions about firms and potentially provides more 
comprehensible, desirable and therefore more legitimate channels for information 
communicated during the IPO listing process”(Carey et al. ,2016). They analyzed if 
optimistic news stories can lead to lower first day underpricing and they actually found a 
negative correlation between optimistic news stories and first-day pricing, as evidence that 
they reduce investor’s level of uncertainty. 
Because underpricing does not measure whether an issue is under-valued or over-valued 
relative to its industry benchmark, Carey et al. (2016) tested whether the first-day price of 
IPOs subject to optimistic news are over-priced or under-priced relative to the industry 
benchmark valuation. They found that the first-day price of IPOs subject to optimistic news is 
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not over-priced relative to their industry benchmarks. Therefore optimistic news stories are 
informative and reduce information asymmetry. 
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3. PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS IN IPOS 
Private Equity funds are organized as limited partnerships, with the general partners (GPs),  
managing the fund, and large institutional investors and wealthy individuals providing the 
bulk of the capital as limited partners (LPs).  These limited partnerships typically last for ten 
years, and partnership agreements signed at the funds’ inceptions clearly define the expected 
payments to GPs. These payments consist of both fixed and variable components. Successful 
private equity firms stay in business by raising a new fund every three to five years. If the 
current fund performs well, and LPs interpret that performance as “skill” rather than “luck”, 
they are prone to provide again funds for a new PE contract. (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). 
PE firms are involved in two main areas of activity – the provision of early stage venture 
capital and the provision of equity capital for buyouts. Buyouts are the principal focus of PE 
investments. PE investors, and often a management team, pool their own money (together 
with debt finance) to buy shares in a company from its current owners. Such transactions are 
called Leverage Buyouts (LBOs). The debt is usually provided by institutions, such as 
commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge funds. (Wright et al., 2009). VCs instead 
have as major characteristic the fact that they invest in young ventures, and do not have an 
high level of debt. In this chapter VC and buyouts will be examined together for what 
concerns the general partners behavior and potential agency problems, while speaking about 
leverage and performance the required distinctions will be done. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: firstly the main exit strategies for a 
private equity are presented; secondly is discussed the private equity point of view and its 
convenience, under certain conditions, on a secondary leverage buyout; thirdly the point of 
view of the entrepreneur of the portfolio firm and his preferences is presented; further the 
ways and speed of divestment after the IPO are discussed; finally various studies on PE 
backed IPOs performance are presented. 
3.1. Different exit strategies for Private Equity funds. 
Exit strategy is one of the most important decision for a private equity fund.  There are five 
main exit strategies: Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), trade sale to another company, secondary 
sales (often called “pass the parcel” deals), buybacks and write-offs. (Soloma, 2015).  
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Exhibit 5: Exit way in Europe in 2014 % number of companies 
 Venture 
capital 
Buyout Growth 
Trade sale 21,70% 24,80% 11,10% 
Initial public offering 0,80% 4,30% 1,10% 
Sale of quoted equity 8% 5,10% 1,90% 
Write-off 26,30% 5,80% 15,30% 
Repayment of silent 
partnerships 
17,50% 2% 46,50% 
Repayment of principal loans 7,80% 15,40% 7,70% 
Sale to another private equity 
firm 
6,30% 26% 6,10% 
Sale to financial institution 1,10% 3,80% 1,60% 
Sale to management 8,70% 8,90% 6,60% 
Other measn 1,90% 3,80% 1,90% 
 1003 
Companies 
776 
Companies 
611 
Companies 
 
Source: EVCA / PEREP_Analytics 
According to EVCA,  the most common route is the sale of the company to a strategic 
(nonfinancial) buyer, together with the sale to another private equity in buyout companies. 
While in growth companies it is the repayment of silent partnership; in the case of a venture 
capital is the write off together with trade sale. There is not an agreement in the literature 
about which is the most profitable exit strategy for private equity funds: Jenkinson & Sousa 
(2015) assert that majority of private equity exits happen with trade sale or secondary sales, 
while Soloma (2015)  suggests that  the most common exit route in Poland and all CEE region 
is the IPO.   
Of course, this disagreement depends on the different samples used in the various studies: 
many factors influence which is the most profitable exit choice during the time and in 
different geographical area.  
According to Jenkinson & Sousa (2015), there are three main sets of factors influencing 
timing and method of exit: market conditions, PE features, company structure. 
The first factor is the market condition that can be described also as macroeconomic factor. 
Market conditions exert a strong influence on what type of exit strategy creates the higher 
value:  favorable conditions in debt market for example increase the possibility of secondary 
sales to other PE (Shivdasani & Wand, 2011). According to Shivdasani & Wand (2011), from 
2004 to 2007, when cost of debt was low, ten times more LBOs (leveraged buyouts ) than the 
previous ten years were completed. This boom collapsed very quickly, with LBO volume 
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dropping by 94% in the fourth quarter of 2007 from the prior-year level. They suggest that 
structured credit markets played an important role in easing the availability and pricing of 
bank credit, thereby affecting the LBO market.  
On the other side, positive IPO window periods represent an opportunity to have positive 
returns from the divestment (Minardi, et al. 2013). Lowry & Schwert (2002) suggest that 
periods of high initial returns are followed by a period of many IPOs. They suggest that this 
positive relation is driven by the by the information that is learned during the registration 
period but only partially incorporated into the offer price. In the process of marketing the IPO 
(after the IPO has been filed), the firm and its underwriters gain information about how 
investors value their firm. This information is a determinant of both the pricing of that IPO, as 
well as the number of private companies that find it optimal to issue public equity in the near 
future. Having more positive information in the form of higher expected valuations results in 
higher initial returns and more companies filing to go public soon thereafter. 
This positive relation appears puzzling at a first glance because it seems that firms wait to go 
public when there will be more underpricing, but Lowry & Schwert (2002) solved this issue. 
If more companies go public following periods of high initial returns, this does not mean that 
they also will be especially underpriced. The level of initial returns at the time a company 
files its IPO contains no information about that firm's eventual underpricing. Rather more 
companies file IPOs following periods of high initial returns because the high returns are 
related to positive information learned during the registration periods of those offerings, 
suggesting that companies can raise more money in an IPO than they had previously thought. 
The second factor is the private equity characteristics. In particular, the moment during PE 
lifetime  can change a lot the exit method. Private equity funds have a contractually finite life, 
which can be extended only with the consent of the limited partner. When a private equity 
fund is near the end of contractual life, it has more pressure to realize the investments. In this 
situation, it could happen that the portfolio firm is not ready yet for  a public offering, but a 
secondary sale could be an attractive way to divest quickly and without leaving too much 
money on the table, because the portfolio firm is not ready yet to go public (Jenkinson & 
Sousa, 2015).  
Moreover, according to Bock & Schmidt (2015) there is evidence that also reputation exert a 
great influence on exit strategy. Venture Capitals have to build a reputation towards limited 
partners to incentivize future fundraising. This is particularly a problem for young funds, 
which did not have the possibility to build their own reputation. Reputation is a difficult 
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characteristic to measure, but it can be expressed by the firm’s age: time since incorporation 
includes investment experience and states that the fund has an intrinsic ability of survival in 
such a competitive and performance-oriented industry (Bock & Schmidt, 2015). When it has 
to build reputation to incentivize future fundraising, PEs tend to realize an IPO. Lee & Wahal 
(2004) described examples of VC firms that, once they took a portfolio company public, were 
quickly able to raise additional capital, because taking a company public signals their quality.  
More precisely, going public is a way to grandstand, so to attract visibility in the market: in 
this way the PE firm can quickly signal its ability in operating a profitable exit and so in 
managing profitably limited partners funds. 
In addition, general partners’ specialization (for example in early stage investment, in 
expansion or in late-stage investment) lead to different exit moment and exit strategy 
accordingly to the portfolio firm stage in its lifecycle (Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015).   
Last factor to consider are the company characteristics: in fact, some firms can be more 
suitable for particular kind of exits than others can.  For example, some companies can 
operate well with an high debt level: usually in this case they have stable cash flow and do not 
need to operate high-level investments. This kind of firm is more suitable to remain in the 
hand of a private equity, since PE operates with an high leverage: in fact for this kind of firm 
the high leverage is unlikely to negatively influence its stability.  From another point of view, 
companies  that are more profitable are more likely to be exited through an IPO and less 
profitable through a trade sale.  (Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015).  
Moreover, firms in their later stage of their lifetime or firms with business models more viable 
against market competition are more likely to go public. This is because these kinds of firms 
will be able to compete in the marketplace without the help of a controlling firm. Instead, 
firms in the earlier stage of their life, less viable against market competition, will more likely 
choose to be acquired. Through the acquisition, this kind of firm can gain valuable help both 
in term of financial resources and in term of strategic support. Moreover, in an industry where 
there is a dominant player the firm will benefit more in being acquired by such a firm: in this 
way it will avoid to compete against the dominant player. Also the nature of the industry will 
influence the exit choice, for example IPOs will fit more capital intensive industries: here 
external analysts have less information asymmetries and they are more likely to do an 
estimate of more in line with the valuation of internal people. (Bayar & Chemmanur,  2011). 
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3.2. Sale to a public firm vs IPO 
Takeovers of private firms by publicly traded firms (sellouts) and initial public offerings 
(IPOs) are both ways to allow PE to divest the investment into a private firm and to raise new 
capital. However there are some important differences to highlight: in an IPO, the firm 
continues to exist as a separate entity, although it is now owned by public shareholders, in a 
sellout the control of assets is moved to another publicly traded firm. 
Previous studies (Bayar & Chemmanur , 2006)  found out that there are five key drivers in the 
choice between trade sale and IPO. Firstly, the probability of success for a firm’s product in 
the market: the higher the probability of success for the product alone, the lower is the 
probability of a trade sale. Secondly,  the amount of information asymmetry with the acquirer 
influence the decision: if it is high, it is likely to have an IPO. Thirdly they also suggest that 
synergies with the acquirer in the product market. Fourth factor is the relative bargaining 
power of the private firm and the potential acquirer. Last factor considered by Bayar & 
Chemmanur (2006)  is the presence of the entrepreneur inside the firm: an IPO increases the 
benefit of control, while an acquisition will drastically reduce it. 
Poulsen & Stegemoller (2008) identified 1,074 IPOs and 735 sellout made between 1995 and 
2004 to analyze the factors influencing the decision. They firstly analyzed  the costs of the 
two types of transactions and the regulations that affect them. The costs of an IPO include 
initial registration with the SEC and continuing mandated disclosures, investment banking 
fees, and underpricing in the initial equity sale. A sellout has a similar costs but they are 
probably lower, since the sellout firm is incorporated into the existing regulatory obligations 
of the acquirer.  
Both sellout and IPO firms benefit from access to public debt and equity markets (in the case 
of the sellout, through the parent). Both types of transactions also benefit from liquidity of 
ownership for managers and investors, and the possibility of linking management and 
employee compensation to traded securities (Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2008). 
However, the management of the selling firm is more likely to lose its ability to set firm 
policy after a sellout than an IPO. This factor influences not only the firm policy but also the 
ability to have access to capital: it may be difficult to raise capital for the sellout firm’s 
projects, since, as Stein (1997) notes, the sellout firm would be competing with other projects 
of the acquiring firm in internal capital markets. As Stein (1997) highlighted, big corporations 
are not more successful in raising capital for their business units than if they were stand-alone 
businesses. Consequently, funds may be allocated in a suboptimal way.  Instead, by 
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undertaking an IPO, the firm may have greater flexibility in accessing resources, especially 
through its new access to the equity markets. Moreover, investors in IPOs may be especially 
willing to invest in high-growth firms, making it easier to raise capital through a public sale of 
shares. Thus  firms with greater growth potential will go public through an IPO rather than 
through a sellout (Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2008). 
3.3. IPO versus secondary LBO: the private equity perspective. 
According to Kaplan & Stromberg (2008), the sale to another PE is an exit strategy that is 
becoming increasingly popular in the private equity market, and it is more used than IPO.  
The scope of this part of the chapter is to highlight what are the advantages for PE firms and 
the value created by this exit strategy compared to the IPO. 
LBOs are typically thought to create value through high leverage, high performance pay, and 
active monitoring of the portfolio companies' management. It is arguable that if the initial 
buyout was successful, a second LBO should be able to do minimal additional changes to the 
target firm. That is why many times literature has said that secondary LBOs do not occur for 
the benefit of improving the target firms, but rather as a way for private equity firms to help 
each other solve their investing and exiting problems. Other times literature has said that the 
phenomenon of secondary buyouts cannot be explained given the usual arguments about the 
reasons for buyouts (Wang, 2012).   
Wang’s (2012) searched for some evidence that firms are more likely to exit through 
secondary buyouts in some situations: firstly when the equity market condition, measured by 
industry IPO volume,  is “cold”; secondly when the debt market condition is favorable, 
suggesting buyers' greater abilities to borrow; thirdly when private equity firms' liquidity 
demand changes, so when they face a higher pressure to exit and make their investments 
liquid.  
To prove this, Wang (2012) tested the probability of firms exit through secondary buyouts, 
through IPOs, and to sales to a strategic buyer when market conditions vary and when sellers’ 
liquidity change. Industry IPO volume in the UK in the exit year was used as a proxy for 
equity market conditions. The higher the industry IPO volume, the better the equity market. 
This variable should be negatively associated with probability of exit through secondary 
buyout. In order to measure the condition of the debt market, the size of the high-yield market 
in the year of exit was used,  this variable should be positively correlated with the probability 
of exiting through a secondary buyout. The results from the sample showed evidence in 
support of secondary buyouts varying with capital market conditions. A “hotter” equity 
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market is significantly negatively correlated with firms exit through secondary buyouts. The 
debt market condition, on the other hand, is significantly positively associated with the 
probability of firms exiting through secondary buyouts. This is consistent with the notion that 
greater borrowing ability is correlated with a higher number of secondary buyouts. 
These two factors combined together led to the following percentage results: 
Exhibit 6: Exiting through secondary buyouts in different market conditions 
 
Source: Wang (2012) 
Wang (2012) also noticed that private equity firm should hold the portfolio company until the 
maximum payoff can be achieved, whether it be sales to the public market, strategic buyers, 
or other private equity firms. However, there are factors that constrain their maximization. 
One such factor is their liquidity needs. When there is a higher demand for liquidity, firms 
would face a higher exit pressure, and this could affect their likelihood of exiting through a 
secondary buyout. Since PE liquidity demand changes when they need to raise a new fund, to 
test for this case he used as variable the seller's fundraising activities within the two years 
from exiting the portfolio company, since two years is the typical fundraising period. He 
found that raising a new fund significantly increases the probability of exiting through 
secondary buyouts. With a 22.7% increase, the result is both statistically and economically 
significant. He also found evidence showing that fundraising during a “cold” equity market 
influences the probability of exiting through secondary buyouts. Another situation that can 
change private equity firms' liquidity demand, and therefore influence their exit decisions, is 
when the portfolio company has been held for a long time. Wang (2012) find also a positive 
correlation between holding period and probability of exit through a secondary buyout. 
Wang (2012) also decided to put a clear evidence ahead or against the general idea that PE 
firms use secondary buyouts to benefit each other, so through collusive behaviors. The idea is 
that if some PE firms use collusive behavior there should be a significant increase in the 
trading activity between them. He found that active acquirers in the secondary-buyout market 
are not likely to trade more frequently with each other than with other players in this market. 
As private equity firms have other ways of paying each other off besides trading assets, it is 
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possible that collusion occurs in a way that is not captured by trading patterns alone. 
However, the concern investigated was that firms are trading poorly performing portfolio 
companies, pushing those companies closer to financial distress, or trading assets at above-
the-market prices, from his results both cases are unlikely. 
Moreover, it results that secondary buyouts have higher deal prices compared to first-time 
buyouts. This price premium surely depends on firm characteristics, such as strategy, 
governance, market positioning, capital structure, but most of all Wang (2012) found evidence 
that higher deal prices are driven by better debt market conditions.   
Overall, it resulted that secondary buyouts are particularly good deals when PE has liquidity 
pressure and needs to divest quickly, which is something that cannot be realized through an 
IPO at all.  These deals are more favorable when debt conditions are positive, since buyouts 
are characterized by higher level of debt, consequently SBOs result also in higher prices. 
Moreover, when equity market is “cold” SBO represents a valuable alternative. 
Degeorge et al. (2014) examined whether SBOs are just “pass-the-parcel” deals and whether 
the motivations for the buying fund are to spend capital and collect fees. They also tried to 
investigate  what additional value, if any, an SBO buyer can bring to the portfolio company 
compared to that of the first private equity owner.  
PE funds have superior governance structures and incentive mechanisms, so a secondary LBO 
should be aimed to benefit their investors. If, for example, PE funds specialize in different 
stages of restructuring, then funds specializing in the first stage would sell to those with 
expertise in the second stage and each fund would create value for its own investors along the 
way. Alternatively, some general partners (GP) may have unique skills that others do not 
possess and when their funds acquire firms from other funds, they generate additional returns. 
For example, funds that are more reputable may have better access to deal financing. From 
this point of view SBO should be a more valuable way than IPO, for the unique skills and 
knowledge that GP may have. 
To demonstrate that buyer with complementary skills to those of the seller might be able to 
further enhance the value of the portfolio company, Degeorge et al. (2014)  collected 
information of 1978 general partners of 138 PE firms, and financial performance information 
on 2137 companies owned by 121 PE firms. They classified PE firms as Finance-oriented or 
Operations-oriented; MBA dominated or not MBA dominated; regional or global; and 
“margin-grower” or “sales grower.” Analyzing the sample it turned out that SBO transactions 
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between firms with complementary skill sets generate significantly higher returns for buyers 
than SBOs between firms with similar skills. BOs perform better, and create value for 
investors, when they occur between a PE firm focusing on margin growth and a PE firm 
focusing on sales growth, or between two PE firms in which the general partners have 
different educational backgrounds or career paths. SBOs also create value when a global fund 
buys from a regional fund. To summarize Degeorge et al. (2014) proved that SBOs can 
effectively create an additional value to the portfolio firm, which is generated by the specific 
complementary characteristics that the seller PE and the buyer PE have: this is something that 
cannot be achieved through other exit strategies.  
According to Arcot et al. (2015), on the sell side, SBOs offer a quick exit for GPs who cannot 
sell via trade sale or Initial Public Offering. Arcot et al. (2015) go on explaining that when 
funds are close to their end and when they have substantial investments still non-exited they 
are more willing to do a quick sale, to improve their chances to raise new capital, and they can 
do so through an SBO.  Many times funds also postpone the exit moment to gain additional 
management fees, but in this way, frequently they find themselves under selling pressure, and 
the quick way to exit is through a SBO. 
For the fund buying, SBOs have many advantages: are quicker to complete, fill the fund's 
investment record, and accrue additional management fees even if the transaction is not in the 
best interest of the buyer's limited partners. Moreover Arcot et al. (2015) explain that PE 
funds with substantial unspent capital during the period close to the end of the PE contract, 
could face a negative feedback from limited partners: if the fund still has a substantial amount 
of unspent capital near the end of its investment period, the LPs are unlikely to commit capital 
to a new fund. This puts further pressure on PE funds to invest their dry powder in order to 
boost their investment record. 
Analyzing these cases previously explained, Arcot et al. (2015) arrive to the conclusion that 
secondary buyouts are widely used when the private equity is under pressure, and many times 
this behavior is backed by an agency conflict with limited partners and thus with different 
signaling needs. 
To conclude, in this part of the chapter it emerged that SBOs could effectively benefit the 
portfolio firms, since PEs have specific skills and characteristics that vary across the different 
PE firms and that other players in the market do not have. In this case, SBOs represent not 
only a valuable exit strategy but also a valuable change in ownership for the portfolio firm.  
Moreover, many authors pointed out that SBO has a bigger advantage that IPOs do not have: 
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it is the speed of exit, since SBOs are relatively quick to realize. This speed benefits PEs in 
some situations where they face pressure to sell, accordingly to their lifecycle.  
3.4. IPO versus trade sale: the entrepreneur perspective. 
The ratio of acquisitions to IPOs among private firm exits has increased dramatically in recent 
years. Moreover the proportion of firms withdrawing their offerings after filing to make IPOs 
and choosing to be acquired instead has also risen steadily. This indicates that the costs of 
going public rather being acquired have risen significantly. It becomes important so, to 
analyze what are the advantages and disadvantages of both exit possibilities. 
A crucial factor driving a private firm’s choice between IPOs and acquisitions is competition 
in the product market: a stand-alone firm has to compete alone after an IPO, while an acquirer 
may be able to provide considerable support to the firm in the product market, thus increasing 
its chances of succeeding against competitors. 
Moreover, while atomistic buyers in IPO can have informational disadvantage, potential firm 
acquirers will be able to value the firm better by virtue of their industry expertise regarding 
the viability of alternative business models in the product market. On the negative side, 
acquirers can be expected to have considerable bargaining power, allowing them to extract the 
firm’s net present value (NPV) from insiders. In contrast, atomistic investors in the IPO 
market would price the firm’s equity competitively (so that insiders can retain the entire NPV 
of the firm’s project) (Bayar & Chemmanur,  2011). 
Concerning acquisition, it is also important to point out which is the entrepreneur position 
after it:  it is likely that she will lose the control after the acquisition. Many times it happens 
that after the acquisition the founding entrepreneur of the target either leaves the firm shortly 
after or is fired. Even if the entrepreneur remains inside the combined firm, her benefits of 
control will be negligible. She will only be in charge of one division of the combined firm, 
and she will have to implement the policies  formulated by the top management of that firm 
even with respect to the division she manages. In contrast, if the entrepreneur will continue as 
the CEO of a stand-alone firm after an IPO, will thus be able to maintain a substantial extent 
of her benefits of control (Bayar & Chemmanur, 2011). 
Interestingly, there could be different points of view between the entrepreneur and the Private 
Equity: while the first prefers the IPO because it will allow him to maintain the control, the 
second could prefer the acquisition for financial considerations. Moreover, the entrepreneur is 
typically a long-term investor that is planning to continue most of his pre-exit equity stake in 
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the firm, even after an IPO (low liquidity demand). In constrast the VC may often be a short-
term investor planning to liquidate much of his pre-exit stake soon after the IPO, but 
liquidating such an equity stake after an IPO requires much time (Bayar & Chemmanur, 
2011). Bayar & Chemmanur (2011) also point out that if entrepreneurs think that their firm is 
not able to survive in the market in the long run and that IPO market valuations are not 
sustainable in the future they are more prone to make their firm be acquired, due to the fact 
that insiders are able to liquidate only a small part of their shares through an IPO, their long 
run expected payoff could be greater with an acquisition. 
3.5. Private Equity ways and speed of divestment after an IPO. 
Unlike for other types of investors, for Private Equity firms the process of exit is a process 
intrinsic in its nature, because for its nature PE is a temporary form of ownership. Many time 
the literature has pointed out that for Private Equity the IPO is a very slow exit way. Normally 
private equity firms have to remain invested after the IPO with a certain number of shares for 
a lockup period: the underwriter as a signal of quality for new investors imposes this 
condition (Hoskisson & Johnson, 2009).   
In this part of the chapter are analyzed PE behavior and  its motivations after the IPO. Firstly 
is studied why is necessary a slow exit after the public offering and it is discussed if the 
average length that is contractually agreed by insiders is optimal or  a longer lockup provides 
higher benefits. Secondly is explored the behavior of some PE firms which stay invested even 
after the expiration of the lockup. Finally, different ways to divest after the IPO are presented. 
Lockup period is particularly important because it helps to reduce the information asymmetry 
about firm’s quality, which is particularly strong in case of new ventures: by retaining some 
stocks the selling investor certificates that she is not trying to divest quickly before sock 
prices go down. Remaining invested in the firm for this period is a costly signal because it 
creates a liquidity charge for the original investor, but for the firms is particularly important to 
reduce the information asymmetry: in this way the firm can minimize the inherent 
underpricing resulting from this asymmetry (Arthurs et al., 2009). 
The typical lockup  period for IPOs 180 days, but when the selling investors are also 
managers in the firms this period is often longer, because they want to signal that key 
employees will remain with the firm for some time and that insiders are not seeking to divest 
quickly before bad news become public.  
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To reduce investors’ uncertainty, before the IPO, the firm presents a prospectus, which 
contains the details about firm’s past performance and future opportunities. In the prospectus, 
high quality firms do not have incentive to state unreal situations, but low quality firms 
instead have incentive to oversell their prospectus. Thus, high quality firms need to take some 
signaling actions that can unequivocally state their superior characteristics. To be credible, the 
signal must be difficult or costly for others to imitate.  A strong signal is the percentage of 
ownership that the insiders retain after the IPO: by retaining a high undiversified risk they 
provide a signal the firm has projects of high value.  Remaining tied for a certain period is 
surely a strong bonding mechanism: it states that information presented is correct, otherwise, 
insiders will suffer a loss.  
Because the lockup period is very costly in terms of liquidity, maybe other signals can be 
preferred by insiders. Arthurs et al. (2009) analyzed this point and found out that the presence 
of a PE firm reduces the need for a longer lockup. Firstly because PE firstly provides a signal 
of the veracity of the information in the prospectus, secondly PE is an expert in minimizing 
moral hazard and thirdly it is an expert in the strategic management of the firm, so it assures 
against incompetence of managers. Going more deeply, they found that in the case of a very 
prestigious PE investor this need is even lower. Therefore, it appears that the presence of a PE 
is a stronger signal than a longer lockup period, because while lockup is an insurance against 
moral hazard of previous owners, presence of PE also assures against incompetence of 
insiders.  
So usually, lockup period after the IPO is six months. Notwithstanding this agreement, in 
some cases it has happened that the PE funds have retained IPO shares far beyond the lockup 
period and this is considered controversial, since limited partners that do not agree in venture 
capitals stay invested in public companies: from their point of view General Partners don’t 
gain the fees to remain invested into public companies, which is something that Limited 
Partners can do by their own. (Bock & Schmidt, 2015). Let us try to investigate the reasons of 
this behavior. 
One reason to avoid a quick sale is that a massive trade of shares from an internal actor can 
give a negative signal to the market and, consequently, market price will fall. If this happens, 
the fund will experience a loss in reputation (Neus & Walz, 2005).  
Reputation can be described as the level of trust of the market in the accuracy of a statement 
that the PE does about a portfolio firm. So it implicitly have a positive influence on the 
pricing of the firm, since it allows to overcome the costs associated with informational 
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asymmetries in the IPO market (Neus & Walz, 2005). Therefore, reputation is particularly 
important, and it is a big issue for young VCs, which still have to create their own reputation 
to signal their ability to investors. Demonstrating to have managed exit investments 
successfully, mainly through an IPO,  is the main way to build trust between limited partners 
(Lee & Wahal, 2004).  
One way that many young VC firms use to build reputation is underpricing: they underprice 
high-quality firms, so in the equity market price will raise consistently and VC will appear to 
be particularly good in investing and managing firms. So with the use of underpricing, young 
VCs are able to overcome the information asymmetry with market investors that are latter 
overcome with the reputation(Neus & Walz, 2005). This is in line with empirical research that 
Neus & Walz (2005) presented: IPOs with a mature VC does not present significant signs of 
underpricing, but a strong underpricing is present when the VC is young (Neus & Walz, 
2005). This is a different way of looking at underpricing, which is usually considered by 
literature as a signal of quality. Lee & Wahal (2004) evidence this behavior emphasizing that 
low reputation PE use underpricing for grandstanding: they look for attention from  market 
participants to gain a positive reputation and they reach it through an high level of 
underpricing. 
As a result, VC firms with higher reputation have less incentives to underprice heavily, since 
they do not need to gain more in reputation. Moreover, if underpricing is low VC firms do not 
need to wait until market price rises to a valuable level. They can divest early after the IPO as 
soon as the lockup period has occurred, while VC with lower reputation could have the 
incentive to wait after the lockup period has expired to divest (Bock & Schmidt, 2015). 
The lifetime cycle of the VC fund has an additional impact on the speed of divestment: when 
a fund get closer to the period of the termination it has more pressure in liquidating the 
portfolio company quickly. Usually after the fourth or the fifth year general partners move 
their attention on raising new funds. Then, when the end of the contract approaches they are 
forced to split their attention between raising new funds and divesting firms currently in the 
portfolio (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). This creates an agency problem: from fund’s managers 
point of view, it is optimal to put a high effort in divesting from current portfolio firms 
quickly, in order to put less effort in monitoring and continuing the board presence after the 
firm went public. So they prefer to sell retained stocks soon after the lockup period expired, 
even if market price is low at that moment. Liquidation pressure thus lead to suboptimal 
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decision making since managers stop monitoring some good investment opportunities even if 
higher gains could be realized by remaining invested (Bock & Schmidt, 2015). 
A last factor influencing speed of divestment after an IPO might be explained with prospect 
theory. Usually in PE firms, general partners receive a fee of about 2% and if they reach a 
breakeven point, they receive also 20% of the fund’s return (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). If this 
is the case, according to prospect theory, managers keep in their portfolio a firm until 
breakeven point is reached: not taking care about the fact that limited partners could be better 
remunerated with a quicker divestment. Consequently, it could happen that managers keep on 
holding stocks for an inefficient period, waiting that the stocks’ price rises up (Bock & 
Schmidt, 2015). 
Paeglis & Veeren (2013) went further in this field of analysis, and found out that the speed of 
divestment is widely influenced by an effect called liquidity effect: the sale of shares by VC 
increase liquidity of a firm’s shares. The increased liquidity is a positive attribute for the 
equity market, consequently also the stock price will augment . Therefore, if VC stages its 
exit it will experience higher returns. In their study Paeglis & Veeren (2013) also analyzed the 
effect of the post-exit ownership structure on the speed of divestment. They explained that VC 
exit would be most detrimental for firms with intermediate levels of founder ownership: 
founder’s stake will not be high enough to ensure control over the firm and too high to ensure 
his incentives are aligned with those of minority shareholders. With VC exit, also VC 
monitoring activity will lack and therefore firm value will suffer of this new situation. In this 
situation the best option is sell quickly its shares before the market becomes aware of the 
firm’s reduction in value. 
Instead, for firms with higher levels of founder ownership the VC exit will not significantly 
change the firm's ownership structure (i.e., the founder will remain the controlling shareholder 
of the firm as before in the presence of venture capitalists). But in this case the owner’s 
presence will be an impediment for liquidity. Investors are aware of this so they will value 
shares at a discount. To avoid to sell all the shares at a discount the VC will improve its 
payoff by selling in various stages its shares, benefiting from the improved liquidity. Finally, 
in case  of lower levels of founders ownership the market for corporate control will substitute 
the monitoring of the founder from the departing VCs: again by staging its exit VC can gain 
more from the improved liquidity. 
As Dong (2015) noticed, there are five  major ways that usually PE firms typically employ to 
divest their block of shares after the IPO of the portfolio firms. 
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The first way is to sell the block of shares to another buyer. In such transactions, it is in the 
interests of the seller of the block (that is, PE) to provide sufficient information to eliminate 
the information asymmetry. However, these transactions can be expected to be rare since 
acquirers of majority stakes will typically extinguish the minority interest to eliminate free 
rider problems. In the second way,  strategic buyer that buys also the minority interest in the 
equity of the portfolio company acquires the shares. Thirdly, the private equity can gradually 
sell the shares through trading activity, but since it is legally an insider, it faces SEC 
restrictions. Another way is to spin-off the holdings to limited partners via a pro rata dividend, 
so each limited partner can decide if keeping the shares or selling them in the equity market. 
This in-kind distribution allows each limited partner to control the timing of the liquidation of 
its stake, but, in this case, the private information held by the general partner is in effect 
dissipated since it cannot be transferred to the limited partners. Moreover, the portfolio 
company can engage in a dividend recapitalization, which provides for a substantial cash 
dividend payment to all shareholders, including the private equity owners, without any actual 
reduction of equity interest in the portfolio asset. This process is not properly an exit, but it 
provides substantial cash flow to limited partners.  Finally, private equity can start a 
secondary offering, or better, an equity issuance, so, the entity is transformed into a publicly 
traded firm with the limited partners as initial shareholders, and shares are sold to capital 
market investors (Dong, 2015). 
3.6. PE backed IPOs performance 
In this part of the chapter various studies analyzing in different circumstances the 
performance of PE backed IPOs are reported. 
Many times the literature has discussed whether PE (buyouts and venture capitals) 
organizations created additional value for the companies in their portfolio. Harris et al. (2014) 
analyzed PE performance and found that on average U.S. buyout fund returns have exceeded 
those of public markets for most vintages since 1984. The public market equivalent (PME) 
method, which compares how much a PE fund investors actually earned net of fees to what 
the investor would have earned in an equivalent investment in the public market, showed that 
outperformance versus the S&P 500 was between 20% to 27% over the life of the fund and 
more than 3% per year. Buyout fund outperformance remained similar in magnitude using 
other benchmarks, such as the Nasdaq.  
There are many explanations for this outperformance. Some PE/VC organizations hire 
consultants to improve operations, develop managerial tools, and redesign organizational 
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structures. PE portfolio firms should have higher quality governance practices and healthier 
organizational structures: they seat on the board, they bring industry specific competencies 
since they usually focus on particular industries, and have strong relationships with high 
quality executives who manage their portfolio companies. For these reasons, and for the 
prominent role that IPO has on PE activity, IPO performance should be higher than the one of 
non-PE backed firms (Minardi et al., 2013). 
Minardi et al. (2013) give evidence of this analyzing the Brazilian market between 2004-
2007. They used a sample of 108 IPOs and studied the one-year cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR). In particular, the registration date represents the day zero to estimate the CAR. The 
PE backed IPOs resulted to have on average a lower book to market ratio and a lower debt to 
equity ratio. The CAR evolution is illustrated in the following figures. Panel A shows the 
evolution during the period 2004-2008, panel B during the period 2004-2006, and panel C 
during period 2007-2008.  
Exhibit 7: Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Brazilian IPOs 
 
Source: Minardi et al. (2013) 
PE backed IPOs perform better than non-PE backed IPOs after 1 year of issuance. At the 
same time PE-backed IPOs are not immune to crises, and on average performed much worse 
in 2008. This is explained by authors saying that PE in Brazil are mostly foreign investors that 
during the crises were forced to sell liquid assets to cover other losses, causing this drop. They 
also analyzed first day performance and they found that there is on average underpricing in 
Brazil, but they found no evidence that PE backed IPOs have less underpricing than non PE 
backed. 
Also Levis (2011) studied this topic. He argued that PE brings in the portfolio firm 
operational efficiencies, achieved by closer monitoring, management expertise, and higher 
levels of debt. He assumed that only PE gains from these practices, but it is reasonable that 
management and financial practices started during PE presence inside the firm will be 
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maintained at least for some time after the exit. This is particularly the case since the 
involvement of PE sponsors is not completely terminated at the time of the IPO. Lock-up 
agreements, performance incentives, and liquidity considerations often result in PE original 
sponsors retaining significant holdings for a considerable period after the IPO.   
Levis (2011) brought evidence of this examining a sample of  1595  IPOs  in the two London 
Stock Exchange markets (the Official List and the Alternative Investment Market) from 
January 1992 to September 2005. He distinguished between PE backed IPOs (including 
company returning public following a LBO) and VC backed IPOs (using companies that 
received start-up, development or expansion VC backing) using various sources and various 
criteria including financing and governance issues. Of the 1595 UK IPOs 250 were VC-
backed, 204 were PE backed and 1141 were ordinary IPOs. PE-backed IPOs accounted for 
12,8% of the volume and 21,7% of the amount raised, while VC-backed IPOs accounted for 
15,7% of volume and only 9,9% of amount raised. Therefore, PE-backed IPOs are on average 
larger companies in term of market capitalization compared to VC-backed counterparts and 
other IPOs. Interestingly, a closer examination revealed that only 28 IPOs in the sample have 
a market capitalization larger than £1 billion: 24 of them were not backed, 3 were VC-backed 
and only one was PE-backed. PE-backed IPOs were larger also in term of operational 
characteristics, for example, they were about four to seven times larger than non-backed or 
VC-backed IPOs in net sales and total assets. This difference anyway was not surprising since 
PE and VC investors apply different criteria in their selection of portfolio companies. He 
analyzed the first-day percentage returns of the three groups from 1992 to September 2005. 
He also highlighted the returns during 1999-2000 dot-com bubble. 
Exhibit 8: First-Day Percentage Returns for the Three Groups of IPOs 
 
Source: Levis (2011) 
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From the table it is possible to notice that first-day percentage returns are consistently lower 
for PE than for VC-backed and non backed, moreover the dot-com bubble amplified this 
effect. It is important to notice that not only PE-backed firms experienced a lower 
underpricing than non backed firms, but also VC-backed firms performed better. The lower 
underpricing of PE-backed IPOs, both in equal- and value-weighted terms, is probably the 
combined result of lower risk, more aggressive pricing, and PE group certification. A similar 
figure emerges from money left on the table: for PE-backed IPOs it is much lower than for 
other groups. 
Levis’ study (2011) also reported the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the sample calculated 
until the earlier of the three-year anniversary of the listing date, excluding the first-day 
returns. The 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are negative and statistically 
significant, confirming the established pattern of average long-term underperformance. The 
results, however, also reveal remarkable differences in the long-term performance across the 
three groups : non-backed IPOs have a consistently poor performance, while VC-backed 
performance is not statistically significant from zero. PE-backed IPOs outperform all three 
benchmarks in the aftermarket.  
Meles et al. (2014) confirmed Levis findings analyzing a sample of 236 Italian firms (118 PE-
backed and 118 non PE-backed) showing that PE-backed firms outperform their matched 
firms over the post-exit period.  The paper also states that PE-backed IPOs (meaning buyouts 
backed IPO) achieve positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns more than Venture 
Capital backed and other non-backed IPOs, that emerged as poor performers.  
The superior performance of buyouts in IPOs are mainly related to the leverage ratio used. 
Buyouts IPOs are, on average, offered at reasonable valuations, but due to the widespread 
market perception of aggressive pricing by PE sponsors and the high debt ratios at the time of 
the issue, these issues start trading at relatively modest first-day returns. Investors appear to 
be taken by surprise by the robustness of their operating performance, the continuing 
involvement of PE sponsors, and the marked reduction of debt immediately after the IPO. The 
realization of these aspects of their operations eventually leads to positive aftermarket 
performance (Meles et al., 2014). 
The result of Meles et al. (2014) regarding the fact  that a firm with a higher level of debt is 
offered at a reasonable price and resulting in a lower  underpricing was also analyzed by 
Barry & Mihov (2005), who compared the IPO performances of VC backed firms and of 
highly leveraged firms, using a sample of more than 6000 IPOs during 1980–2012. They 
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found that the characteristics of firms with high levels of debt financing are consistent with 
less uncertainty about the firm’s value than those being backed primarily by VC. Concluding  
that debt backing is associated with lower underpricing, especially pronounced in periods of 
high uncertainty.  
Barry & Mihov (2005) went more deeply in understanding the differences between VC and 
debt as major sources of financing and their performance after IPO. They found that VC 
backed firms perform much better in the long run than highly leveraged firms do. They 
explained this difference saying that, unlike venture capitalists, the lenders do not generally 
share in the upside of equity value from the companies that they finance, and so their 
tendency is to provide financing to firms with characteristics that make the lending relatively 
safe: predictable cash flows,  less volatility, and comparatively easier to value. These 
characteristics tend to be associated with less valuation uncertainty, therefore, less 
underpricing at the IPO stage. Those same characteristics may be associated with lower 
upside potential in equity value and hence lower long-term equity performance on average, in 
contrast with VC-backed IPO firms that perform better in the long-run, on average (Barry & 
Mihov, 2005). This again supports Meles et al. (2014) evidence that venture capitalists 
provide favorable long-term effects for the firms, thus confirming their widespread reputation 
to be ‘buildwinners’. 
This chapter has presented the Initial Public Offering in relation to a Private Equity firm, as a 
way to divest its participation to a portfolio company. Beginning with the illustration of all the 
main exit strategies for a private equity, continuing with the convenience for private equity 
and the conditions influencing such ease for the IPO being discussed.  The point of view of 
the entrepreneur of the portfolio firm and his preferences were presented. Later the speed of 
divestment after the IPO was discussed and finally various studies on PE backed IPOs 
performance were illustrated. It was strongly proved that in the short period a PE-backed IPO 
outperforms rivals that are non PE-backed, while in the long run they have a general tendency 
of underperformance.  
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4. VALUATION AND PRICING PROCESS OF AN IPO 
When the valuation of a firm is done in the context of the initial public offering of the firm 
itself, the aim is to contribute to the pricing process. All the success of the operation and the 
reputation of the firm with the rest of the community, including all the stakeholders of the 
firms (creditors, customers, employees, suppliers…) depend on the result of the valuation. In 
addition in the IPO process, like in many other processes (M&A, restructuring…) the 
valuation is based usually on the multiples evaluation, but with some peculiarities: 
- Absence of a control premium, since usually for a firm going public not all of firm’s  
shares are sold. 
- Absence of potential synergies, which instead have to be evaluated in a M&A process. 
The Listing Guidelines of Borsa Italiana (2004) make some considerations about the most 
used valuation methods: multiples and discounted cash flow methods. The multiples method 
is considered particularly important in an IPO valuation, since it is synthetic and easy for the 
comparison with other listed firms. In fact, most of the times institutional investors compare 
the ratio of the IPO firms with the ones of other public companies in the same industry. It is 
simple and obvious, if it is applied to a mature industry. But still, it has some problems: 
firstly, the definition of comparable corporations is subjective, it is not a finer method to take 
other companies of the same industry as reference, because it is likely to have many 
differences between firms in the same market segment in terms of operations, risk and growth 
potential, making it hard to avoid personal bias. Secondly, even if a group of suitable and 
comparable companies can be selected, differences persist in basic aspects between the 
evaluated company and these companies (Wang, 2010). Discounted Cash Flow method 
instead is widely used, and it is based on the idea that firm value equals the discount of future 
cash flow that firm can produce for stakeholders. This method is considered fairly precise, 
anyway it is fundamental to estimate precisely many factors, which could be complicated in 
some cases (Wang, 2010). 
Also Roosenboom (2012) concentrated his research in this field. He found that, together with: 
the multiples valuation and discounted cash flow, also dividend discount model has to be 
taken into account. He found out that these three techniques have similar bias, accuracy and 
explainability.  
Concerning multiples methodology, Roosenboom (2012) found that the most popular 
multiples are price-earnings ratios, price-to-cash flow ratios, price-to-sales ratios and 
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enterprise value ratios.  A fFirm’s estimated value is calculated by multiplying the average or 
median multiple of the peers group with the corresponding accounting number of the IPO 
firm. Data is usually forecasted for the current and the following year to calculate the 
multiples. While underwriter select six comparable firms on average. 
Multiples are used in 87% of the cases, in 59.2% the dividend discount model to estimate the 
equity value  is also used, and  economic value added valuation is used only in 19,3% of the 
cases. Underwriters sometimes use specific valuation techniques such as discounting sales, 
discounting earnings, and sum-of-the-parts valuation. These underwriter-specific techniques 
are used in 11.4% of the cases. Roosenboom (2012) also points out that different weights are 
given to the valuation estimates deriving from different methods: multiples valuation has the 
highest weight, followed by dividend discount model and then discounted cash flow model. 
The economic value added and  underwriter-specific techniques play a minor role. While 
among different multiples, the price-earnings multiple is the most important one. 
The following analysis will concentrate on two methods. The first one is the Enterprise DCF, 
which it remains the preferred method of practitioners and academics, because it relies solely 
on the flow of cash in and out of the company, rather than on accounting-based earnings, 
according to Koller et al. (2015). The second one is the multiples method, which is very 
helpful in preparing a quick and insightful assessment of the firm. 
4.1. Discounted cash flow method 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method is considered one of the most accurate way to 
determine firm value, according to its capacity of producing a level of financial cash flow 
adequate to remunerate investors expectation (Borsa Italiana, 2004). The praxis says that 
capital value of the firm is the sum of: 
- Actualized value of operative free cash flow the firm will generate in the future 
(Enterprise Value) discounted for a rate which is the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) 
- Consolidated net financial position expressed at market value 
- Market value of activities not inherent with operating activities (surplus assets) 
The formula can be synthesized as follows: 
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Where: 
E= is the market value of equity 
n = number of years for the explicit forecast, 
Vf= is the continuing value,  
D= is the net financial position, 
M= is the minorities value, 
SA= is the surplus assets, so the value of non operating activities. 
Where the Enterprise value is defined as follows: 
" =	
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Operating expected free cash flow (FCF) is the cash flow available to all investors (equity 
holders, debt holders and any other non-equity investors), so it is independent of the capital 
structure. Consistently with this point, FCF are discounted using a weighted average cost of 
capital, so the WACC. The debt and other non equity claims on cash flow are subtracted from 
enterprise value to determine equity value (Borsa Italiana, 2004). 
Free cash flow, which is the measure of the cash generated by the operating activity of 
the firm, so it does not account for financing and non-operating assets, is calculated as 
follows: 
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What is mentioned above as continuing value (Vf)is also called terminal value. This concept 
assumes that a certain level of cash flow will grow in perpetuity at a certain established grow 
rate. This avoids to individually forecast cash flow for many years.  The formula to calculate 
it is the following. 
"# = ((	(	 + 1) −   
FCF(t+1) represents the estimated cash flow in perpetuity. The grow rate here captures the net 
total expectation about individual line items. This grow rate has a very important impact in 
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the estimated value: the higher it is, the higher is the value, so it is really important to 
establish a confidence regarding the assumptions used to estimate it (Mils, 2005). 
4.1.1. Weighted average cost of capital calculation 
WACC is the average opportunity costs faced by investors for investing funds in the firm. It is 
one of the most important values that have to be estimated for the implementation of DCF 
methodology.  Since WACC must be used in the contest of DCF, it must be consistent with its 
other major component, which is the free cash flow calculation. This consistency requires that 
WACC: 
- Takes into consideration the opportunity cost for all kind of investors that put funds 
into the company, not only equity holders 
- Weight the securities’ required return for its market weight, not for its historical book 
weight 
- Incorporates any financing benefits, such as interest tax shields,  that are not included 
in free cash flow 
- Is computed after corporate taxes 
- Is calculated in the same expectation of inflation of FCF and also with the same 
duration of securities  
Starting from these considerations the formula results as follows: 
 = $" /0(1 − ,1) +

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Where : 345 is the portion of debt using market values and  
4
45	instead is the level of equity. kd 
is the cost of debt, ke is the cost of equity and Tm is the marginal tax rate (Koller et al., 2015). 
Cost of equity calculation 
“Cost of equity is the rate of return investors require on an equity investment in a firm” 
(Damodaran, 2002). It can be determined using Capital Asset Pricing Model, through riskless 
rate and a risk premium, as follows: 
Expected return= Riskless rate + Beta(Risk premium) 
Risk free rate is estimated looking at government default-free bonds. Ideally each cash flow 
should be discounted using a government bond with the same maturity. Actually few times 
each FCF is discounted matching it with the risk free rate of the related maturity, and 
normally a single risk free rate value is used. Since DCF valuation is done in a long term 
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perspective, it is a good idea to not use short term treasure bill to determine the risk-free rate: 
short term risk free rate usually is lower than the long term one, since investors when short 
term matures can reinvest at higher rates (Koller et al., 2015).  
Market risk premium is the difference between market expected return and risk free rate, 
unfortunately it is unobservable so it has to be estimated. There are several methods to 
estimate it: 
1. Measuring and extrapolating historical returns. This method starts from the idea that, 
if level of risk aversion hasn’t changed over time, historical returns should be a 
reasonable proxy for future returns. Koller et al. (2015) suggest to calculate market 
risk premium over long term government bonds, that better match duration of firms’ 
cash flows, and to use the longest time interval possible, to find a stable market 
premium. This is valid only if market risk premium is stable, but if there is a premium 
change is better to use a smaller period. Finally it is important to convert into average 
long date intervals, such as creating annual numbers starting from a ten-years 
observation. 
2. Using regression to link current financial ratios to expected market return. This 
methodology starts from the idea that market risk premium is predictable using 
observable variables, such as financial ratios or forward looking estimation models, 
for instance as follows: 
61 − # = 7 + 8ln ;$
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This method was demonstrated to be reliable, but has a drawback: market risk 
premium can be negative, so investors ask to be rewarded to keep in their portfolio a 
risky asset. 
Moreover regression ignores that dividends depend on their expected grow, and that 
they are just on form of corporate payout. 
3. Using forward looking models. Since stock price value is the present value of its 
dividend, assuming that they are growing at a constant rate, we can re arrange the 
perpetuity to calculate expected market risk premium: 
*
 = 3>?>020@AB	C  that converts into /2 =
3>?>020
DE>F2 + 	. Once cost of equity is 
calculated, using risk free rate and beta estimation it is possible to know market risk 
premium. 
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According to Koller et al (2015) an appropriate range for market premium is between 4.5 and 
5.5., even if financial crisis has increased dramatically risk premium to 6,8 in 2007 and 7,8 in 
2008. 
The beta measures how much the stock and the entire market move together. According to 
KPMG(2014) it expresses the degree to which the company’s specific risk is comparable to 
market’s risk. Also beta cannot be observed directly and has to be estimated. To do this, the 
starting point is using the regression. The most common regression to estimate beta is the 
following market model: 
6> = 7 + 861 + = 
Here stock return is regressed against market return. The slope represent the beta, which 
usually ranges between 0 and 2. According to Koller et al. (2015) raw regression should be 
based on monthly returns, to avoid the systematic inclusion of short term biases. It should also 
contain at least 60 data points (5 years of monthly results), in this way it could take into 
consideration any systematic changes in a stock’s risk. Market portfolio should be estimated 
with a very well diversified market portfolio, to avoid any distortion due to market bubbles 
(Koller et al., 2015).   
On this point KPMG (2014) report the existence of many difficulties in determining the 
historical beta factors: for example, the cash generating units are not listed on the stock 
market so they cannot be individually estimated. In practice, in situations where the beta for 
single cash generating units need to be calculated, listed peer groups that best reproduce the 
operative risk of the CGUs are employed. 
Beta estimation done with raw regression has to be improved by deriving an unlevered 
industry beta and then re-levering the industry beta to the company target structure.  Since 
companies in the same industry face similar operating risks and so have similar operating 
betas. Anyway using the simple industry median or average does not consider the leverage: 
company’s beta depends also on financing risk, not only on operating risk. To remove the 
effect of leverage it is possible to use the theory of Modigliani and Miller, who say that 
weighted average risk of company equals the weighted average risk of a company’s economic 
assets: 
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When the debt is not that high it is possible to assume that the beta debt is equal to zero. In 
this case, with some calculation, the equation becomes the following: 
82 = 8G ;1 + $< 
This equation can be used to convert equity betas into unlevered betas: for each competitor 
firstly it has to be regressed the equity beta with OLS regression, than with the above formula 
the beta unlevered is found, finally the average is calculated. Finally the unleveraged industry 
beta can be re-leveraged with firm’s debt-to-equity ratio (Koller et al., 2015). 
Estimating cost of debt 
Cost of debt kD is estimated as the average medium-long term debt net of tax effect (Borsa 
Italiana, 2014). For firms with bonds that rarely trade, kD is calculated in an indirect method. 
Firstly it has to be determined the company’s credit rating on unsecured long term debt. Then 
it has to be determined the yield on a portfolio of long-term bonds with the same credit rating. 
The determination of credit rating is usually done by professional rating agencies, that will 
examine the most recent financial ratios and firm environment (Koller et al., 2015). 
Moody’s (Tennant, 2007) suggest the use ratios, which are a good foundation to start a rating 
analysis. After ratios’ analysis Moody starts also a qualitative forward-looking analysis and 
also takes a deep look at industry’s variation. 
Financial data must be of the most recently available fiscal year-end filings. The metrics 
studied include measures of coverage, leverage, cash flow-to-debt, profitability and revenue 
stability, and are the following: 
Exhibit 9: Ratios explanation 
Ratio Explanation 
EBITA/Average Assets EBITA/Average of Current and Previous 
Year Assets 
EBITA/Interest Expense  
EBITA Margin EBITA/Net Revenue 
(FFO+Interest Expense) /Interest Expense Free Cash Flow from Operations + Interest 
Expense) /Interest Expense 
FFO/Debt Free Cash Flow from Operations /(Short-
Term+Long-Term Debt) 
RCF/Debt (Free Cash Flow from Operations –
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Dividends)/ (Short-Term+Long-Term Debt) 
Debt/EBITDA (Short-Term+Long-Term Debt)/EBITDA 
Debt/Book Capitalization (Short-Term+Long-Term Debt)/ (Short-
Term+Long-Term Debt+Deferred 
Taxes+Minoirty Interest+Book Equity) 
Operating Margin Operating Profit/Net Revenue 
CAPEX/Depreciation Expense Capital Expenditure/Depreciation Expense 
Revenue Volatility Standard Deviation of Trailing Five Years of 
Net Revenue Growth 
Source: Tennant, 2007 
Moody’s, using its database, created a classification for each ratio of the ranges for each 
rating category. The result is the following: 
Exhibit 10: Rating by ratios 
 
Source: Tennant, 2007 
4.2. Economics Profit method 
Economics profit technique measures the value created by the company in a single period 
(Koller et al., 2015). This method is very useful since, if it is applied correctly, leads to the 
same valuation of the DCF method so it can be used as a way of checking if DCF method was 
calculated correctly. It is defined as follows: 
J
	*
	 = -.		
		 ×	 (6- −) 
Since 6- = LMDNOPQ?2R20	SIT>IU , equation can be written as follows: 
J
	
	 = )*+, − (-.		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		 × 	) 
This methodology can be used to value a company, in equivalence with DCF technique, as 
follows: 
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Here it is possible to value future economic profit with a growing perpetuity: 
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This demonstrates that if expected economic profit is zero, the value of operations equals 
invested capital.  
Economic profits usually are explicitly forecast for 10 years; the remaining years are valued 
using an economic-profit continuing-value formula. 
"VW = -W + -! × (6-! −)(1 +)! +⋯+
-!W × (6-!W −)
(1 +)!W +
"
(1 +)!W 
)*+,F? = )*+,!W × (1 + ) 
*F? = )*+,F? − ( − -!W) 
" = *F? ×
)*+,F? × [ 6)-\ × (6)- −)
 × ( − )  
In the continuing value formula RONIC must equal historical ROIC in the continuing-value 
year. 
4.3. Valuation through multiples 
Much of the literature on IPOs suggest that, for valuing IPOs, an important point is comparing 
the operational and financial performance with the one of the other public firms in the same or 
similar industry. Valuation is factored with market ratios, with some firm-specific 
adjustments. Many market multiples can be used in the comparable firms approach, including 
industry-specific ratios. Anyway there is not a real clear answer about which is the best 
multiple to be used. 
4.3.1 Multiples choice and calculation 
Theoretical models draw the relevance of price on earnings (P/E) and market to book value 
(M/B) ratios. P/E ratio is implemented by capitalizing the earnings per share (EPS) of the firm 
under consideration at the average or median price earnings (P/E) ratio of comparable 
publicly traded firms. If earnings forecasts are available, these are commonly used for the 
comparables. Other market multiples, such as market-to-book, price-sales, price-operating 
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earnings, enterprise value-to-sales, and enterprise value-to-operating earnings ratios, are 
sometimes employed.  P/E ratio can be used in two different ways: comparing it with the one 
of a random firm from the same industry, or using a firm in the same industry with the most 
similar ten-year average growth rate of earnings. In fact it was proven that there is an high 
relevance of long term growth, while short term growth and risk are less important. The 
second way has proved to be the most accurate. Not only growth is considered relevant, but 
also dividend payout and size of the firm (Kim & Ritter, 1999).  
Choosing the comparables is fundamental in using the P/E valuation: it was proven that 
selecting comparables by industry with the three-digital SIC code is relatively effective (Kim 
& Ritter, 1999). Although, SIC codes are frequently used to classify firms by industries, 
unfortunately they are not without problems. The number of multiproduct firms and the 
prevalence of diversification strategies make classification by product difficult and sometimes 
arbitrary. Moreover by restricting our comparables to firms in the same SIC code, valuation is 
subjected to the arbitrariness of these classification. 
Also Koller et al. (2015) highlighted that it is important to keep in mind this problem. They 
said that it is fundamental to understand which are the exact industries where comparables are 
operating: many times it happens that companies operate in many sub industries whose 
product areas vary a lot in terms of competitive dynamics. So, also return on invested capital 
from the various sub industries changes significantly, leading to substantial variations in 
multiples. At the end each business unit will have different multiples.  
Koller et al. (2015) also pointed out that it is essential to have as a denominator to forecast 
profits, preferably normalized for unusual items, rather than historical profits. According to 
them, it is much better to use forward earnings estimates, because they usually have a lower 
variation between pears, leading to a narrower range of uncertainty in value. Koller et al. 
(2015) in fact, said that for the same group of firms, the backward looking P/Es ratio ranged 
from 12 to 28 times, while looking at enterprise value to projected EBITA of next year 
variation ranged from 12 to 17, and going to a five year estimation, variation across 
companies disappeared. Moreover, forward-looking multiples are consistent with the 
principles of valuation: in fact the idea is valuing the cash flow of the future, more than 
looking at backward-looking multiples. Forward-looking multiples also contain future 
expectation, so they are better multiples than the ones created with historical data. Koller et al. 
(2015) pointed out that in IPO multiples based on forecast earnings outperformed those based 
on historical earnings. 
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Many websites and newspapers use price-to-earnings of last the 12 months as a ratio to 
analyze a firm’s value.  Koller et al. (2015) reports that it is much better to use as multiple net 
enterprise value (EV) to EBITA or NOPLAT.  The use of this measure rather than P/E 
eliminates the distorting effect of different capital structures, non operating assets, and non 
operating income.  So any items that are not useful to estimate a firm’s ability to generate 
cash flow in the future is eliminated. The point of avoiding P/E ratio is that this mixes capital 
structure and non-operating items, with expectations of operating performance.  
Koller et al. (2015) also found out that it is important to use EBITA or NOPLAT, which are 
much better than EBIT or EBITDA. They explain that EBITA is preferable to EBITDA 
because when a company purchases a physical asset such as equipment, it capitalizes the asset 
on the balance sheet and depreciates the asset over its lifetime. Since the asset wears out over 
time, depreciation has to be included in operating expenses, as a rough proxy for the 
deterioration of that asset and saving  future capital expenditure required to replace the asset. 
This is a very important proxy to include because the firm will face the capital expenditure in 
the future and will use that cash flow to replace the equipment. If we try to understand why 
EBITA is more adapt than EBIT, Koller et al. (2015) states that organic investment in 
intangibles such as new customer lists and product brands are expensed and not capitalized. 
Then, when the acquired intangible loses value and get replaced through additional 
investment, but the investment is already expensed, and the company is penalized twice: once 
through amortization and a second time through reinvestment. Using EBITA avoids double-
counting. Now let us consider the differences between EBITA and NOPLAT in the multiples 
valuation. It happens many times that EBITA is used instead of NOPLAT because EBITA 
does not require the calculation of operating taxes, which differ a lot from reported taxes, and 
need to be calculated with care. Moreover, EBITA works well when peer groups have the 
same tax rate or operate within a single tax jurisdiction, but when tax rates are different 
NOPLAT is a better measure. 
There is  a general consensus that for the EV/EBITA calculation it is important to adjust the 
multiple for non operating items, that are embedded in EBITA. Consequently, to calculate the 
nominator it is important to exclude non operating items. That is why many times EV is 
called “Net” Enterprise Value. The general rule says that any non-operating asset that does 
not contribute to EBITA should be removed. This includes excess cash and market value of 
non-consolidated subsidiaries, but also excess real estate, other investments, and the market 
value of prepaid pension assets. It also includes debit and equity claims such as minority 
interest, unfunded pension liabilities and employee grants. 
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Referring back to the choice of the right peer group, the common practice is to select from 8 
to 15 peers and take the average of their multiples. A reasonable valuation anyway requires 
judgment about the companies and if their multiples are truly relevant. Also Koller et al. 
(2015)  points out that identifying comparable firms using the SIC code (Standard Industrial 
Classification) or the GICS code Global Industry Classification Standard) could be dangerous, 
because classifications often are too broad, so it should be used only as a starting point. 
Another approach could be to use the peers group provided by the firm, but too often this 
represents more an aspirational group than a group of truly comparable firms. Koller et al. 
(2015) suggests using a smaller group of comparables  that actually compete in the same 
markets, with similar products and services.  
Even for companies that compete head-to-head there might be relevant differences in 
performance that justify differences in multiples. For example both ratios, EV/EBITA and 
EV/NOPLAT depend on growth, ROIC and WACC. If one of these variables varies between 
the firms, than multiples must be different. Moreover while WACC is often similar between 
competitors, this is not true for growth and ROIC, which depend a lot on specific firm’s 
characteristics. To avoid a misleading valuation due to these variables, a firm’s multiple is 
usually compared to the average multiple of peer companies, but it is much better to use a 
smaller sample with similar performance. A comprehensive approach should imply that, once 
the list of comparables and their measured multiples are collected, some issues must be 
analyzed to understand why there is a variation in multiples. It is important to understand if 
some firms have superior products, for example, better access to customers, economies of 
scales, recurring revenues or other kind of strategic advantages that translate to superior ROIC 
and growth rate. In this case better-positioned companies should be traded at higher multiples 
(Koller et al., 2015). 
4.3.2. Usefulness of comparable firm approach 
Under the comparable firm approach, the worth of a company is determined by capitalizing an 
accounting measure with an average price-multiple of firms with similar attributes. This 
approach works when a group of comparable firm exists. The approach is relatively easy to 
implement in highly populated and traded stock markets, as in the US, where appropriate 
comparable firms are readily available, but it is not so clear if it works in a less populated 
market (How et al., 2007). 
How et al. (2007) analyzed the Australian equity market to understand whether there is a 
positive association between the price multiples of IPO firms and those of comparable firms. 
The Australian market is particularly adequate for this analysis for three reasons. Firstly, in 
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Australia, some industries contain only a few companies and firm’s characteristics vary 
considerably, so it can be difficult to find comparable firms. Secondly, the disclosure regime 
in Australia makes it easy to have useful information such as earnings forecasts, surely more 
valuable than historical earnings, to calculate price-multiples based on forecast of earnings. 
Thirdly in Australia the fixed-price offerings are typically used: so, while with the road-show 
and the bookbuilding mechanism the offer price is adjusted to market demand step by step, 
with fixed price regime the price is established for a significant period of time. Based on a 
sample of 275 Australian industrial IPO firms, they proved that comparable firm approach is 
useful for the IPO pricing. They discovered that IPO price multiples are positively associated 
with comparable firms’ multiples. Without adjustments, IPO price-earnings (P/E) and market-
to-book (P/B) multiples based on management forecasts of earnings, and book values of 
equities provided in prospectuses are strongly associated with the average P/E and P/B 
multiples of two comparable firms (matched on industry, growth and size). 
This results are in contrast to Kim & Ritter (1999), who say that comparables approach has a 
modest usefulness without further adjustments, but this difference can be attributed to the 
unique institutional feature present in Australia. They add that comparable firm approach 
works better when the average of two firms' multiples are used in a less populated market 
such as Australia, and also Kim & Ritter (1999) say that in average, the multiples apply better 
if the spread in comparable firms’ multiples is lower. So, using more firms with greater 
variation in price multiple does not result in a better valuation. To summarize, according to 
How et al. (2007), by using the adequate earnings forecasts of the competitors to calculate a 
comparable firm’s multiples and using the multiples that have the lower spread, it is possible 
to obtain a firm’s value, that maximizes IPO returns. 
4.4. Valuation and pricing process in an IPO 
In the case of an IPO, the valuation starts with the first pitch with the firm and it is the result 
of a continuous analysis and verification. Therefore, valuation is an integral part of the due 
diligence. When a fair value is estimated, the valuation should start to take into consideration 
the investors’ instructions, as well as the stock market trends and potential liquidity of the 
stock to determine an IPO discount, that maximizes the level of demand and leads to a good 
return on investment for who invests in the firm during the placement.   
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The phases of the value determination process are described in the following graph.  
Source: Borsa Italiana (2014) 
Acoording to the Listing Guidelines of Borsa Italiana (2014) the process of examination is 
divided into four phases, which start from a wider look, to achieve a more detailed 
examination and to a narrower determination of price. These phases can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Pitch. 
In this phase, the firm chooses the intermediaries of the listing. Investment banks 
present a proposal, which also includes a firm’s valuation, which is usually very rough 
compared to the ones that will be done in the following months, since it does not 
include a detailed knowledge of the business plan and the results of the due diligence. 
2. Due diligence. 
The investment bank analyzes the business plan and proposes a range of values for the 
firm. This valuation accounts the business details such as future trends in the reference 
market, strategic organization of the firm and sustainability of main hypotheses. On 
the other hand, it does not account for IPO discount and information coming from 
possible investors. This Valuation Document is part of the listing application 
submitted to Borsa Italiana. 
3. Pre-marketing. 
Investment bank carries a survey on institutional investors and collect preliminary 
independent valuations published by the bank of the institutional consortium. With 
this new information the investment bank defines an indicative price range and meets  
Exhibit 11: Value determination process 
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with the issuing firm. They define together a price range and a maximum price, which 
will be the reference for the collection of orders by institutional investors 
(bookbuilding process). 
4. Pricing. 
After the publication of the prospectus a road show for institutional investors and a 
promotional campaign for the general public will begin. This helps gathering 
declarations from  institutional investors  of interest to buy at a certain price. The offer 
price is then determined by taking into consideration the number of shares requested 
for each price. Also, investors characteristics are taken into consideration, such as 
portfolio management strategy, investment policy, portfolio size and market sector of 
interest, etc . With this information, a final price is determined to effectively allocate 
shares to institutional and retail investors, leaving also part of the demand unsatisfied 
to increase interest in buying and to support stock performance in the market. 
 
4.5. From value to price :  voluntary price discounts 
According to Roosenboom (2012), underwriters establish shares value  using many valuation 
techniques, where fair value is just an ex-ante estimate of the market value of the IPO.  
Exhibit 12: IPO valuation and pricing process 
 
Source: Roosenboom (2012) 
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After the underwriter has determined the fair value using the several techniques presented 
before, he applies a deliberate price discount to arrive at the preliminary offer value. This 
intentional price discount equals 18.2%, evaluated at the mean and the median. The deliberate 
price discount is often advertised in the underwriter report. For example: ‘‘The preliminary 
offer price offers a substantial discount from our fair value estimate. We therefore issue a 
strong buy recommendation for this stock’’. This is calculated before the underwriter learns 
about investor demand for the IPO. On average, the minimum tender price for IPO auctions 
and the price range for book build IPOs are chosen two weeks before the shares start trading 
on the stock market. Then the underwriter collects information about investors’ demand for 
the shares, and the preliminary offer price is adjusted to arrive to the final offer price. 
Equilibrium market value is determined as the number of shares outstanding after the IPO 
times the market equilibrium price at which shares transact. Roosenboom (2012), analyzing 
his sample, found that average market value is above the average final offer value. Therefore, 
investors earn a return by paying a lower stock price than the full information equilibrium 
market price. 
Many authors pointed out that price discount will depend on many factors. Some factors are 
associated with the need to discover an investor’s demand: discount makes it profitable for 
them to reveal their interest in the share. Other factors are associated with compensation for 
the risk taken by investors, who bid on an unknown firm, so they have to be rewarded in some 
way for this additional risk they take.  
Roosenboom (2012) went through this analysis and he actually confirmed that one reason of 
value discounting is to induce investors to disclose information about their actual demand of 
IPO shares. Underwriters are willing to make such discount because investors will be more 
likely to bid up the price during the bookbuilding procedure, and, if demand is positive, then 
the price will be updated positively. In this way, underwriters also expect to recoup the price 
discount given to investors: with such a simple method they expect to gain precious 
information about market valuation of the IPO firm, with a very low cost operation. However, 
it is important to emphasize that only part of the discount is recouped through price updates 
during the roadshow, the remaining part is not recouped and results in higher returns for 
investors.  What is important for our study is that this underlines that the major reason for 
discounting stock value is to foster investors’ demand. Of course, this is not an unique 
motivation.  
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Roosenboom (2012) said also, that price discount helps to compensate investors for the risk 
they take, this is confirmed by many authors and institutions.  
According to the Listing Guidelines of Borsa Italiana (2004) discount is justified in the 
following way: it would be preferable to buy shares of a firm with similar characteristics, 
similar risks already quoted in the market, a known equity story, a management already 
recognized in the financial community, and an overall lower information asymmetries than a 
firm that is going public for the first time.  
In addition, Chahine & Filatotchev (2008) have concentrated on information asymmetries in 
IPOs, between insiders and small investors. Those investors anticipate the costs deriving from 
this asymmetry and price-protect themselves and this leads to IPO price discount. They said 
that the cost can be reduced by two kind of firm signals. On one hand, firms can disclose 
strategic information in issuing documents, but this is a very risky option, since it may lead to 
reduction of a valuable competitive advantage. On the other hand, IPO firms can use 
governance parameters such as board characteristics to signal their value and ability to reduce 
managerial opportunism. Corporate governance parameters, like board independence, may be 
a good signal of a firm’s value and thus reduce IPO discount. . They verified this using a 
sample of 140 IPOs in France. Results say that increasing information disclosure IPO firms 
can reduce information asymmetries and therefore, mitigate the costs associated with adverse 
selection problem. However, in this way they could disclose too much information and this 
could be viewed as putting the strategic advantage of the firm in a risky position. Moreover, 
they suggest that investors may become skeptical about the willingness of manager in 
disclosing so many information. They also point out that different types of information have 
different values for informing investors: information about human resources or the risk that 
the firm is facing are effective in reducing information asymmetries, while information about 
marketing, R&D and technology might induce investors to think that the disclosure of this 
proprietary information may harm firm’s competitive advantage. On the other side, board 
independence has a positive effect on IPO offer price: investors may think that the board 
independence may reduce agency costs associated with adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems in IPO firms (Chahine & Filatotchev, 2008). 
In a latter work Chahine & Filatotchev (2011), analyzed if audit and non-audit fees have an 
importance in affecting investors’ evaluation of the firm. They found that audit fees may help 
to reduce information asymmetries associated with the IPO while non-audit fees add 
uncertainty to the quality of earnings. Therefore, the IPO firm’s managers and early stage 
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investors should carefully evaluate costs and benefits of engaging their auditor, in 
consultancy-related services: they could result in harming the stock market performance of 
the firm. They went even further, to say that audit services do not work in isolation: a firm 
that has paid audit and non-audit fees and that have also independent board’s members or 
members of the audit committee with higher financial and accounting expertise have a 
negative association with underpricing. Hence, the credibility of services provided by external 
auditors, may be reinforced by the credibility of internal governance mechanisms, reducing 
the need to use large price discounts on the IPO price. 
Another, very important way to reduce investors risk is that an IPO firm should the right 
underwriter. Roosenboom (2012) said that it seems that an underwriter with a higher 
reputation usually practices lower price discounts: this could result from the fact that this kind 
of underwriter has a higher market share, so they do not need to offer larger price discounts to 
attract investors, but they uses their reputation to certify quality of the IPO firm.  
This was already pointed out by Carter and Manaster (1990), who studied this phenomenon: 
they argue that IPO price run-up compensates for the uninformed investors that are at risk of 
trading against superior information. Anyway, underpricing is costly for the issuing firm, 
therefore low risk firms attempt to reveal their low risk to the market, making it unnecessary 
to underprice. One way to do this is selecting underwriters with high prestige. They supported 
this thesis observing a sample of 501 IPOs between 1979 and 1983. Prestigious underwriters, 
to maintain their reputation, only market IPOs of low risk firms. As a result, a signal in the 
form of an underwriter reputation is provided to the market. More in detail, they found a 
significant negative relation between underwriter prestige and price run-up. They also found a 
negative relation between prestige and magnitude of price run-up. 
Concerning underpricing level, Roosenboom (2012) found out that older companies are 
associated with lower level of underpricing, while the technology industry is associated with a 
higher level. Other firms’ characteristics seem to have no affect, significantly, on 
underpricing. Also firms that are forecasted to be more profitable are not subject to high 
discounts: it seems that investors are attracted by the expectation of having a high profitable 
firm in their portfolio, for the future. Then the dimension of the discount depends also on the 
financial structure and on management track record. Not to forget that the equity market 
conditions, the situation of the industry where the firm operates, the competitors situation, the 
tracking of other shares quoted in the recent period, the general economic conditions and the 
level of trust of investors can all influence the discount. 
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So part of the underpricing seems to be associated with a compensation for investors to 
disclose their demand for the IPO firm, another part instead, depends on the intentional price 
discount to compensates the risk that investors take in investing on an unknown firm. 
4.6. Accurancy of the valuation methods in IPOs 
Roosenboom (2012), after presenting the methods that are frequently used to calculate an IPO 
firm’s value, he went further in the analysis and calculated signed prediction errors of each 
valuation technique as : 
(estimated	value − equilibrium	at	market	value)
(equilibrium	market	value)	  
Assuming an efficient stock market, these prediction errors capture the bias that is associated 
with the different methods. He found that most methods are associated with positive average 
prediction errors. This suggests that underwriters overestimate market values ex-ante.  
Comparing the different value methods he observed that the comparable firms/transaction 
multiples method is the least biased valuation method.  
One of the reasons for this overvaluation could be that this gives the possibility to 
underwriters to offer a larger discount to investors. Later in this chapter it will be pointed out 
that the value discount is recouped only partially through price bids up by investors. 
In the second part of his research, he investigated whether s firm’s or an industry’s 
characteristics change the biases and accuracy of the valuation. More profitable IPO firms 
show less biased valuations. Higher reputation underwriters are associated with lower bias for 
most of the valuation methods. Moreover, underwriters seem to more accurately value older 
companies with established track records, but are less accurate when the stock market is more 
volatile. There are no other firm’s and offer’s characteristics besides company age, 
underwriter reputation and pre-valuation market volatility that can consistently explain the 
cross-sectional variation in accuracy.  
The underwriter decides which methods are appropriate to value the IPO stock and which are 
not. For example, the difference between the signed prediction error of the multiples method 
and the dividend discount model could be caused by companies for which the underwriter 
uses the multiples method but not the discounted dividend model.  
Roosenboom (2012) calculated also the absolute prediction errors, which measure the 
valuation accuracy of the different systems: 
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j(estimatedvalue − equilibrium	market	value)
equilibrium	market	value
j 
In the sample he found that multiples valuation technique has the lowest average absolute 
prediction error and the highest accuracy, while the economic value added method has the 
highest average absolute prediction error and the lowest valuation accuracy, from additional 
considerations it results that multiples approach and the discounted cash flow valuation 
perform equally well.  
Roosenboom (2012) also analyzed explainability, so the ability of values estimates to explain 
cross-sectional variation in equilibrium market values. He found that dividend discount model 
has the highest explanatory power and the economic value added method is associated with 
the lowest explanatory power. 
Roosenboom (2012) investigated whether underwriters can improve their valuation estimate 
when using different valuation methods together, using the three most popular techniques for 
which we have sufficient number of observations (multiples valuation, the dividend discount 
model and the discounted cash flow model): adding an additional method increases the 
explanatory power of the model significantly for all combinations. 
4.7. Long-run performance of IPO 
According to the Listing Guidelines of Borsa Italiana (2004) a more prudent valuation could 
be more profitable in the long run than a very positive valuation due to very favorable market 
conditions. Considering that in the long run the equity market will discount every expectation, 
it is important that valuation does not incorporate any short run positive courses in the market. 
Also Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) analyzed whether IPOs pricing in relation to 
their fair value. They computed IPOs value using multiples such as price/EBITDA, 
price/sales, price/earnings of non-IPO industry peers and by comparing their enterprise value 
and offer price. From their analysis it resulted that IPOs are systematically overvalued at the 
offer price relative to peer firms. In a sample of 2000 large capitalization IPOs from 1980 and 
1997 the median IPO is overvalued, compared to industry peers by about 14% to 50%, 
depending on the matching criteria. A match done by using industry, sales and profitability 
resulted in overvaluation of 50%.  By adding the analyst earnings growth forecasts, 
overvaluation decreases at 33%. If match is done only with analyst earnings growth forecasts  
overvaluation is about 14%. This suggests that IPO investors may focus too much on 
optimistic earnings growth forecasts and too little on profitability in valuing IPOs. 
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The overvaluation result is inconsistent with the notion of underpricing that is widely 
discussed in the literature, presented also in the previous paragraph, but it is consistent with 
the long-run underperformance of IPOs. Going further in their analysis Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004) showed that overvalued IPOs provide 5% to 7% higher returns than 
undervalued IPOs on the first day after the IPO, but 20% to 30% lower long-run risk-adjusted 
returns. This result suggests that the procedure to distinguish undervalued and overvalued 
IPOs is reasonably correct. From this result, it is also possible to say that overvalued IPOs 
have lower initial sales, lower EBITDA and lower profit margins, but higher first-day share 
turnover, higher overallotment, higher analyst earnings growth forecasts. The key differences 
with undervalued IPOs have to do with profitability and expected growth. Overvalued IPOs 
have lower current profitability, but higher expected earnings growth. Ex post projected that a 
high growth rate does not materialize . In general, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) 
found that IPO investors pay too much attention to optimistic growth forecasts and too little 
on current profitability, giving rise to overvaluation at the offer price. Eventhough, 
concentrating less on optimistic forecasts would easily avoid misevaluations. 
Regarding long run IPO underperformance Miller (1977) assumed that investors have 
heterogeneous expectations regarding the valuation of a firm, but only investors that are 
optimistic about IPO value buy the stocks. Over time, as the variance of opinions decreases, 
the marginal investor's valuation will converge towards the mean valuation, and its price will 
fall. This argument works better when the float is small and not too many investors are 
required. This is consistent with the drop in share price at the end of the lockup period. 
This chapter concentrated on valuation and pricing process of the IPO firm. The most used 
techniques to investigate firms’ value were firstly presented: DCF, the multiples analysis and 
Economic Profit. The IPO pricing steps were then presented next, and the reasons of the price 
discounts were discussed. Finally, the accuracy of those techniques in relation to IPO value 
was analyzed, presenting Roosenboom (2012) analysis. It resulted that underwriters on 
average overvalue IPOs, for many reasons: to recoup price discounts offered to investors, or 
for high forecasts of profitability that usually stands around. This, together with distorted 
investors’ expectations, leads to an average long run underperformance of IPO firms. 
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5. THE TECHNOGYM CASE OF STUDY 
5.1. Firm’s history 
Technogym was founded in 1983 in Cesena (Italy) when Nerio Alessandri started to project 
his first machine for training. From the beginning he worked in strict collaboration with the 
brother Pierluigi. They started to operate in fitness sector producing machines with an 
extreme attention for product design and for incidents prevention.  
In the first half of Eighteen’s fitness sector was just a niche in Italy, and gyms were attended 
mainly by bodybuilders. The founders understood that, to improve their business, it was 
fundamental to make their machines more technological and functional and to push to make 
the fitness world more spread in the public, promoting the idea that exercise benefits heath. 
In 1984 Nerio Alessandri introduced a new line of products, completely innovative for the 
Italian market: a line of isotonic machines. They were extremely simple to use and facilitated 
the training of specific muscles. With this line of products, the business started to operate at a 
national level. 
In 1986 Technogym S.r.l. (a limited liability company) was founded.  In the same year the 
first machine for home was launched, and its advertising campaign increased the firm 
visibility and notoriety in the Italian market. The firm kept on investing in research and 
development of new fitness solutions, thanks to the institution of a research centre, where it 
combined competences of engineering, biomechanics, sport medicine, new materials and 
electronics.  
In the Nineteen’s fitness market has increased its popularity and so the number of competitors 
spread. To face this increased competition Technogym started to produce also machines 
linked with the culture of movement, supporting the idea that making exercise increase the 
psycho-physical wealth: in this period Technogym started to present itself as “The Wellness 
Company”, moving from the concept of fitness to the concept of wellness. In this period 
Technogym also launched a line of product for physical rehabilitation, opening the new line 
of business of medical products. It also started to operate in the cycling sectors and created a 
complete software to manage the entire traineeship of the person. In the end of the Nineteen’s 
Technogym  operates in 60 countries in the world, generating a relevant percentage of its 
turnover abroad. 
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In years 2000s Technogym started a phase of growing turnover and consolidation of its image 
at an international level.  The new line launched in 2000 started also to be commercialized in 
the US. In the same year the firm became also the official supplier of the Paralympics Games 
of Sydney, starting a collaboration with the Olympics and  Paralympics games that continued 
also for Athen 2004, Pechin 2008, London 2012 and Rio de Janeiro 2016.  The presence in 
this international events has increased firm notoriety at the international level and amplified 
the possibilities of building relationships with sportive federations. 
In 2012 new digital platforms Technogym Ecosystem and Mywellness came to life: they 
allowed to maintain the contact with final users and professional operators and to obtain an 
higher personalization of the traineeship programs. This has permitted to augment the 
possibility of fidelization of both the final users and the trainers, incrementing also the 
turnover. In the same year was also opened the Technogym Village, the headquarter that 
gathered together the various plants of the firm. The Village represent a real wellness campus: 
it is the meeting point for final users, trainers, medical operators, architects, researchers and 
institutions to experiment the Technogym “wellness experience”. 
Last years of activity were characterized by an increase in turnover and development of new 
products. In 2013 the campaign “Let’s move for a better world” was also launched through 
professional operators and final users. In 2015 Technogym also participated to Milan Expo as 
official wellness partner, creating a dedicated wellness walk. 
In 2015 Technogym worked on the acquisition of the Technogym Village, which was 
property of TGB group and which was located to Technogym. In 2016 Technogym also 
50,01% of Exerp ApS, a Dannish firm which operates in provision of software for the 
managing of fitness centers, to amplify firm offering in digital solutions for fitness and 
wellness. Going more in detail, Exerp produces modular systems used for managerial aspects 
by fitness chains, so its software is complementary to the digital systems of Technogym. 
Now Technogym operates in 130 countries in the world, with 13 commercial branches, 85 
local distributors and 1 joint venture company, creating 90% of its turnover outside Italy. 
5.2. Corporate evolution 
July 15th 1986 Technogym  S.r.l. (limited liability company) was constituted with a capital of 
50 million Lire, owned by Nerio Alessandri for 63% and by Pierluigi Alessandri for the other 
37%. 
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In 1990 capital was increased to 1,2 billion Lire, using extraordinary reserves and options 
from owners. 
In 1997 capital was again increased to 10 billion. In this year Nerio and Pierluigi Alessandri 
submitted their rights on Technogym S.r.l to Technogym Group S.p.A, owned by the two 
brothers. Next year they moved on in this field and it resulted that Technogym S.r.l was 
owned by: Technogym Group S.p.A  for 98,8%, Nerio Alessandri for 0,9% and Pierluigi 
Alessandri for 0,3%. 
In 2001 share capital was converted from 10 billion Lire to 5,2 million Euro. Then in 2002 
Technogym S.r.l. changed its juridical form, from limited liability company to share-based 
company and increased its capital from 5,2 bilion Euro to 10 bilion Euro. Tios capital is 
represented by 100 000 share whose nominal value is 100 Euro each. In 2003 Nerio and 
Pierluigi Alessandri transferred their shares of Technogym S.p.A. to Technogym Group 
S.p.A., so it resulted that  Technogym S.p.A. was completely owned by Technogym Group 
S.p.A.. Six months later Technogym Group S.p.A. merged with Technogym S.p.A.. 
In 2008 brothers Alessandri wanted to divest part of their participation in Technogym S.p.A., 
so they made a new minority shareholder enter. This minority owner was Salhouse, a vehicle 
owned and managed by Arle Capital Partners Limited, a society partially owned by Candover 
Investments plc. During this operation Salhouse and Wellness Holding (75% owned by Nerio 
Alessandri and 25% by Pierluigi Alessandri) conferred in a firm called Scott S.r.l.: Salhouse 
330 million, while Wellness Holding conferred 50,77% of Technogym S.p.A. Financial 
resources conferred by Salhouse together with a financial loan of 150 milion were used to buy 
from brothers Alessandri  their 49,23% of Technogym S.p.A.. In this way Scott S.r.l. owned 
100% of Technogym S.p.A. Later Technogym S.p.A. merged with Scott S.r.l. and was 
denominated Technogym S.p.A.. During this operation Salhouse and Wellness Holding 
stipulated a shareholders’ agreement about governance of the firm and about disinvestment of 
Salhouse. 
This shareholders’ agreement says that it is possible for Salhouse to require the IPO of 
Technogym, notwithstanding an eventual agreement with Wellness Holding. Moreover both 
Wellness Holding and Salhouse have to make possible that: 
- Technogym S.p.A. becomes public in no more than two months from Salhouse 
demand for IPO 
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- It is done the nomination of necessary consultants for the admission in the public stock 
exchange 
- Board of Directors votes for the IPO 
- The management collaborates for the organization and the execution of the due 
diligence, the prospectus and other documentation required for the IPO and for the 
progress of the road show 
- The management collaborates with the authority to make the IPO possible. 
5.3. PE role in the IPO 
It is widely known that the initial public offering of Technogym was organized to allow 
Salhouse to divest its participation, after its investment in 2008. This operation was already 
decided in the shareholders agreement that was established between Arle Capital and 
Wellness Holding in 2008. 
Anyway, it is clear that it was already an agreement in timing of Salhouse divestment, but the 
way of divestment was not so sure. It was previously explained in this thesis that there are 
several ways for a Private Equity to divest its participation into a firm. The choice of the most 
profitable method varies according to many factors. 
First of all, as Jenkinson & Sousa (2015) pointed out, firm characteristics have a strong 
impact in exit strategy. Technogym  has many characteristics that make it suitable to go 
public. First of all the high growth rate of last years make it an appealing investment in the 
public market: not only there was a continuous growth in turnover, but also EBITDA and Net 
Income has grown at an even higher level, overcoming the slowdown in growth of 2013. 
 
Exhibit 13 Technogym: Grow rates 
Growth rates 2013 2014 2015 CAGR 13-15
Revenues 0% 13% 10% 11%
EBITDA -35% 72% 35% 23%
EBITA -63% 137% 83% 27%
TECHNOGYM
 
Ratios also report an higher profitability than competitors: 
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Exhibit 14 Technogym: Comparables' ROE and ROIC 
Profitability 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
ROE 40% 85% 106% 12% 7% 14% 71% 19% 22% 138% 22% 20%
ROIC 12% 17% 42% 9% 6% 8% 1106% 157% 28% 87% 20% 22%
NAUTILUSTECHNOGYM BRUNSWICKAMER SPORT
 
A firm facing such a positive period of growth and expansion perfectly fits the public market, 
so this is promising that the firm will not suffer any reduction in value. 
Also from a financing point of view the conditions are all supporting the IPO of Technogym: 
debt is present but it was reduced a lot in the last years, and now it is considered sustainable at 
all, as all the ratio about leverage demonstrates. 
Exhibit 15 Technogym: Comparables' ratio about leverage 
Financ Struct 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
NFP/Equity 24,0 6,1 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,5 (0,7) (0,6) 0,2 0,1 (0,1) (0,1)
NFP/EBITA 6,3 1,9 0,6 3,1 4,0 2,4 (4,1) (2,3) 0,6 0,4 (0,2) (0,5)
NFP/EBITDA 2,6 1,1 0,5 2,5 2,9 1,9 (3,4) (2,0) 0,5 0,3 (0,2) (0,4)
TECHNOGYM AMER SPORT NAUTILUS BRUNSWICK
 
Moreover another factor to be considered in the analysis of firm characteristics is 
Technogym’s  positioning in the industry against competitors. Technogym from many years 
is working one step head competitors in technological application and in development of 
machines that meet the needs of new trends in wellness, positioning its products in the 
upper/luxury segment of  the market. This is demonstrated by the fact that the firm is the 
official partner of Olympic Games from  many years and is working together with many top 
global sportive teams. Technogym has developed a strong competitive advantage in the 
market that ensures a constant profitability and growth, and so it can be considered an 
appealing investment in the market. 
The second factor pointed out by Jenkinson & Sousa (2015)  are the market conditions. 
Market conditions seem not to favor an IPO. Cost of debt was very low in time of the IPO and 
in the period before: this situation supports more a secondary leverage buyout or an 
acquisition than an IPO, because the acquirer can use debt to finance the operation at a very 
low rate. 
In addition Lowry & Schwert (2002) found out that it is more likely to have an IPO during a 
IPO window: in this period returns for the firm are higher because of the information learned 
by the market from previous IPO during the window. It seems that at the beginning of 2016 
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equity market was “cold”, with just four IPOs done in the Milan stock exchange before the 
one of Technogym during the same year.  
Third factor for Jenkinson & Sousa (2015) is represented by the PE characteristics. To 
understand in detail which are the characteristics of Salhouse, the vehicle firm of Arle Capital 
that has invested in Technogym, let’s try to understand how it was created and which is its 
step in lifecycle. 
Arle Capital Partner Limited is a private equity firm specialized in medium sized firms 
through activities of investments, expansion, growth capital and buyouts. It typically invests 
in industrial and services companies which operate around the energy and natural resources 
sector with a focus on oil and gas, metals mining, nuclear power, alternative energy, water, 
testing, inspection, and certification, business information, safety and security, waste water 
treatment, offshore equipment and services, engineering and advanced technical services, 
automation and process control, energy efficiency and infrastructure solutions. It is focused 
mainly in firms headquartered in Western Europe. Usually it invests between $14.15 million 
and $666.2 million in companies with enterprise values between €500 million ($666.2 
million) and €1 billion ($1332.41 million). It usually takes a controlling stakes in its portfolio 
companies or it can co-invest for larger equity commitments along with limited partners 
(Bloomberg, 2016). 
According to Chassany & Menon (2010) Arle Capital Partners Limited was formed from 
some Candover Partners’s executive, and Candover Partners sold them the buyout unit. The 
scope of this operation was to create an  independent unit focused on the divestment phase, to 
realize the maximum value of the portfolio. The new firm has also the mandate to raise new 
funds, but this is still not planned. All these actions were reasoned by the turbulence of the 
end of 2008, which created the major challenges that Candover had to face since its 
foundation in 1980. Candover faced a drop in the value of its assets and a deep run out of 
liquidity. 
So this private equity has a very long past history, but faced deep problems in the recent 
period and, due to the global crisis, it was forced to put in place very big changes to survive 
and to make its business profitable. After this critical period it is fundamental to build again a 
reputation of a winning firm, that is able to divest in a very profitable way. Moreover now it is 
in a life stage where the funds are close to the end, in fact the primary scope now is to divest 
in a remunerative way current shareholding to pay back investors. After this phase is likely 
that many partners will try to raise new funds to stay in the business, even if the senior partner 
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stated that after this mandate he will retire. Taking into consideration this future developments 
it is even more important to build up a new reputation, which was weakened in previous years 
of tensions. The better way to build up reputation  is through an IPO as Bock & Schmidt 
(2015) demonstrated: making a firm public in such a cold IPO period ensures market 
attention, and the positive results of the IPO and the profitability of the firm itself made the 
public offering a success. This will help the private equity to build the trustworthiness of the 
firm. 
Since secondary LBOs are the most used exit strategy at the moment it is important now to 
understand in detail why this method was not used in this case, considering also that market 
conditions are very favorable at the moment for debt, and so for a LBO. First of all, as Wang 
(2012) pointed out, one of the main advantages of secondary LBOs is the speed of divestment 
compared to an IPO, where usually the private equity, as any other big shareholder that wants 
to divest, has to keep majority of its shares for a lock up period. This is aimed at not giving a 
wrong signal to the market and avoiding share price to drop. From this point of view a sale to 
another private equity was not that convenient for Arle Capital, because the process of 
divesting from the portfolio companies is just at the beginning: Arle still has to organize the 
divestment from majority of portfolio firms, so there is no point to organize a quick 
divestment from one of them, and so realize a surplus of liquidity long before the moment of 
repaying the investors. If speed of divestment is not important in this moment for Arle 
Capital, one of the main advantages of secondary LBOs disappears.  
Another fundamental point to consider is that LBOs usually involves majority or totality of 
shares of the firm, while the shareholding that Arle Capital has had in Technogym is a 
minority shareholding, with the majority owned by the entrepreneur. This kind of 
shareholding is really unusual to be acquired and kept by a private equity, which typically 
wants the majority to bring new efficiencies and innovative strategies inside the portfolio firm 
without the need to discuss and convince a majority owner. It can be potentially difficult to 
sell this kind of shareholding to another private equity, because the lack of control rights is 
against the typical way of operating of private equity firms, so it is very likely that a market 
for Salhouse stake was missing.  
Moreover, the shareholders agreement specify the following: Salhouse has the right to require 
to Wellness Holding to transfer to a third part, willing to acquire the whole shares of the firm, 
its shares only in the case of death of the entrepreneur Nerio Alessandri (Documento di 
registratione, par 18.4). This case has not happened, so Salhouse does not have this right. So a 
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secondary LBO can happen only with brothers Alessandri’s consensus. But this situation is 
really not probable, considering their willingness to not lose decisional control in the firm.  
Let’s consider more in detail the position of brothers Alessandri and their power: their clear 
willingness to maintain the control over the firm in all the fundamental decisions, could have 
excluded not only the possibility of a secondary LBO, but also other kind of bargainings with 
subjects interest in buying also entrepreneurs’ stake such as the trade sale to a bigger 
corporation, limiting Alessandri’s control over the firm. In fact in January and February 2016 
rumors about bargains with the two private equity firms Eqt (from Sweden) and Temasek 
(from Singapore) were strong, but nothing came out from this possibility. The major critical 
point was the size of the shareholding, and so of the investments that has to be done, and the 
lack of control, that had to remain in the hand of Wellness Holding (Filippetti, 2016). 
Entrepreneur willingness of maintain the control is also evident from the commitment of 
Salhouse in not selling any of its shares in Technogym to market competitors(Nota 
Informativa, par 3.4). This excludes a priori the possibility of a trade sale to a competitor, 
which, according to Poulsen & Stegemoller (2008), in certain conditions could have 
represented a profitable exit way. 
In conclusion, even if market conditions were encouraging a secondary buyout or a trade sale 
of Arle Capital shareholding, because equity market was cold and debt conditions were 
favorable, firms characteristics and private equity features were more prone to an IPO. 
Moreover the shareholders agreement were bonding in excluding the trade sale to a 
competitor, and limited the possibility of Arle Capital to impose a LBO without consensus of 
brothers Alessandri. 
5.4. IPO benefits for Technogym 
Main reason of the IPO was surely linked with the shareholders agreement and the need of 
Salhouse to divest and return cash to shareholders. What is more interesting is that the IPO 
was considered the best way of divestment since the beginning of the relation between 
Candover and brothers Alessandri, and also in the shareholders agreement is cited as primary 
way of divestment. Surely the IPO assures the maintenance of decisional control over the firm 
for brothers Alessandri, and also was the more suitable way for Arle Capital. Anyway  there 
are other advantages than the ones for the shareholders that can be exerted from being a 
publicly traded company instead of a private one. 
One of the major benefits of the IPO is the possibility of raising capital to finance projects of 
growth. Many times literature analyzed this kind of situation, pointing out that is the first 
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benefit deriving from the IPO. For Technogym this aspect has secondary importance at least 
in the short run, since any new capital was raised with the IPO. In the long run anyway it is 
still open the possibility of a quick raising of capital.  
A great advantage is the possibility of increasing firm knowledge and visibility. This is 
particularly important for Technogym , in this particular phase of its life. Analyzing market 
penetration, Technogym results well positioned in Europe, where it is the first player in term 
of market share, which is the double compared to the second, but it still scarce outside 
Europe, where it is the second player and has a market share of only 6%. This represent a 
great possibility of growth, but it requires an higher reputation and visibility those countries.  
Exhibit 16 Technogym: market share 
 
Source: Prospetto Informativo Technogym 
The going public process surely has augmented firm awareness in the market and this could 
have strategic positive consequences. Anyway since the filing and the IPO happened less than 
one year ago, it is impossible to prove this using financials.  
Another fundamental point is the enhanced possibility of attracting, remunerating and 
retaining a valuable work force offered by the fact of being a publicly traded firm, compared 
to a privately held firm. Nerio Alessandri already declared his intention of slowly converting 
the firm from an entrepreneurial to a managerial one: a firm with such level of complexity 
must have the most skilled people sitting in the top management team. To attract the most 
skilled people the firm has to appoint an appropriate compensation plan, which not only 
appeals the most skilled managers, but also align their interest with the interest of the firm 
itself and of its shareholders. To do this  compensation plan should be linked with stock 
performance and methods like stock options can be used. 
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What emerges is that the IPO was a natural step in the growth of the firm:  not because new 
capital was collected, but because this was the occasion to create an internal informational 
structure in the firm that will help in increasing firm knowledge in the market, so will allow to 
better appeal customers and suppliers, and also to put in place appropriate compensation plans 
to better attract and retain most skilled workforce. 
5.5. Reaction on competitor prices 
In this part of the chapter the reaction of competitors to the IPO of Technogym will be 
analyzed. The thesis of Hsu et al. (2010) will be applied to see if publicly traded competitors 
face a reduction in performance. Hsu et al. (2010) tested several hypothesis: they checked if 
the IPO has negative impact in stock price of competitors analyzing CAR (cumulative 
abnormal returns) of stocks, then they checked the impact of IPO in competitors operating 
performance. Since operating performance can be analyzed only in few years after the IPO, 
this hypothesis cannot be tested in Technogym case, because the firm went public just few 
months before this thesis. So it will be tested only the hypothesis concerning CAR in stock 
market. 
The competitors used in this analysis will be the following: Amer Sport, Brunswick, Johnson 
Health Tech and  Nautilus. 
The test aims at analyzing whether in the days around the IPO there is a drop in cumulative 
abnormal returns. For the four competitors were picked the closing prices for the periods 
decided, around the IPO event, which was on May 3rd 2016. 
Hsu et al. (2010) in their sample found that in the period between 10 days before and 1 day 
after the IPO amounts to a -0,40% cumulative abnormal returns and is significant at the 5% 
level.  
Here the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated following the first method 
proposed by Santos & Victorio (2013) who start from definition of abnormal returns as the 
difference from actual returns and normal returns. Normal returns are the ones calculated 
through the Capital Asset Pricing Model as follows: 
(6>) = 7> + 8>6k 
So, Abnormal Returns (AR) are the difference between the daily stock return and the daily 
market index return, which can be approximated by the S&P500 index at time t.  
6> = 6> −	[	7> + 8>6k] 
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In this equation	7 is the intercept and	8 is the slope of the characteristic line from the CAPM. 
This method is called Market Adjusted Returns. The second method presented by Santos & 
Victorio (2013) is not used since is considered, according to the authors, analogous and able 
to bring to the same result. 
To study the AR in the Technogym case, for each of the five competitors chosen it was 
applied the Market Adjusted Returns method. So for each of them, a sample of more than 200 
days was taken. For each days was registered the price at close of the stock and of the 
reference index. The index taken was chosen for its significance as a proxy of the market 
returns. For example of US firms the index chosen was the S&P500, for Amer Sport, which is 
listed on the Helsinki stock exchange, the OMX Helsinki GI was chosen, and for Johnson 
Health Tech, which is listed in the Taiwanese stock exchange, the index of reference was 
chosen. Those data were used to calculate 7 and	8 with a OLS model. Once these two 
numbers were calculated, they were used to calculate the AR for each firm, in a interval 
around the day of the event, which is considered to be May 3rd, the day of the listing of 
Technogym in the Milan Stock Exchange. For each competitor it can be displayed a 
significative negative tendency during the decided interval of time. Next step was calculating, 
for each day, the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) in the following way: 
6 = 16>

> !
 
The significance on the AAR for each day is also tested with t-statistics in the following way: 
	On = 6oOn √⁄  
Finally the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the specific firm and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAAR) for all the firms together are calculated as follows: 
6 = 6X!6 
6 = 6X! + 6 
And tested with the t-statistic: 
	SOn = 6oSOn √⁄  
A strongly negative tendency was displayed around the IPO event. 
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Exhibit 17 Technogym: CAAR 
 
Numerical results at the end of the interval are the following: 
Exhibit 18 Technogym: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
Date
 CAR 
Brunswick
CAR 
Nautilus
CAR  
Amer
CAR 
Johnson AARt CAARt test t p value
04/05/2016 0,89% -5,73% -1,24% -2,37% -1,53% -2,11% -11,31 2,13E-07
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns are widely negative, and the test shows a strong 
significance. 
Hsu et al. (2010) analyzed also a longer period of time, taking the prices between 10 days 
before at 10 days after the IPO. This interval was also analyzed in Technogym case, but 
results here are less clear. While for Brunswick and Amer Sport there is a significative 
negative relation, for Nautilus and Johnson Health Tech relation becomes positive.  Going 
more deeply, for Nautilus there is a positive, exceptional peek on May 10th. It was due to the 
announcement of the approval by the Board of Directors of a 10 million dollars share 
repurchasing program. This is a exceptionally important news, that put a strong upward 
pressure on share price, since it is a very strong way of remunerating investors. The peak in 
stock price surely depends on the announcement and cover the effect of Technogym’s IPO. 
Speaking about Johnson Health Tech, there is a slightly positive tendency during the IPO 
event. Since there are no particular news or announcements on these days, it is reasonable to 
think that the market reacted to the IPO of the competitor in a positive way after few days. 
This ambiguous situation emerges also from the results of Average Abnormal Returns at the 
end of the interval, which are slightly negative but not significant: 
-2,50%
-2,00%
-1,50%
-1,00%
-0,50%
0,00%
0,50%
1,00%
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Exhibit 19:  Average abnormal returns 
Date BrunswickNautilus Amer Johnson AARt t stat p-value
17/05/2016 -0,52% 0,78% -1,31% 0,20% -0,21% -0,67195 0,509300993
 
This interval was shown to be too big: it seems that after ten days from the IPO the market 
override the news of Technogym IPO. This seems plausible, since the competitors used here 
are very big global players, not only with their own market, but also highly diversified: it is 
reasonable to see a negative reaction around the event which remains just for few days. This is 
confirmed using a smaller interval: between ten days before and four days after the IPO event, 
CAAR remains negative: 
Exhibit 20 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
Date
 CAR 
Brunswick
CAR 
Nautilus
CAR  
Amer
CAR 
Johnson AARt CAARt test t p-value
09/05/2016 -1,26% -4,25% -0,89% -0,81% 0,99% -1,80% -7,79 1,863E-06
 
In conclusion, the thesis of Hsu et al. (2010) is confirmed in this case: it is possible to notice a 
drop in competitors CAAR around the IPO event. This drop is particularly evident in the 
interval between 1o days before and 1 day after the IPO event, while, taking a ampler interval 
of time the tendency remains significantly negative. We were not able to confirm the thesis 
using the most ample interval used by Hsu et al. (2010) , were ARR were not significative. 
These results support the hypothesis that competitors suffer stock price drops around the 
completion of an IPO in their industry. 
5.6. Technogym’s Porter analysis  
Before proceeding with firm valuation we will try to access its competitive positioning using 
the five forces’ Porter analysis. This will be really helpful in accessing the risks and the 
sustainability of firm’s performance. 
Bargaining power of buyers 
Technogym operates using three retail channel and a wholesale channel. Wholesale channel is 
formed by foreign distributors who intermediates with final users and professional operators. 
The retail channel are the following: 
• field sales: Technogym’s sale agents  
• inside sales: online sales 
• retail: point of sales directly owned and managed by Technogym 
Turnover is generated by these four channels in the following proportion: 
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Exhibit 21 Technogym's turnover segmental analysis 
 2015 2014 2013 
Field sales 69% 70% 69,6% 
Wholesale 22% 21,7% 22,6% 
Inside sales 7,2% 6,3% 6% 
Retail 1,8% 1,9% 1,9% 
 
Sales agents not controlled by Technogym produce less than one fourth of revenues. This is a 
consistent percentage but still allows firm to maintain some bargaining power with them. 
What has more significance is the important of key account clients, who are typically fitness 
center chains, hotel and wellness chains, medical centers and other multinational chains. The 
relationship with them is directly managed by Technogym with the dedicated key account 
managers, since those clients produce a great volume of turnover. In 2015 key account clients 
part of the “Club” segment produced 25,5% of Technogym’s revenues. It is clear that they 
have an high bargaining power, because a possible missed renewal of contracts with them 
would consistently reduce firm’s turnover.  
Bargaining power of suppliers 
Technogym products require different kind of raw materials, which include iron, plastic, steel 
and electronic components. Those materials account for almost 40% of operating result. So 
suppliers play a major role in firm profitability. Firm suppliers are widely diversified, and the 
10 bigger suppliers accounted for 33% of raw materials in 2015, so the concentration does not 
look worrying. Some problems could still arise from a breaking of the commercial relation 
with them, that could be harmful, but not in an alarming way. 
Rivalry among existing firms 
Technogym operates in the market of fitness equipment and is one of the leader at the global 
level of this sector. This sector is characterized by an high level of competitiveness and by the 
presence of some major international competitors. In 2014 the seven biggest players 
accounted for 38% of market share, anyway the market is characterized by the presence of 
many small competitors operating and the local level or specialized in a more restricted 
segment. Taking into account this industry composition the rivalry is considered medium high 
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Threat of new entrants 
The absence of strong legal barriers and the vivacity of consumer markets makes easy for new 
players to enter in the market. Anyway the possibility to such firms to grow and break 
through the business sector is unlikely, so threat is considered medium low. 
Threat of substitute products 
Overall the threat of products of services that could serve to customers for the athletic 
preparation and the physical rehabilitation is present and of medium significance. It is of 
extreme importance for Technogym to maintain high the level of interest in these products by 
the market. 
The analysis is done also graphically with the following scale: 
Exhibit 22: five forces impact 
 
The results of the five forces is the following: 
Exhibit 23 Technogym: five forces analysis 
 
The industry structure seems favorable, with only the threat of substitute product being lower 
than 2.5 . 
 Score from Score to Meaning
0 1 Very Weak
1,1 2 Weak
2,1 2,4 Low medium
2,5 2,5 Medium
2,6 3 High medium
3,1 4 Strong
4,1 5 Very strong
 Five forces
Degree of rivalry 2,8
New entrants 2,7
Substitutes 2,7
Buyer power 2,1
Supplier power 1,8
Avg 2,4
FF impact Low medium
Degree of rivalry
New entrants
SubstitutesBuyer power
Supplier power
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5.7. Assessment of firm performance and sustainability through peer group 
analysis 
Next step in firm valuation is the analysis of firm performance using a comparable firm. To 
find a suitable group of comparable firms we looked at major world competitors operating in 
the same industry sector: the production and distribution of training equipment. Inside this 
group we just picked up listed firms. This choice firstly depends on the availability of 
information: stock exchanges require to publish some information about the firm to reduce 
investors’ information asymmetry. Secondly the choice depends on the homogeneity of listed 
firms in terms of possibility to raise capital and financing projects of growth. Moreover 
analysts coverage and auditing control is always present and ensures a level of trustfulness 
and homogeneity of information.  
The peer group was formed taking into account industry composition: going more in detail it 
results that the industry is dominated by 5 major players that share the market globally. They 
are: Brunswick Inc, Nautilus Inc, Johnson Health Tech, Amer Sport and Technogym. 
Brunswick Inc was founded in 1845 in Ohio. It is traded in the New York and Chicago stock 
exchanges and operates with 12600 employees all around the world. It operates in three 
segments of activity: Engine, Boat at Fitness, which contributes respectively to 50%, 31% and 
19% of the turnover. The fitness segments produced 795 millions $ revenues in 2015. This 
category is comprehensive of cardio, strength, rehabilitation equipment together with the 
billiards tables and the game rooms products, of which Brunswick is the major producer in the 
US. In the fitness segment Brunswick operates with the following brands: Life Fitness, 
Hammer Stregth, Cybex, SCIFIT, InMovement, and Brunswick Billiards. Life Fitness, which 
today is the brand with the greater market share globally (12% of total sales), was founded 
1977. 
Nautilus sells cardio and strength equipment for home use through the brands Bowflex, 
Nautilus, Schwinn and Universal. It is particularly strong is selling directly to consumers 
through a strong brand identity built with strong marketing campaigns.Revenues in 2015 were 
$ 335 million. 
Johnson Health Tech is a Taiwanese firm founded in 1975 and it is specialized in fitness 
equipment production (treadmills, exercise bikes, elliptical machines, rowing machines, step 
machines, massage armchairs and weight training machines). It is the major player in Asia. It 
operates with the brands Johnson, Matrix, Vision, Horizon and Tempo. 
93 
 
Amer Sport  operates in the field of sporting goods, selling both to trade customers and 
directly to final users, balancing the presence in sporting goods chains and brand stores, 
factory outles and e-commerce. In 2015 sales were € 2,5 billion, distributed between the 
various brands: Salomon, Wilson, Atomic, Arc’teryx, Mavic, Suunto, Precor, DeMarini, 
Louisville Slugger, ENVE Composites,distributed between Outdoor, Ball Sports and Fitness. 
Outdoor segment in 2015 created turnover for € 1,5 billion, and entails fottwearn apparel, 
winter sports equipment, cycling and sports instruments. Ball Sports produced turnover for 
€647 million shared between individual ball sports and team sports. Fitness segment instead 
produced €357 million turnover. 
To calculate the following ratios it was necessary to do a reclassification of the balance sheet 
and income statement of Technogym and of comparable firms. The details of the 
reclassification are presented in Appendix 1 and 2. 
First step is looking at Technogym profitability compared to peer group: profitability 
followed a growing path in the last year, and it is much higher than competitors.  
Exhibit 24 Technogym: profitability ratios 
 
Technogym’s perspectives are also encouraging if we look at grow rates.  Again Technogym 
performance is encouraging, with a compound annual grow rate of 11% in revenues and 23% 
in EBITDA. What is even more encouraging is that this growth in revenues is accompanied 
by a reduction in invested capital.  More in detail, there is an increase in trade working 
capital, which is due to the increase in revenues, but a decrease in operating fixed capital: so 
also with a reduction of fixed capital revenues are increasing. 
 
Profitability 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
ROE 40% 85% 106% 12% 7% 14% 71% 19% 22% 138% 22% 20%
ROIC 12% 17% 42% 9% 6% 8% 1106% 157% 28% 87% 20% 22%
Premium over book capital 102% 102% 101% 130% 129% 132% 290% 125% 149% 142% 132% 135%
ROIC without goodwill 13% 17% 42% 11% 8% 11% 3208% 197% 42% 124% 26% 29%
Check 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Pretax ROIC 15% 41% 82% 16% 11% 20% 1053% 292% 63% 47% 37% 40%
Operating margin (ROS) 3% 7% 12% 7% 5% 8% 7% 11% 12% 8% 9% 8%
Revenues/invested capital 447% 570% 693% 222% 223% 246% 14649% 2660% 527% 555% 421% 478%
Check 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Net working capital/revenues -1% -1% 0% 24% 25% 22% -9% -4% 3% 3% 5% 6%
Operating fixed assets/revenues 21% 17% 15% 17% 17% 17% 10% 8% 16% 14% 13% 11%
BRUNSWICKAMER SPORTTECHNOGYM NAUTILUS
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Exhibit 25 Technogym: growth rates 
 
Management of working capital can be improved even if it is not worring. Nautilus seems 
more efficient in managing inventories and receivables, while Amer has a worse position in 
this these ratios. 
Exhibit 26 Technogym: working capital ratios 
 
Concerning the financial structure, comparables firms resulted to have some excess cash that 
made the net financial position negative, so of an extreme low level. Notwithstanding this 
benchmark, Technogym position appears good: in the last years there was a strong 
improvement in leverage, due to a reduction of net financial position. 
Exhibit 27 Technogym: Financial structure 
 
The debt coverage improved a lot in the last year, surpassing most of the competitors, and  the 
ratio concerning FCF from operation over NFP is particularly good. This makes evident that 
not only debt position improved a lot, but also ability to repay debt is very good, with an 
excellent ability to pay debt cost and at the same time remunerating investors. This can be 
shown from EBIT/interest ratio: the margin remained after having paid all operating costs and 
 
Growth rates 2013 2014 2015 CAGR 13-15 2013 2014 2015
CAGR 
13-15 2013 2014 2015
CAGR 
13-15 2013 2014 2015
CAGR 
13-15
Revenues 0% 13% 10% 11% 4% 4% 14% 11% 13% 25% 22% 32% 5% -1% 7% 5%
EBITDA -35% 72% 35% 23% 10% -19% 61% 19% 38% 80% 28% 78% 9% 4% 5% 9%
EBITA -63% 137% 83% 27% 12% -26% 79% 21% 49% 92% 34% 95% 12% 2% 3% 9%
NOPAT -60% 18% 125% 2% 17% -27% 37% 8% 346% -58% 31% 58% 247% -73% 6% 0%
IC 1% -24% 8% -9% 2% 5% 5% 6% -82% 1760% 575% 375% 84% -12% 6% 30%
IC excl goodwill 1% -23% 8% -8% 4% 4% 2% 5% -132% 1654% 378% ##### 144% -17% 7% 48%
Trade work cap 2% 28% 13% 22% -1% 10% 7% 8% -95% 152% 366% -25% 9% 11% 3% 12%
Oper fixed capital -6% -14% 7% -7% 0% 1% 29% 14% 1% -4% 346% 108% 4% -29% 12% -9%
AMER SPORT NAUTILUS BRUNSWICKTECHNOGYM
 
Working Capital 
Management 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
Working Cash 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Receivables 65 59 60 88 89 81 26 35 49 34 37 35
Inventories 48 49 43 61 68 69 12 33 46 56 62 61
Suppliers 83 73 67 37 39 40 (62) (63) (67) (30) (30) (30)
Trade working cap 34 39 40 115 121 115 (20) 8 32 65 72 70
Check #RIF! #RIF! #RIF! #RIF! #RIF! #RIF!
BRUNSWICKTECHNOGYM AMER SPORT NAUTILUS
 
Financial Struct 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
NFP/Equity 24,0 6,1 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,5 (0,7) (0,6) 0,2 0,1 (0,1) (0,1)
NFP/EBITA 6,3 1,9 0,6 3,1 4,0 2,4 (4,1) (2,3) 0,6 0,4 (0,2) (0,5)
NFP/EBITDA 2,6 1,1 0,5 2,5 2,9 1,9 (3,4) (2,0) 0,5 0,3 (0,2) (0,4)
TECHNOGYM AMER SPORT NAUTILUS BRUNSWICK
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having considered also the cost of replacement of operating assets allow to cover the interest 
on debt 47,1 times.  
Exhibit 28 Technogym: coverage ratios 
 
In conclusion of this analysis we can assert that firm profitability is encouraging, both in term 
of return on invest capital and also in term of return on equity. Grow rates are increasing and 
well positioned compared to competitors. Working capital management is efficient, even in 
there is space for improvements. Considering financial structure, it is hard to make a 
comparison with competitors, because many of them has excess cash, anyway debt appears 
sustainable, also because there was a debt reduction in the last period. Taking this into 
consideration the debt coverage does not present any kind of problem.  
5.8. IPO valuation through multiples 
In this part of the chapter we will try to investigate firm value using multiple analysis. The 
case analysis of multiples start with the use of the traditional ratios widely applied in the 
market, so P/E and M/B ratios (price and exchange rate at August 5th 2016). 
Exhibit 29 Technogym: P/E and P/BV ratios 
 
It actually results that variability across peer group is lower using earnings estimates, as 
Koller et al (2015) mentioned. Using P/E ratio to value Technogym leads to the following 
result: 
 
Coverage 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
EBIT/interest 3 9 47 5 3 5 437 1206 1831 4 12 13
EBITA/interest 5 10 49 5 3 5 437 1206 1831 4 12 14
EBITDA/interest 11 19 64 7 4 7 529 1367 1986 5 14 17
Cash for inv/NFP 10% 43% 60% 15% 7% 4% -34%
-9% -359% 13% 106% 160%
FCFO/NFP 11% 55% 63% 9% 1% -2% -84% 4% -508% 15% 7% 4%
BRUNSWICKTECHNOGYM AMER SPORT NAUTILUS
 
Company Name
Price
Last 
close
P/BV last 
available P/E 15 P/E 16
Brunswick 44,8 3,5 14,3 12,5
Amer Sport 26,7 3,3 20,4 17,5
Johnson Healt Tech 1,4 1,6 11,8 10,0
Nautilus 18,9 5,1 18,3 15,6
Avg 3,38x 16,20x 13,88x
Avg Adj 3,40x 16,28x 14,03x
Median 3,40x 16,28x 14,03x
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Exhibit 30 Technogym: valuation using P/E ratio 
 
This result is influenced by the financial position of competitors, which varies a lot between 
the firms. 
Exhibit 31 Technogym: valuation using P/E multiple for each competitor 
 
Let’s go further in the analysis using a measure that eliminates distorting effect of different 
capital structure. 
Exhibit 32 Technogym: valuation using EV/S multiple 
 
The use of enterprise value instead of price avoid the influence of the different capital 
structure of firms in the peer group, so the valuation is improved. At the same time the use of 
sales, even if it is a good approximation of the ability of the firm of producing cash flow for 
 
 € million 2015 2016
Earnings 28.168,0 48.709,5
PE multiple* 16,3x 14,0x
Equity Value 458.685,6 683.240,1
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0 200.000,0
Value per share (€) 2,29 3,42
*Median of comparable companies
 
Company Name NFP last available P/E 15 Value per share P/E 16 Value per share
Brunswick -172,38 14,27 2,01 12,48 3,04
Amer Sport 585,00 20,44 2,88 17,49 4,26
Johnson Healt Tech 86,81 11,79 1,66 9,99 2,43
Nautilus 19,85 18,29 2,58 15,57 3,79
 
 € million 2015 2016
Sales 511.102,0 542.305,9
EV/S multiple* 1,28x 1,19x
Value of operations 655.277,9 642.843,1
Non-operating assets 6.193,0 6.193,0
Enterprise Value 661.470,9 649.036,1
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39.884,0 36.186,0
Minority interest 433,0 400,0
Equity Value 621.153,9 612.450,1
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0 200.000,0
Value per share (€) 3,11 3,06
*Average of comparable companies (restricted sample)
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investors, doesn’t account for the operating costs, neither the investments in operating capital. 
It is better to look for a more representative measure. 
Exhibit 33 Technogym: valuation using EBITDA multiple 
 
Exhibit 34 Technogym: valuation using EBIT multiple 
 
As already explained in the previous chapter, EBITDA doesn’t account for the investments in 
operating assets, while EBIT could contain some double counting for investments in 
customers lists and brand knowledge. A more precise measure could be the use of the OLS 
regression to estimate the multiple instead of using the average from the peer group. 
 
 € million 2015 2016
EBITDA 80.029,0 91.447,6
EBITDA multiple* 10,6x 9,4x
Value of operations 848.156,2 861.764,8
Non-operating assets 6.193,0 6.193,0
Enterprise Value 854.349,2 867.957,8
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39.884,0 36.186,0
Minority interest 433,0 400,0
Equity Value 814.032,2 831.371,8
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0 200.000,0
Value per share (€) 4,07 4,16
*Average of comparable companies (restricted sample)
 
 € million 2015 2016
EBIT 57.430,0 63.746,1
EBIT multiple* 13,6x 11,6x
Value of operations 778.750,0 741.162,3
Non-operating assets 6.193,0 6.193,0
Enterprise Value 784.943,0 747.355,3
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39.884,0 36.186,0
Minority interest 433,0 400,0
Equity Value 744.625,9 710.769,2
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0 200.000,0
Value per share (€) 3,72 3,55
*Average of comparable companies (restricted sample)
98 
 
Exhibit 35 Technogym: valuation using EV/Sales muliple calculated through 
regression 
 
Exhibit 36 Technogym: valuation using EBITDA multiple calculated through 
regression 
 
For a more accurate valuation we will try to estimate EV/NOPLAT and EV/EBITA ratio. 
Since to determine NOPLAT some calculation is needed, starting from the financial review, 
we have to exclude Johnson Health Tech from the calculation, because its balance sheet is 
publicly available only in Mandarin language. 
 
 € million 2015
Sales 511.102,0
EV/S multiple* 1,77x
Value of operations 904.725,3
Non-operating assets 6.193,0
Enterprise Value 910.918,3
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39.884,0
Minority interest 433,0
Equity Value 870.601,3
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0
Value per share (€) 4,4
*Calculated through regression
 
 € million 2015
EBITDA 80.029,0
EBITDA multiple* 9,4x
Value of operations 753.484,5
Non-operating assets 6.193,0
Enterprise Value 759.677,5
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39.884,0
Minority interest 433,0
Equity Value 719.360,5
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0
Value per share (euros) 3,6
*Calculated through regression
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Exhibit 37 Technogym: valuation using EV/NOPLAT multiple 
 
Exhibit 38 Technogym: valuation using EV/EBITA multiple 
 
What emerges from valuation through multiples is a great variability in the range of value per 
share. Moreover in this case the usefulness of peer group is limited: many firms operating in 
the same market of Technogym are widely diversified, and produce also other kind of sports 
related equipment like sportive shoes and clothing, tennis equipment, billiards tables, boats 
engines. This changes a lot the market dynamics of these firms and the risk factors, 
considering that they are more diversified. For what concerns the two other comparable firms 
which operate only in the sport equipment sector, Nautilus and Johnson Health Tech. 
5.9. DCF and economic profit methods 
In this part of the chapter the Discounted Cash Flow method and the Economic Profit method 
will be used to estimate more precisely value per share. 
 
 € million 2015
NOPLAT 50.098,1
EV/NOPLAT 28,0x
Value of operations 1.400.774,3
Non-operating assets 6.193,0
Enterprise Value 1.406.967,3
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39.884,0
Minority interest 433,0
Equity Value 1.366.650,3
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0
Value per share (euros) 6,8
*Average of comparable companies (restricted sample)
 
 € million 2015
EBITA 60.722,0
EV/EBITA 17,4x
Value of operations 1.056.771,9
Non-operating assets 6.193,0
Enterprise Value 1.062.964,9
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39.884,0
Minority interest 433,0
Equity Value 1.022.647,9
Number of share outstanding (million) 200.000,0
Value per share (euros) 5,1
*Average of comparable companies (restricted sample)
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The valuation started with revenues estimation, which was done taking into consideration the 
possibility of growth for the next five years. This growth was calculated considering the 
market positioning of Technogym product, threat’s from competitors and firm’s strengths.  
Exhibit 39 Technogym: assumption on Revenues in percentages 
 
Exhibit 40 Technogym: assumptions on Revenues in € million 
Personnel costs and other operating costs were estimated with OLS regression starting from 
their percentage on sales. 
Exhibit 41 Technogym: assumptions on Personnel Costs 
 
Exhibit 42 Technogym: regression of Personnel Costs 
 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CAGR 
15-20
Assumption on revenues
Italy 0,00% 12,0% 1,3% 2,3% 2,2% 2,1% 2,1% 2,1% 2,2%
EU 0,00% 11,7% 17,6% 12,5% 13,0% 12,0% 10,0% 9,0% 11,3%
Extra EU -0,33% 15,6% 2,4% 5,0% 5,2% 5,4% 5,6% 6,0% 5,4%
Total revenues -0,13% 13,22% 9,97% 8,8% 9,3% 8,9% 8,0% 7,5% 8,5%
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Assumption on revenues
Italy 46,1 39,9 39,9 44,6 45,2 46,3 47,3 48,3 49,3 50,3
EU 189,4 210,2 210,2 234,8 276,1 310,6 351,0 393,1 432,4 471,3
Extra EU 154,7 161,5 160,9 186,0 190,5 200,0 210,4 221,8 234,2 248,2
Total revenues 390,1 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,8 556,9 608,7 663,1 715,9 769,9
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Assumptions on personnel costs
Personnel expenses -81,2 -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0 -109,9 -118,3 -126,8 -134,6 -142,4
% on sales 20,8% 20,8% 20,5% 19,7% 20,3% 19,7% 19,4% 19,1% 18,8% 18,5%
Pendence (0,00)  
Intercept 0,23   
RQ 39,9%
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Exhibit 43 Technogym: assumptions of Operating Costs 
 
Exhibit 44 Technogym: regression of Operating Costs 
 
Depreciation and amortization were considered as a portion of fixed capital. 
Exhibit 45 Technogym: assumptions on Depreciation and Amortization 
 
 Trade working capital was estimated starting from ratios of previous years, with some 
adaptation: 
Exhibit 46 Technogym: assumptions on Trade Working Capital 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded)
Operating cost -265,5 -289,4 -293,1 -315,0 -327,7 -349,9 -368,0 -384,4 -397,7 -408,7
% on sales 68,0% 70,3% 71,3% 67,7% 64,0% 62,8% 60,5% 58,0% 55,6% 53,1%
Pendence (0,000)   
Intercept 0,883    
RQ 65,4%
 Assumptions on Deprec & Amortiz 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
D&A of operating fixed capital 15,3 20,6 26,3 19,3 20,3 23,0 25,9 27,8 30,0
Operating fixed capital (Jan 1st) 73,1 90,6 84,8 72,6 77,9 88,3 95,8 103,1 111,0
Depreciation on operating fixed capital 20,9% 22,8% 31,0% 26,6% 26,0% 26,0% 27,0% 27,0% 27,0%
Depreciation on sales 3,7% 5,0% 5,6% 3,77% 3,64% 3,77% 3,90% 3,89% 3,89%
 Assumptions on 
Trade Working 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Working cash 4,1 4,1 4,7 5,1 5,6 6,1 6,6 7,2 7,7
Working cash on sales 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Trade receivables 61,5 73,0 75,5 84,1 91,5 101,7 110,8 119,6 130,8
Days in revenues 55 65 59 60 60 61 61 61 62
Inventories 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4 65,6 71,7 78,1 82,4 88,6
Days in revenues 54 48 49 43 43 43 43 42 42
Trade payable -88,6 -93,1 -93,2 -93,9 -102,3 -111,8 -123,5 -133,4 -143,4
Days in revenues 79 83 73 67 67 67 68 68 68
Trade working capital 37,6 38,5 49,2 55,7 60,4 67,7 72,0 75,8 83,6
Trade work capital on sales 9,1% 9,4% 10,6% 10,9% 10,8% 11,1% 10,9% 10,6% 10,9%
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Those estimations were used to calculate forecast the balance sheet and the income statement.  
Exhibit 47 Technogym: forecasted balance sheet 
 
The income statement is presented in a format that distinguish between funds invested and 
source of financing. This allows to make evident the Invested Capital, which is the starting 
point of calculation for DCF and EP. 
  € million
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Working cash* 5,1 5,6 6,1 6,6 7,2 7,7
Trade receivables 84,1 91,5 101,7 110,8 119,6 130,8
Inventories 60,4 65,6 71,7 78,1 82,4 88,6
Trade payable -93,9 -102,3 -111,8 -123,5 -133,4 -143,4
Trade working capital 55,7 60,4 67,7 72,0 75,8 83,6
Other current assets and liabilities -50,6 -50,6 -50,7 -50,7 -50,7 -50,7
Net working capital 5,1 9,8 17,0 21,3 25,1 32,9
Total operating fixed capital 77,9 88,3 95,8 103,1 111,0 119,5
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities -6,4 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 76,6 100,6 115,2 126,9 138,6 155,0
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 0,5 0,3 0,1 0,0 -0,2 -0,4
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 77,1 100,9 115,4 126,9 138,4 154,6
Non-operating assets 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,2
Total funds invested 83,3 107,1 121,6 133,0 144,6 160,8
Net financial position 36,8 38,1 -12,9 -87,8 -187,9 -307,5
Debt equivalents 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1
Net financial position and debt equivalents 39,9 41,2 -9,8 -84,7 -184,8 -304,4
Minority interests 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5
Shareholders' equity 43,0 65,5 131,0 217,2 328,9 464,7
Total source of financing 83,3 107,1 121,6 133,0 144,6 160,8
103 
 
Exhibit 48 Technogym: forecasted income statement 
 
Income statement makes evident the various margins. This format is very useful because it 
makes possible to calculate the NOPLAT (Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes). The 
starting point to calculate it is the EBITA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Amortization). 
This is used instead of EBITDA to take into account the use of operating assets to produce the 
revenues, moreover EBITA is preferable to EBIT because it avoid some double counting 
ofdepreciation of intangible assets such as brands, which are expensed and not capitalized. 
To calculate NOPLAT the operating taxes are subtracted to EBITA. Operating taxes differ 
from taxes in the income statement because they do not suffer the effect of non operating and 
extraordinary items.  
  € million
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Revenues 511,1 556,9 608,7 663,1 715,9 769,9
Other income 0,7 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,3
Change in inventories 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Raw materials, consumables and goods
-183,4 -195,8 -205,9 -215,1 -222,5 -228,7
Other operating costs
-4,9 -5,2 -5,5 -5,7 -5,9 -6,1
Service and disposal of assets
-139,5 -148,9 -156,6 -163,6 -169,3 -173,9
Operating costs -327,7 -349,9 -368,0 -384,4 -397,7 -408,7
Personnel expenses
-104,0 -109,9 -118,3 -126,8 -134,6 -142,4
EBITDA 80,0 98,1 123,4 153,1 184,7 220,1
Depreciation
-10,6 -11,2 -12,6 -14,2 -15,3 -16,5
Amortization of operating intangibles
-8,7 -9,1 -10,3 -11,6 -12,5 -13,5
Total D&A
-19,3 -20,3 -23,0 -25,9 -27,8 -30,0
EBITA 60,7 77,8 100,5 127,3 156,9 190,1
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill
-0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2
Receivables write-offs 0,0 -0,5 100,3 127,1 156,7 189,9
Impairments of assets
-0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges
-2,6 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0
EBIT 57,4 71,1 194,7 248,2 307,4 373,9
Share of joint venture result 1,0 1,8 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,9
Interest income (expense) from investments -0,9 -1,0 -1,0 -1,3 -1,3 -1,5
Exchange rate (losses) gains -1,3 -1,0 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -1,1
Financial (expense) income -1,2 -1,1 -0,4 0,5 1,4 1,9
Net financial result -2,6 -2,1 -1,3 -0,4 0,5 0,8
EBT 55,0 69,8 194,2 248,4 308,5 375,1
Taxes -26,6 -24,4 -62,1 -74,5 -83,3 -101,3
Group Net Income 28,4 45,3 132,0 173,9 225,2 273,8
Minority result -0,2 -0,3 -1,1 -1,4 -1,8 -2,2
Net Income 28,17 45,0 131,0 172,5 223,4 271,6
104 
 
Exhibit 49 Technogym: operating taxes calculation 
 
Exhibit 50 Technogym: NOPLAT calculation 
 
NOPLAT is the starting point to calculate Free Cash Flow from operations. 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
EBT 55,0 69,8 194,2 248,4 308,5 375,1
Income taxes -26,6 -24,4 -62,1 -74,5 -83,3 -101,3
Actual (blended global) tax rate 48,4% 35,0% 32,0% 30,0% 27,0% 27,0%
Adjustments:
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2
Estimated tax rate 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4%
Taxes 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Receivables write-offs 0,0 -0,5 100,3 127,1 156,7 189,9
Estimated tax rate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Taxes 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Impairments of assets (544,0) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Estimated tax rate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Taxes 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -2,6 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0
Estimated tax rate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Taxes 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Share of joint venture result 1,0 1,8 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,9
Estimated tax rate 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4%
Taxes -0,3 -0,5 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6
Interest income (expense) from investments -0,9 -1,0 -1,0 -1,3 -1,3 -1,5
Estimated tax rate 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4%
Taxes 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,5
Net financial result -2,6 -2,1 -1,3 -0,4 0,5 0,8
Estimated tax rate 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5%
Taxes 0,7 0,6 0,4 0,1 -0,1 -0,2
Estimated taxes on EBITA -27,3 -24,8 -62,3 -74,5 -83,0 -101,0
EBITA 60,7 77,8 100,5 127,3 156,9 190,1
Estimated tax rate on EBITA 45,0% 31,9% 62,0% 58,5% 52,9% 53,1%
Taxes on EBITA (27.343) (24.818) (62.290) (74.501) (83.022) (100.978)
Adjustments on taxes 724 401 153 (11) (267) (287)
Taxes on EBT (26.619) (24.416) (62.137) (74.511) (83.289) (101.264)
 
 € million
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
EBITA 60,7 77,8 100,5 127,3 156,9 190,1
Operating taxes -27,3 -24,8 -62,3 -74,5 -83,0 -101,0
NOPLAT 33,4 53,0 38,2 52,8 73,8 89,1
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Exhibit 51 Technogym: Free Cash Flow from operations calculation 
To triangulate results also cash available to investors is calculated, which, together with the 
net financial result, change in minority interest and in shareholder’s equity, determines the 
change in net financial position for the year. 
Exhibit 52 Technogym: change in NFP 
Next step is the calculation of Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), which is the 
weighted average cost of capital and average after tax cost of debt: 
 = $" /0(1 − ,1) +

" /2 
Value of debt (D) correspond to the last net financial position available (€39,9 million), while 
value of equity is calculated as market price*number of shares outstanding. This was 
calculated at May 7th: 200000*€3,8=€760 million. 
Cost of debt (k D) was calculated estimating debt rating first. Debt rating depends on leverage 
and coverage of the firm, synthesized by the following ratios: 
  € million
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT 33,4 53,0 38,2 52,8 73,8 89,1
Amortization of operating intangibles 8,7 9,1 10,3 11,6 12,5 13,5
Depreciation 10,6 11,2 12,6 14,2 15,3 16,5
Gross cash flow 52,7 73,2 61,2 78,6 101,7 119,1
Change in operating working capital -9,0 -4,7 -7,2 -4,3 -3,8 -7,8
Net capital expenditures -24,6 -30,6 -30,4 -33,2 -35,8 -38,5
Change in other operating assets and liabilities 8,6 -8,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Gross investment -25,0 -44,2 -37,6 -37,5 -39,6 -46,3
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar 27,7 29,0 23,5 41,1 62,1 72,8
Investments in goodwill and other intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar 27,7 29,0 23,5 41,1 62,1 72,8
  € million
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Investments in non-operating assets -1,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Receivables write-offs 0,0 -0,5 100,3 127,1 156,7 189,9
Impairments of assets -0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -2,6 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0 -6,0
Share of joint venture result 1,0 1,8 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,9
Interest income (expense) from investments -0,9 -1,0 -1,0 -1,3 -1,3 -1,5
Non-operating taxes 0,7 0,4 0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,3
Change in debt equivalents -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating cash flow -3,7 -5,3 95,3 121,6 151,0 184,1
Cash available to investors 24,0 23,7 118,8 162,8 213,1 256,8
Net financial result -2,6 -2,1 -1,3 -0,4 0,5 0,8
Change in minority interests 0,0 -0,4 -1,1 -1,3 -1,8 -2,2
Change in shareholders' equity 4,8 -22,5 -65,5 -86,2 -111,7 -135,8
Change in net financial position 26,2 -1,3 51,0 74,9 100,1 119,6
Beginning net financial position 63,0 36,8 38,1 -12,9 -87,8 -187,9
Ending net financial position 36,8 38,1 -12,9 -87,8 -187,9 -307,5
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Exhibit 53 Technogym: leverage and coverage ratios 
 
These ratios are indicative of the financial stability of the firm and of the sustainability of the 
debt. Since rating is an approximation of risk it is also the starting point for the cost of debt.  
Three ratios were weighted to calculate a synthetic rating.  
Exhibit 54 Technogym: key financial ratios and rating 
Using Damodaran (2014) conversion table, to the rating were associated a specific rating 
 Financial Structure 2012 2013 2014 2015
NFP/Equity 17,5 24,0 6,1 0,8
NFP/EBITA 2,3 6,3 1,9 0,6
NFP/EBITDA 1,7 2,6 1,1 0,5
Coverage 2012 2013 2014 2015
EBIT/interest 12,8 2,5 8,8 47,1
EBITA/interest 15,4 4,5 10,4 48,9
EBITDA/interest 21,7 11,2 18,6 64,4
Cash available for investors/NFP -13% 10% 43% 60%
FCF from operation/NFP -8% 11% 55% 63%
 Debt/EBITDA EBITA/Interest expense FCF/Debt
from to Rating from to Rating from to Rating
0,0 0,4 AAA 12,5 100,0 AAA 154,6% 1000,0% AAA
0,4 1,0 AA 9,5 12,5 AA 42,5% 154,6% AA
1,0 1,5 A 4,5 9,5 A 30,9% 42,5% A
1,5 2,3 BBB 4,0 4,5 BBB 14,1% 30,9% BBB
2,3 3,0 BB 3,0 4,0 BB 7,8% 14,1% BB
3,0 5,4 B 2,0 3,0 B 2,1% 7,8% B
5,4 100,0 C-CCC 0,0 2,0 C-CCC 0,0% 2,1% C-CCC
Technogym case:
2015 0,5 AA 48,9 AAA 62,3% AA
Score 0,75 0,25 0,75
Weight 33% 33% 33%
Weighted score 0,58
Rating AA
Score
from to Rating Rating Spread Beta Debt
0,0 0,5 AAA 0,25 AAA 0,65% 0,05
0,5 1,0 AA 0,75 AA 1,15% 0,07
1,0 1,5 A 1,25 A 1,40% 0,10
1,5 2,5 BBB 2,00 BBB 2,50% 0,14
2,5 3,5 BB 3,00 BB 4,25% 0,28
3,5 4,5 B 4,00 B 5,50% 0,40
4,5 5,0 C-CCC 4,75 C-CCC 8,75% 0,80
Source: Damodaran (2014)
Synthetic 
score
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spread. Cost of debt is the sum of the risk free rate and of the debt spread. As risk-free rate 
proxy was used the return of theIRS in a length of 10 years, which was 0,57% on May. 
Exhibit 55 Technogym: cost of debt calculation 
 
Once the calculation of cost of debt is completed, it is time to calculate cost of equity. Using 
the CAPM it is calculated as follows: 
[6>] = # + 8>([61] − #) 
Risk free rate used remains the same explained before. Anyway it was added the country risk 
premium to take into consideration the risk of the different countries where the firm is 
operating. Damoradan last updated estimation of country risk premium was used, and this was 
weighted for the sales of Technogym in the various part of the globle, as follows. 
Exhibit 56 Technogym: Country risk premium calculation 
 
The total country risk premium was 1,56%. To calculate market risk premium ([61] − #) 
Damodaran last updated calculation was used, and it was 6,25%. Finally the beta was 
calculated. Since to calculate beta using OLS regression was not accurate in this case, because 
observations available were of a short period of time (Technogym went public just few 
months ago), the beta of comparable firms were used. More precisely, from beta equity of 
comparables, the unlevered beta was calculated. Since the level of debt is low, I assumed that 
beta debt is zero, to simplify calculation. Then the mean of competitors were used as proxy of 
industry unlevered beta. This was then used to calculated Technogym’s beta equity. 
 Debt rating AA
Debt spread*** 1,15%
Risk free rate* 0,57%
Cost of debt (Kd) 1,72%
 CRP SALES 2015 % CRP*SALES
Europe (Italy excluded) 1,49% 53,90% 0,80%
APAC (Asia and  Pacific) 3,70% 13,50% 0,50%
North America (Usa, Canada) 0,00% 10,60% 0,00%
Italy 2,93% 8,80% 0,26%
MEIA (Middle East, India, Africa) 5,13% 9,70% 0,50%
LATAM Latin America 5,74% 3,40% 0,20%
Group (Total) 100% 1,56%
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Exhibit 57 Technogym: Unlevered beta calculation through comparables 
 
82 = 8G [1 + 34\= 1,37*(1+5%)=1,44 
The calculation led to the following cost of debt: 
ke= 0,57%+1,60%+(6,25%x1,44)=11,20% 
Debt tax rate used was 27,5%. So the WACC in the end was the following: 
 = 345 /0(1 − ,1) +
4
45 /2 = [5% ∗1,72%*(1-27,5%)]+[95%*11,20%]=10,77% 
Now all the data need to calculate Economic Profit are available. Firstly we calculate ROIC as 
NOPLATt/Invested Capitalt-1. Then we calculated the spread between ROIC and WACC. The 
economic profit is Invested Capitalt x Spread. 
 beta equity D/E 1+ D/E beta unlevered
Brunswick 1,89 -0,15 0,85 2,22
Nautilus 2,01 0,17 1,17 1,71
Johnson Health Tech1,51 0,32 1,32 1,14
Amer Sport 0,67 0,62 1,62 0,41
Mean 1,37
Mean Adj 1,43
Median 1,43
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Exhibit 58 Technogym: Economic Profit calculation 
 
Enterprise value is then calculated: 
Exhibit 59 Technogym: Enterprise Value calculation using EP method 
 
Now also the calculation through Discounted Cash Flow is also possible. 
 
 € million 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Before goodwill
ROIC 69,1% 38,0% 45,8% 58,2% 64,3%
WACC 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7%
Spread 58,4% 27,3% 35,1% 47,5% 53,6%
Invested capital 76,6 100,6 115,2 126,9 138,6 155,0
Economic profit 44,8 27,4 40,4 60,3 74,3
NOPLAT 33,4 53,0 38,2 52,8 73,8 89,1
Capital charge -8,2 -10,8 -12,3 -13,6 -14,8
Economic profit 44,8 27,4 40,4 60,3 74,3
After goodwill
ROIC 68,7% 37,9% 45,7% 58,2% 64,4%
WACC 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7%
Spread 58,0% 27,2% 35,0% 47,5% 53,7%
Invested capital 77,1 100,9 115,4 126,9 138,4 154,6
Economic profit 44,7 27,4 40,4 60,3 74,3
NOPLAT 33,4 53,0 38,2 52,8 73,8 89,1
Capital charge -8,2 -10,8 -12,3 -13,6 -14,8
Economic profit 44,7 27,4 40,4 60,3 74,3
  € million
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
 Base for 
CV
Economic profit 44,8 27,4 40,4 60,3 74,3 74,3
WACC 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7%
Discount Factor 0,90 0,82 0,74 0,67 0,60
Present value of EP 40,5 22,4 29,8 40,1 44,7
Present value of EP2014-2018 177,5
Continuing value of EP 513,9 854,4
Total economic value added 691,4
Invested capital 76,6
Value of operations 768,1
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Exhibit 60 Technogym: Enterprise Value calculation using DCF 
 
Exhibit 61 Technogym: equity valuation 
 
DCF and Economic Profit methods lead to a valuation of €3,7 per share. This valuation is 
widely influenced by the estimation of WACC and long term grow rate: a change in one of 
these two factors would change consistently the final value per share, as it is shown in the 
following table. 
 
 € million 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
 Base for 
CV
NOPLAT 53,0 38,2 52,8 73,8 89,1 90,9
Change in invested capital -24,0 -14,7 -11,6 -11,7 -16,3 -3,1
Free cash flow 29,0 23,5 41,1 62,1 72,8 87,8
WACC 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7% 10,7%
Discount Factor 0,90 0,82 0,74 0,67 0,60
Present value of FCF 26,2 19,2 30,3 41,4 43,8
Present value of FCF2014-2018 160,9
Continuing value 607,2 1009,3
Value of operations 768,1
  € million
2015
Value of operations 768,1
Non-operating assets 6,2
Enterprise Value 774,3
Net financial position and debt equivalents39,9
Minority interest 0,4
Equity Value 733,9
Number of share outstanding (million)200.000
Value per share (euros) 3,7
BIT:BRE
Price per share (2016.05.11) 3,75
Price per share (max 2016) 3,95
Price per share (min 2016) 3,51
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Exhibit 62 Technogym: sensitivity analysis on shares' value 
 
The value estimation through DCF and Economic Profit seems coherent with the one done 
with multiples: 
Exhibit 63 Technogym: valuation synthesis 
 
 
5.10. From share valuation to pricing – market evidences 
On April 20th 2016 started the period of institutional placement.  In this period the offer was 
addressed exclusively to institutional investors and involved a maximum of 50 million shares, 
corresponding to 25% of Technogym’s share capital, all of which was offered for sale by the 
shareholder Salhouse Holding. Salhouse Holding also granted the Joint Global Coordinators a 
greenshoe option to purchase, at the offer price, a maximum of 7,5 million additional shares, 
that should have been exercised within 30 days after the start of the trading in the stock 
exchange. 
 Sensitivity Analysis on Value per share (€)
WACC
3,7 9,7% 10,2% 10,7% 11,2% 11,7% 12,2%
0,0% 3,6 3,3 3,1 3,0 2,8 2,7
0,5% 3,7 3,5 3,3 3,1 2,9 2,7
1,0% 3,9 3,6 3,4 3,2 3,0 2,8
1,5% 4,0 3,8 3,5 3,3 3,1 2,9
g 2,0% 4,2 3,9 3,7 3,4 3,2 3,0
2,5% 4,5 4,1 3,8 3,6 3,3 3,1
3,0% 4,8 4,4 4,0 3,7 3,5 3,3
3,5% 5,1 4,6 4,3 3,9 3,7 3,4
 
EV/NOPLAT EV/EBITA
3,1 4,35 4,07 3,85 3,72 2,29 4,50 5,11
Multiples*
EV/EBIT P/EEV/Sales (Row)
EV/Sales 
(Regr)
EV/EBITDA 
(Row)
EV/EBITDA 
(Regr)
 
RONIC** 58,7%
WACC 10,7%
market g 1,0% 2,0% 3,0%
Value per share as of 2015.05.11 3,75 3,4 3,7 4,0
DCF/EP
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Exhibit 64Technogym: change in shareholders' composition 
 
This offer period was set up for the purpose of enabling expressions of interest by 
Institutional Investors. The  Global Coordinators established a valuation range of the 
Company's share capital between approximately €600 million and approximately €750 
million, corresponding to a minimum price of €3.00 per share and a maximum price of €3.75 
per share. 
This price range implies a certain price discount decided during the phase before 
bookbuilding period, to encourage investors to bid and express their demand for firm’s shares 
and their valuation about the firm itself.  
The offer period ended on April 28th 2016 at final offer price was established at €3,25 per 
share: at this price book was covered four times, so this price ensured that there was a market 
of firm’s shares and avoided stagnation in transaction.  
With this price the discount on share value was only partially recouped, and the investor 
selling its shares (Salhouse Holding) left on the table a great deal of money. This can be 
noticed by the price run up of the first days: 
 Shareholders Shares 
to be
sold 
with 
the 
trading
Greensho
e option
Wellness Holding 120 mil 60% - 120 mil 60% - 120 mil 60%
Salhouse Holding 80 mil 40% 50 mil 30 mil 15% 7,5 mil 22,5 mil 11,25%
Market - - - 50 mil 25% - 57,5 mil 28,75%
Total 200 mil 100% 50 mil 200 mil 100% 7,5 mil 200 mil 100%
Shares before the
start of the trading
Share after the
IPO
Share after IPO
in case on total
exercise of
greenshoe 
option
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Exhibit 65 Technogym: stock price between May 3rd and Mau 14th 
 
Source: http://www.4-traders.com/ 
From the graph is possible to notice that during the first day of trading price ran up from 
€3,25 to €3,63: with a level of underpricing of 11% in the first day which is considered a 
normal and optimal level of underpricing by literature (Derrien & Womack, 2003). 
Such a first day percentage return is line also with the findings of Levis (2011): PE backed 
firms have first day returns consistently lower that Venture Capital backed firms or non 
backed firm. Levis (2011) pointed out that this could be due to a combination of lower risk, 
more aggressive pricing and PE group certification. This results seem applicable also in 
Technogym, with the first day return of 11%, which is an high return but not surprisingly 
high: the level of risk is low, and this is proven also by the debt rating analysis conducted to 
find the cost of debt and the beta calculation in relation to the industry; the PE certification 
was present even if we cannot affirm that the pricing strategy was aggressive. In Technogym 
case anyway the thesis of Meles et al. (2014) cannot be confirmed since the level of debt is 
consistently lower than the average level of debt usually found on PE backed firms that go 
public. 
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Moreover comparing first day trading price with multiples evaluation it could result that firm 
was actually undervalued. 
Exhibit 66 Technogym: valuation through multiples 
EV/NOPLAT EV/EBITA
3,1 4,35 4,07 3,85 3,72 2,29 4,50 5,11
Multiples*
EV/EBIT P/EEV/Sales (Row)
EV/Sales 
(Regr)
EV/EBITDA 
(Row)
EV/EBITDA 
(Regr)
 
P/E ratio will not be considered in this case because of the big differences in term of leverage 
in the peer group. Using as reference the ratio of EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT based on 
average of peer group of comparable firms, and as reference price for Technogym the one of 
August 26th 2016, a fair market price should range between 3,1and 4,07 so a price of 4,10 is 
positioned above the range the overvaluation is just of 0,1%.  Using as reference the ratio 
obtained with the regression method, which should be more accurate, for EV/sales and 
EV/EBITDA, a fair market price should range between 3,85 and 4,35. Using such ratios 
Technogym seems fairly priced. Using EV/NOPLAT or EV/EBITA Technogym seems 
actually undervalued. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) stated that IPO firms in median are overvalued 
between 14% to 50% compared to industry peers. But there is a valuable model to understand 
whether Technogym’s IPO was overvalued or undervalued. For each Technogym and for its 
comparable firms was compared the P/S, P/EBITDA, P/E ratios at the date of the IPO, as 
follows: 
;*'< =

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VJu		ℎ	V		


	
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The price considered for Technogym was offer price, while for competitors was the price at 
close of the date of the Initial Public Offering. To understand whether Technogym could have 
been overvalued or undervalued for each ratio was computed the resulting P/V ratio, which 
compare the price value of the firm (P) with its intrinsic value calculated with firm’s 
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comparable. The idea behind this ratio is comparing a simple ratio based on price over a 
measure of firm profit calculated on the IPO firm with the one of a peer to see whether there 
is a significant difference.  
[D5\RIU2R =
(D x⁄ )yz{
(D x⁄ )|}~A; 	[
D
5\4QP3O =
(D 4QP3O⁄ )yz{
(D 4QP3O⁄ )|}~A;	[
D
5\2IE>CR =
(D 4⁄ )yz{
(D 4⁄ )|}~A 
 For each ratio I also calculated the mean and the median. The results of the calculation were 
the following: 
Exhibit 67 Technogym: P/V ratios' calculation 
Technogym Amer Nautilus Brunswick Johnson Mean Median
P/S 1,27 1,19 1,66 1,07 0,88 1,20 1,13
P/EBITDA 8,12 11,50 11,14 8,53 14,91 11,52 11,32
P/E 23,08 24,80 20,95 18,22 26,49 22,61 22,87
P/V sales 1,07 0,77 1,19 1,45 1,06 1,12
P/V ebitda 0,71 0,73 0,95 0,54 0,70 0,72
P/V earnings 0,93 1,10 1,27 0,87 1,02 1,01
 
A value of 1 in the P/V ratios means that there is no significant overvaluation or 
undervaluation of the IPO firm compared to the comparable company(Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan, 2004). Here it results no overvaluation in reference to peer group of 
comparable firms for Technogym, with values of the P/V ratios close to one. In addition for 
P/V calculated on EBITDA it seems that Technogym was actually undervalued, but we 
attribute this result more to the high skewness of the distribution of this ratio which was 
observed by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) than to a particularly strong 
undervaluation of the firm. Such tendency to undervaluation is quite unusual in IPO, because, 
as literature pointed out many times, usually IPO firms tend to be overvalued, and the main 
reasons for this overvaluation can be the overoptimistic expectation about growth in 
profitability of the firm in the future (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). In Technogym 
case instead a reasonable explanation could be that, considering the fact that with this 
operation new capital to finance future growth was not raised, market investors and analysts 
did not capitalized high grow expectations for the firm, so the offer price set after the 
bookbuilding period remained fairly in line with competitors actual price and no high 
overvaluation was done.  
Concerning the aftermarket valuation of an IPO, many authors assert that IPO shares are 
priced at an higher level than their actual value by the market, for many reasons: because 
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investors systematically misestimating the probability of finding a big winner (Loughran & 
Ritter,1995) or  because there is the underwriter’s price support (Aggarwal, 2003). But this 
makes IPO perform badly in the long-run. 
In particular Friesen & Swift (2009) took evidence that IPOs typically have strongly positive 
returns in the first six months after the IPO, but in the long-run returns become negative. Also 
in Technogym, analyzing the data available (just for 3 months), we can say that returns are 
widely positive: 
Exhibit 68 Technogym: stock price between May 3rd and August 26th 
 
Source: http://www.4-traders.com/ 
Technogym stock price followed an upward trend, and prices went down at a lower level than 
May 3rd just on June 27th, so in a period of big market turmoil at global level, because of the 
announcement of the vote in UK. This strongly positive trend which was persistent in the first 
three months after the IPO seems due to an overvaluation by the market on the firm, due to 
several factors. First of all the high growth of the past two year presents a strongly positive 
trend that will continue in the future, so it is highly probable that market investors 
overestimate such positive trend and overestimate future growth. It is particularly interesting 
to see how price augmented in August, after the release of the quarterly results, which states 
an increase in revenues in the US of 25% compared to the same semester in 2015. This is a 
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very important result since the breakthrough in the US, one of the most competitive market at 
the global level, is considered by many investors a milestone to understand the possibilities of 
growth and the strategic advantages of the firm. Secondly the presence of the private equity 
was helpful in reducing the information asymmetry between entrepreneur and market 
investors: the private equity, which usually helps in improving operating performance, in 
bringing efficiencies and in undertaking profitable strategies, works as a certification of firm 
quality. Moreover the private equity’s retention of a large stake of its shares for a long lock up 
period increased the power of the signal to investors (Ritter & Welch, 2002). 
In conclusion, taking into consideration DCF and EP valuation result, together with multiples 
methodology valuation, it resulted that Technogym stocks were offer at a discount price in the 
market. This could have been done for several reasons, such as avoiding stagnation in the 
trading activities and providing a positive signal to the market. The market conditions of the 
first months of 2016, with an high volatility in the stock market, contributed to the uncertainty 
in the pricing. The level of discount anyway is not of a great magnitude, it results fairly in line 
with market praxis and it is a result of the bookbuilding procedure. The presence of the 
Private Equity as certification helped in this side.  
The market reacted positively to the IPO, in fact there was an underpricing of 11% in the first 
day, and positive trend continued for the period under analysis.  This highly positive trend 
seems due to the perspectives of high growth for the future years which are confirmed by the 
quarterly results presented in August. Literature anyway suggests to use caution in this 
situation: many times IPO firms have an extraordinary performance for the first semester after 
the IPO, then starting from the second semester investors become more careful, and in the 
long run they faces an underperformance. This could be due to the capitalization of temporary 
improvements Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) or the over-expectations from who 
invests in the earliest aftermarket (Miller, 1977).  
In Technogym case, until now the first period in the market was characterized by positive 
returns, anyway a first important step will be when the lock up period for Salhouse will end, 
180 days after the IPO. It will be interesting to see whether Arle Capital Partners will prefer to 
keep Technogym stocks again in its portfolio or divest them immediately. It will be also of 
great importance to notice market reaction to these new shares available for trading: if market 
will discount these new availability or not. After this important step, also analyzing medium-
long run performance of stocks will be fundamental. It will be more clear if these positive 
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returns were actually due to an undervaluation of the firm in the bookbuilding period or if 
aftermarket capitalized in an overoptimistic way short term improvements. 
5.11. Arle Capital’s return on the investment in Technogym 
The aim of this last part of the chapter is analyzing the return on investment obtained by the 
Private Equity fund, Arle Capital. The Registration Document affirms that Salhouse invested 
in Technogym € 330 million in 2008, and in 2014 the net value of the participation was € 220 
million. The cash flow from the investment for Salhouse was the following: 
Exhibit 69 Salhouse: cash flow from the IPO 
# shares price cash flow
Shares sold in the IPO 50 mil € 3,25 € 162,50 mil
Shares sold with the greenshoe option 7,5 mil € 3,25 € 24,38 mil
Residual shares to be sold after lock up period 22,5 mil € 4,20 € 94,50 mil
TOTAL 80 mil € 281,38 mil
 
For the price of the residual shares it was used an estimate close to the present market value of 
Technogym shares, because they will be sold at the end of the lock up period of 180 days 
from the IPO. Considering this total cash flow of €281,38 million and the initial investment of 
€330 million, it results that the Internal Rate of Return for the Private Equity is negative, and 
it is -15%, anyway this way of reasoning is too simplistic: it is fundamental to consider again 
the history of the Private Equity fund which has invested in Technogym. It was previously 
mentioned that Candover was the original investor through the vehicle Salhouse, but in 201, 
because of some tensions deriving from the financial crisis, it sold its stake to Arle Capital 
Partners at a nominal consideration. Without more precise information about the 
consideration transferred, it is plausible that the amount transferred is close to the actual value 
of the shareholding, which is written for €220 million in Salhouse balance sheet. Considering 
this, it results that IRR for Arle Capital was about 28%. This explains why Arle Capital 
accepted to start the IPO in a period of difficulties in the equity market, even when the offer 
price was set at a much lower value than the valuation range resulting from multiples and 
DCF calculation. It is possible to affirm that the Private Equity could have gained more from 
the IPO, because offer price was set at discount in respect to the valuation range proposed 
using multiples and DCF. The market seems to confirm this idea, since the stock performance 
was positive since the beginning, and shares’ price keeps on raising. Surely the negative mood 
that market was experiencing in the first months of 2016 had a strong influence on the setting 
of the offer price, also the fact that Arle Capital acquired the participation at a lower price 
strongly influenced its incentive for asking at higher return.   
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis was aimed at valuing the Initial Public Offering of a firm, making a particular 
emphasis on the case in which a private equity fund owns a stake in the firm before the IPO.   
The benefits and costs of the IPO were firstly illustrated, to understand in detail which 
implications this particular operation has on the firm and on its equity holders. Secondly the 
motivations and the implications of the private equity for this operation were presented, and 
later the process of pricing and valuation of the issuing firms were illustrated. Finally these 
issues were analyzed through the exposure of the Technogym case. 
Concerning the benefits deriving from the Initial Public Offering, the most important benefit 
pointed out by literature and by managers is the possibility to raise new capital (Ritter and 
Welch, 2002).  This process has a drawback: it rises a problem of asymmetric information 
with equity holders. Lucas and McDonald (1990) stated that the firm is conscious of this, and 
it will prefer to go public, or to raise new capital, when the market overvalues the firm, so it 
will be able to raise more funds compared to when market undervalues it. The IPO is not just 
an occasion to raise new capital: Zingales (1995) pointed out that it is an optimal way for 
firm’s initial owners to maintain the control over the firm but at the same time divest part of 
their ownership by transferring the rights of firm’s cash flow to other subjects. What was 
extremely important of Zingales’s research was the highlight on the fact that cash flow rights 
and benefits of control are bargained in different negotiations. Pagano et al. (1998) pointed 
out that with an IPO the firm’s stock becomes liquid, and this allows investors to better 
diversify their funds, reducing their overall risk. 
The convenience of going public was examined many times by literature, with different 
results. Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1999) pointed out that in a firm’s lifecycle there are 
different moments, and depending on these moments it could be more or less convenient to be 
publicly traded according to the cost of informing investors: for example in the early stage of 
a firm’s life a large investor will minimize the cost of producing information. Anyway an 
undiversified participation is risky and suboptimal, so as soon as the cost of production for 
information decreases it is better to go public. That is why many times a venture capitalist 
divests its participation in a portfolio firm through an IPO. Also Maksimovic & Pichler 
(2001) pointed out that the investors perception and the costs associated with disclosing 
private information influences significantly the benefits of going public. 
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Pagano et al. (1998) analyzed other benefits of the IPOs, for example the possibility of 
overcoming borrowing constraints more than a private firm: being publicly traded makes it 
possible to reduce bargaining power of banks, by having the possibility of raising debt capital 
directly in the market.  Added advantages are firstly an additional instrument of monitoring 
behavior of managers, thanks to information embodied in stock price and secondly the 
possibility to have an indirect advertising of firm’s quality and firm stability. 
Literature pointed out that the IPO is an effective way to gain market share and disadvantage 
competitors, this was said by Schultz and Zaman (2001) in their analysis of technology firms, 
that go public extremely early in their life. They said that those firms were operating in an 
industry where gaining market share against competitors was fundamental so they decided to 
go public early in their life. Hsu et al. (2010) also confirmed that this is true, stating that  
competitors’ stock prices react negatively to the IPO, because the market anticipates the 
negative impact on firm’s profitability and ability to produce future cash flow, due to the fact 
that a competitor is going public. 
Nevertheless the IPO entails many costs, some of them are associated with the IPO process 
and some others are related to remaining a publicly traded company. The costs of the IPO 
process include the fees that have to be paid to consultants, advisors, to the stock exchange 
and are related also to the road show. There are also start up costs, due to the fact that the firm 
has to build up some informational structures for market investors that were not present 
before the IPO, for example additional auditing and accounting abilities to comply with stock 
exchange regulation. This process moreover can be very distracting and time-consuming, and 
can divert attention from strategic and operational issues. 
The expenses associated with the fact of being public are also significant. These costs are 
associated with different issues: firstly with the need to prepare and report timely specific 
financial information. Secondly with the need to add new employees to respond to new 
exigencies in the areas of audit, taxation team, financial planning (budgeting and forecasting), 
risk management, technology support, board of director, internal staff assessment, and human 
resources. Moreover the firm will need to engage also external resources such as consultants 
to meet the new regulatory requirements, implementing the new financial reporting, 
implementing disclosure standards, and to maintain investors relations. Also governance 
structure will be changed and increased to meet new regulatory requirements, and audit fees 
will increase for the same reason. 
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An extensive cost faced by the firm going public is the underpricing phenomenon, meaning 
that they do not collect some funds because the prices rose in the days immediately following 
the IPO.  This fact is present basically in all the IPOs, and it seems due to the fact that some 
firms want to solve an information asymmetry with market investors: high quality firms will 
consider that discounting at the moment of IPO is a good signaling method, then they will 
recoup this sacrifice in later activities of issuing stocks (Ritter & Welch, 2002). Loughran & 
Ritter (1995) highlighted that this underpricing phenomenon depends also on the fact that 
market over weights short term improvement thinking that those are long term tendencies. 
When the transitory nature of the operating performance becomes apparent, the stocks 
underperform. But this underperformance does not start immediately after issuing. Also 
Friesen & Swift (2009) analyzed overreaction of investors and found out that usually returns 
remain positive until six months after the IPO. Aggarwal (2003) instead said that this positive 
returns in the first days and consequent underpricing are due to the stabilization activities of 
underwriters, that give price support to weak offerings and try to avoid flipping activity. 
Flipping activity is the phenomenon of the immediate aftermarket of reselling IPO stock 
immediately after the allocation to earn from the price difference. What happens usually is 
that a small portion of shares are flipped many times, resulting in very high volume. Of course 
underwriters and issuing firm prefer that institutional investors keep the stocks for a certain 
period instead of flipping them, because this is a signal of their interest in the firm itself, and 
of confidence in firm ability to produce future positive returns. So underwriters try to avoid 
this flipping by imposing some penalties to institutional investors Aggarwal (2003). 
Derrien & Womack (2003) discovered that underpricing is also a feature of the bookbuilding 
selling mechanism. They discovered that auction procedure actually reduces underpricing, so 
it would be optimal from the issuing firm point of view, but bookbuilding process is preferred 
globally because it allows underwriters to reveal their quality to investors. It seems that 
issuing firm suffers  an agency conflict, since controlling underpricing is not the only interest 
of underwriters. 
Lately in the thesis it was discussed the presence of a Private Equity inside the firm, and its 
influence on the IPO decision. The IPO in fact is one of the exit way that could be used by the 
Private Equity, together with a secondary LBO and a trade sale to another firm. There are 
other exit ways, but those three are the most commonly used. It emerged that market 
conditions, firm conditions and private equity characteristics influence the decision 
(Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015). In fact a very favorable debt market with low rates make a 
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secondary LBO extremely profitable. Instead a very hot equity market favors an IPO. Also 
private equity characteristics are fundamental: when the PE is near the end of contractual life 
it has more pressure to realize the investments. In this situation it could happen that the 
portfolio firm is not ready yet for  a public offering, but a secondary sale could be an 
attractive way to divest quickly. Moreover, in IPOs, PE is usually obliged to remain part of 
the shares for a lock up period, to not give a negative signal to the market (Jenkinson & 
Sousa, 2015). Bock & Schmidt (2015) also discovered that when it has to build reputation to 
incentivize future fundraising PEs tend to realize an IPO, because the IPO gives more 
visibility to portfolio firm success, and so PE ability to invest in high quality firms. Last factor 
to consider is related to firm’s characteristics: in particular the ability to operate with high 
level of debt favors more a secondary LBO, while high profitability and high grow rates make 
an IPO more profitable.  
Poulsen & Stegemoller (2008) pointed out that contracting costs could be much lower in case 
of a trade sale to a competitor. Moreover this way could be much more valuable when in the 
industry there is a big competitor, and economies of scale are fundamental. Nevertheless they 
also pointed out that this exit choice would reduce flexibility in firm policies so it is not 
valuable for firms with high growth potential. Moreover a trade sale could not be a possible 
exit way if it is present an entrepreneur with a strong position inside the firm. If she is 
interested in maintaining the decisional control over the firm it would be fundamental that the 
firm itself remains a standalone entity (Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2008). In this case is possible 
that a conflict of interests arises, with the PE preferring a trade sale, and the entrepreneur 
preferring the IPO.  
An interesting topic related to the IPO of a private equity backed firm is the performance of 
the firm itself in the IPO. Levis (2011) analyzed this issue and found out that the presence of 
the private equity reduces significantly the underpricing phenomenon after the IPO, cutting 
significantly the money left on the table by previous owner. Meles et al. (2014) found out that 
this phenomenon is mainly due to the presence of an high level of debt in private equity 
backed IPO firms. Barry & Mihov (2005) explained that this is due to the fact that banks 
prefer to finance firms that make the lending relatively safe, so with predictable cash flows, 
less volatility and easier to value. These characteristics make the firm easier to value by the 
market to underpricing is lower. 
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Later the valuation techniques most used in the market were presented: the multiples 
methodology, the Discounted Cash Flow and Economic Profit methods. Multiples  and DCF 
models resulted to be the most used and the less biased techniques (Roosenboom, 2012). 
Concerning multiples valuation, Kim & Ritter (1999)pointed out that is fundamental to 
choose the right group of peer group firms: using SIC code is a good starting point, but 
sometimes this classification could be too rigid, so it is important to go further this 
classification to find the most fitting peer group.  Koller et al. (2015) pointed out that the use 
of P/E ratio alone could lead to a misevaluation of the firm, since P/E ratio is influenced by 
the capital structure of the firm. Other ratios free from the influence of capital structure and of 
non operating or non recurring items lead to a better valuation, and are: EV/EBITA and 
EV/NOPLAT.  
Once that the major issues regarding fair value valuation were presented, the step of the 
pricing process were discussed, passing from the first pitch with the intermediaries of the 
listing, through the due diligence of the investment bank, then the pre marketing phase and the 
bookbuilding process, until the definition of the offer price (Borsa Italiana, 2014). A fair 
pricing could be more profitable in the long run, especially because overvalued IPO firms 
tend to suffer a deep underperformance in the long run (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 
2004). 
Last chapter of the thesis concentrated  in the Technogym case. From the analysis done we 
can say that in Technogym  the IPO was mainly determined by the interest of the two 
investors in the firm: Arle Capital Partners from one side (using Salhouse vehicle), and 
brothers Alessandri (through the vehicle Wellness Holding) from the other side. The IPO was 
started to allow Arle Capital Partners to divest, but many other options were available, and 
maybe, taking into consideration debt and stock market conditions, some of them could have 
been valuable alternatives. So what was determinant in the choice of the IPO was the presence 
of the other investors, brother Alessandri through Wellness Holding and their willingness to 
maintain the absolute control of the firm.  This motivation does not surprise since they are the 
founders of the firm and from the beginning they had the total control and decided the course 
of the company. Moreover this motivation was so strong that the IPO was indicated as a way 
of exit even in the shareholders agreement signed between Arle Capital Partners and Wellness 
Holding before the entry of Arle Capital Partners in Technogym. This was done because only 
the IPO is a way that totally ensure the maintenance of the control on the firm, differently 
from a secondary LBO or the trade sale of the participation to another investor. In fact the 
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possibility to change the beneficiaries of the cash flow rights from the firm without losing the 
power of control is one of the main advantages of the IPO pointed out by Zingales (1995). It 
is known that for some time the a dual track was followed, so Technogym negotiated also the 
sale of Salhouse participation with other private investors, but in the end the decision of going 
public was taken. This course of action was favorable also not only for the entrepreneur, but 
also for the private equity, since it was more in line with its conditions.  
The IPO also improved entrepreneur position in few ways. Firstly, selling in the market PE 
shareholding, a strong counterparty, owning a great stake of the company had disappeared: its 
stockholding has been bought by many shareholders and it is more fragmented. In this way 
the incentive to monitor and intervene actively inside the firm, maybe in contrast with the 
entrepreneur, is lower if not absent. It is possible to conclude that with the IPO the 
entrepreneur power over the firm has augmented.  Moreover this operation creates the 
possibility for Wellness Holding to buy firm’s shares in the future and increase its 
shareholding if they will see a good return from this action, or to reduce its investment in 
Technogym, if on contrary it prefers to diversify its wealth. 
The IPO was an excellent way to re affirm PE’s reputation in investing in excellent firms and 
in being able to divest successfully. An IPO gives more advertisement and  notoriety to this 
fact, since the portfolio firm remains quoted,  its performance is public and can be checked by 
investors at any moment, which is not the case if the firm is sold in a trade sale or through a 
secondary LBO.  Arle Capital Partner in fact was facing a strong need to build up its 
reputation after the turmoil faced because of the global crisis, which made Candover separate 
part of its investment in Arle Capital Partners. If the PE want to obtain new funds in the future 
for new investments a necessary condition will be have re built its reputation. Moreover since 
the PE has just started to divest from its portfolio firms, still a long time has to pass before it 
will repay investors, so a quick way of divestment is not needed (in IPO the investor selling 
stock usually have to keep part of the shares for a lock up period to avoid to send a negative 
signal to the market about firm’s ability to produce positive cash flow to investors in the 
future). 
The Initial Public Offering produced some benefits and advantages also for Technogym  
itself. First of all it increased firm knowledge and visibility, which is very important for 
Technogym  in this particular moment: the firm is well positioned in Europe, but in the rest of 
the world is the second player. To break through competition and enter profitably in those 
markets such as Asia and US having a great visibility and good reputation also in financial 
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terms is really important, particularly when it is dealing with customers of big dimensions, 
that are interested also in the financial stability of its suppliers.  
This operation was also a milestone in the firm organization because being public allows to 
attract, remunerate and retain a more valuable workforce than being private. In fact a public 
firm can set up an attractive compensation plan for managers linked to firm’s performance, 
using stock options or distributing shares, which have very high returns. At the same time 
these compensation methods give the possibility to align managers’ interests with the ones of 
owners. On the contrary, one of the major benefit of an IPO does not seem applicable in this 
case: the possibility to enhance managers’ monitoring thanks to market. The entrepreneur is 
inside the firm and is actively involved in everyday operations, so he already has a privileged 
position to monitor managers way of operating.  
The going public process will open the possibility to raise new funds in the future in several 
ways: first on all increasing share capital, secondly collecting debt funds in several manners. 
The fact of being a public firm will allow Technogym to issue bonds directly in the market or 
to go to banks, but with a stronger bargaining power in debt negotiation, thanks to the 
possibility of direct issuing giving by the market. 
In addition it is possible to state that market perceive the IPO as a way to improve competitive 
positioning of the firm, since there was a negative reaction in stock price of competitors 
around the IPO event. Strongly negative cumulative abnormal returns on competitors’ stock 
around the IPO suggest that the market considered Technogym’s IPO as an event with a 
negative influence for them, that could lead also to a reduction in performance in the long run. 
Conversely, this enhances firm’s competitive advantage in the marketplace.  
Last part on the thesis was aimed at producing a valuation of firm’s fair value and comparing 
it with the market price established by issuing banks, to see whether firm’s stocks were 
undervalued or overvalued, and finally try to access IPO success. 
First of all Technogym was valued in comparison to a peer group of competitors. The major 
firms operating in the field were picked up: Brunswick Inc, Nautilus Inc, Johnson Health 
Tech, Amer Sport. The major issue to take into consideration is that Brunswick and Amer 
operates also in other fields of activity and are widely diversified, while Nautilus and Johnson 
Health Tech are more focused in the training machines sector.  Technogym profitability was 
discovered not only to be perfectly in line with competitors, but also to be higher. Also 
looking at grow rates Technogym was not underperforming rivals: grow rates were absolutely 
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higher than Brunswick, and in line with the ones of Amer, even if Nautilus appeared to have 
had an high level of growth in the past years.  
Concerning working capital management, Technogym have an efficient organization, even if 
days on receivables can be improved. Financial structure, compared to peer group, appears 
solid, even if competitors’ one is better. This is due to excess cash that was present in 
Nautilus in the past years and by Brunswick even now.  
Next step was calculating Technogym’s value using multiples calculated on competitors. 
Firstly P/E ratio was used, but this was influenced by net financial position of competitors, 
which was highly different from Technogym’s one. Secondly EV/Sales multiple was 
calculated, but this appeared too much influenced by the different fields of activity of some 
competitors: sales don’t take into account the different operating costs that is required by 
different products that widely diversified corporations such as Brunswick and Amer produce. 
So EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/EBITA and EV/NOPLAT were calculated. The valuation 
was refined using not only the average of competitors, but also using regression to calculated 
multiples. The range of values obtained were reported in Exhibit 64, and are reported again 
here. 
 
Lately in the chapter discounted cash flow and economic profit method were used and the 
result of this valuation were compared to the one done with multiples. The starting point for 
DCF and EP were the calculation of: free cash flow for the following five years, weighted 
average cost of capital and invested capital. To calculate the future free cash flow some 
estimation was done. In particular an estimation of future revenues were done: it was 
considered that Technogym will have a strong growth in the following years in Europe 
(around 12%), while outside Europe it will take more time to get close to this growth.  These 
estimations of growth anyway are fairly prudent if compared with the grow rate of 2014 and 
2015, which were respectively of 13,22% and 9,97%. The estimated grow rate for 2016 is 
instead 6%, and the CAGR is 8,5% in the 5 years period. 
EV/NOPLAT EV/EBITA
3,1 4,35 4,07 3,60 3,72 2,29 6,83 5,11
Multiples*
EV/EBIT P/E
EV/Sales 
(Row)
EV/Sales 
(Regr)
EV/EBITDA 
(Row)
EV/EBITDA 
(Regr)
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The resulting value per share from DCF and EP valuation was €3,7 per share. This value is in 
line with the range of values produced using the multiples valuation, anyway is sensible to the 
estimation of WACC and long term grow rate used, as the sensitivity analysis produced 
pointed out. 
Once that fair value analysis was completed the next step was analyzing the pricing process 
and the market valuation of the firm stock. In the period before the IPO the firm performed a 
roadshow to understand market demand for Technogym shares. The price range proposed for 
the roadshow was between €3,00 and €3,75 and at the end the offer price was fixed at €3,25, 
the book was completed four times for this pricing level, which implies an high demand for 
the firm’s shares. Such price range implies a strong discount, which, according to 
Roosenboom (2012) was done to induce investors to disclose information about their actual 
demand of share and to compensate them for the risk taken in investing into a firm actually 
unknown by the market.  
The fact that offer price was fixed at €3,25 confirms Roosenboom (2012) thesis for which 
discount is only partially recouped. This was proved also by the subsequent underpricing: the 
price ran up to €3,63 in the first day of trading, and in the following day price grew even more 
to €3,94, which are respectively and increase of 11% and of 21% in stock price. It is plausible 
that such an high discount resulted also from the negative period that the equity market was 
facing in those months, and with the pre-marketing activities underwriters were not able to 
obtain higher reactions from investors. 
In the last part of the thesis the return from the operation for Arle Capital was analyzed, and it 
was found that this return was almost 28%. This return is extremely high, and it outperforms 
consistently the return of the market, which is about 8,5%. Notwithstanding that shares were 
sold at a discounted price and that equity market conditions were not the most favorable for 
an IPO because of the high volatility of the period, it is possible to conclude that the 
investment on Technogym was extremely profitable for Arle Capital. This is extremely 
interesting to notice, because the presence of the entrepreneur with a majority position had 
limited the divestment ways available for the private equity fund. Anyway if we consider the 
initial investment of Candover of €330 million, the internal rater of return of the investment 
was highly negative.  So it is possible to conclude that Candover overpaid for such a 
shareholding in Technogym, but we can find two major causes of this. Firstly some years of 
no growth for the firm, such as 2013, which negatively influenced on free cash flow. 
Secondly the weak position in some markets such us USA also has negative consequences in 
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investors valuation of future possibilities of growth in revenues in this market. Lastly the 
negative mood that the market was facing in the first period of 2016, which influenced a lot 
the road show and led to a highly discounted offer price.  
It is reasonable that the IPO will produce benefits also for the other major investor, the 
entrepreneur, that will strengthen his decisional control, since the second most powerful 
investor in the firm, the private equity, will disinvest completely in few months, and market 
investors usually have more fragmented positions. Moreover the IPO will allow the 
entrepreneur to change the degree of its investment in the firm, increasing or reducing it 
according to his needs. 
The fact that market competitors discounted negatively the IPO, as the analysis of the 
cumulated average abnormal return demonstrated, and the evidences that equity investors are 
extremely positive in valuation of Technogym’s stocks confirm that also the firm itself will 
have positive drawbacks associated with this operation: an high contractual power with debt 
financers, an improved internal control system, a more impartial system to control managers’ 
behavior and an improved system to incentivize managers. The IPO will make also easier to 
raise new capital in the future, if new projects of growth will require it.  In conclusion, the 
Initial Public Offering was an operation that benefited all the major interests involved in the 
firm: the private equity, which were able to divest profitably, the entrepreneur, who 
maintained and strengthened his control, and the firm itself, which enhanced its possibility of 
growth.  
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7. APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: Technogym balance sheet and income statement 
reclassification 
Balance sheet and income statement as reported 
 
INCOME STATEMENT AS REPORTED
TOTAL REVENUES
Revenues 390,1 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,1
Other income 19,1 16,5 1,1 0,7 0,7
Total revenues 409,2 428,0 412,1 466,1 511,8
OPERATING COSTS
Change in inventories -2,6 -1,2 -6,1 8,4
Raw materials, consumables and goods -142,3 -142,1 -152,8 -183,6 -183,4
Services and disposal of  assets -116,9 -142,3 -129,8 -133,5 -139,5
Personnel expenses -81,2 -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0
Depreciations, amortizations and impairments -15,7 -16,6 -23,4 -27,0 -20,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -7,7 -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6
Other operating costs -3,7 -3,7 -4,4 -6,3 -4,9
Joint venture result share 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0
Total operating costs -370,0 -396,6 -404,3 -437,9 -453,3
NET OPERATING INCOME 39,3 31,4 7,8 28,2 58,4
FINANCIAL GAINS/LOSSES
Financial gains 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,5
Financial expenses -4,3 -3,1 -3,5 -3,6 -1,7
Gain/losses from exchange 1,3 -1,6 -2,9 -0,8 -1,3
Total financial gain/losses -2,5 -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6
GAINS/LOSSES FROM INVESTMENTS
Other gains/losses from investments 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9
Total gain/losses from investments 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9
RESULT BEFORE TAXES 37,1 27,4 2,1 24,4 55,0
TAXES
Annual taxes -11,0 -7,0 -0,4 -19,3 -26,4
Previoius year taxes -0,5 0,0 -0,1 0,5 -0,2
Total taxes -11,5 -7,0 -0,5 -18,8 -26,6
RESULT BEFORE MINORITY INTERESTS 25,6 20,4 1,6 5,6 28,4
Minority interests -0,4 -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2
GROUP NET RESULT 25,2 19,6 1,2 5,5 28,2
Earnings per share 2,52 1,96 0,12 0,55 2,82
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TOTAL ASSETS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A. NON-CURRENT ASSETS
A.I Property, plant, equipment 42,6 57,6 54,2 50,0 56,9
A.II Goodwill 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
A.III Other intangible assets 30,7 35,6 32,5 23,2 21,5
A.IV. Equity investments 0,4 1,5 0,1 4,7 3,8
A.V. Other financial assets 14,2 9,9 4,5 6,2 9,5
A.VI. Anticipated taxes 17,4 20,2 22,3 16,0 15,7
A. Total non-current asset 105,2 124,7 113,7 100,0 107,4
B. CURRENT ASSETS
B.I Inventories 50,2 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4
B.II Trade receivables 68,1 61,5 73,0 75,5 84,1
B.III Tax receivables 0,0 1,7 3,0 1,7 0,0
B.IV Current financial receivables 0,0 0,0 3,9 3,6 0,1
B.V Cash and cash equivalents 40,9 26,7 40,4 41,1 68,0
B.VI Other current assets 23,0 12,1 14,1 14,9 31,8
B.VII Other financial current assets 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,2
B. Total current asset 182,2 162,6 189,1 199,4 244,6
TOTAL ASSETS 287,5 287,4 302,8 299,4 352,1
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TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
C. GROUP EQUITY
C.I Share capital 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0
C.II Shares overpricing reserve 382,6 382,6 382,6 0,0 0,0
C.III  Revaluation reserve 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
C.IV. Conversion reserve 0,6 1,0 1,3 2,7 0,0
C.V Other reserves -430,1 -430,6 -433,2 -25,6 -8,2
C.VI Retained earnings/(losses) -3,8 21,4 41,0 17,4 13,0
C.VII Profit/(loss) for the year 25,2 19,6 1,2 5,5 28,2
C. Total group equity and reserves -15,5 4,0 2,9 10,0 43,0
C.VIII Minority share capital 0,1 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,2
C.IX Minority's profit/(loss) for the year 0,4 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,2
C.  Total minority interests 0,5 1,0 0,7 0,2 0,4
C. TOTAL GROUP EQUITY  -15,0 5,0 3,7 10,3 43,4
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
D. NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES
D.I Loans 70,0 40,0 0,1 0,0 42,1
D.II Financial debt 13,1 8,6 3,1 5,0 6,3
D.III Provisions for employees benefits 1,9 2,1 3,1 3,3 3,1
D.IV Provisions  for contingecies and charges 6,3 6,9 6,4 7,6 8,6
D.V Other non-current liabilities 0,0 0,1 5,8 5,9 13,5
D.VI Deferred tax liabilities 9,3 10,6 1,2 1,0 0,7
D. Total non-current liabilities 100,5 68,2 19,7 22,7 74,4
E. CURRENT LIABILITIES
E.I Current debt 39,3 71,1 124,8 99,4 57,6
E.II Other financial debt 0,0 0,0 3,9 3,6 0,0
E.III Trade payables 98,1 88,6 93,1 93,2 93,9
E.IV Tax payables 5,1 4,0 0,9 6,6 14,0
E.V Current provisions for contingecies and charges 7,9 7,7 6,4 8,3 18,4
E.VI Other current liabilities 51,6 42,6 50,3 54,7 50,0
E.VII Other financial current liabilities 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,4
E. Total current liabilities 202,0 214,1 279,4 266,4 234,3
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 287,5 287,4 302,8 299,4 352,1
132 
 
Details on the income statement and balance sheet 
 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A.I Property, plant, equipment and other equipment 42,6 57,6 54,2 50,0 56,9
Land and buildings 6,7 7,3 24,9 22,7 28,0
impianti e macchinari 6,6 6,0 6,5 6,2 6,6
Industrial and commercial equipment 7,4 6,0 14,2 11,1 10,3
Other equipments 6,1 4,9 5,3 5,2 5,0
Improvements on third party equipment 10,6 21,0 1,5 1,5 4,2
Assets in course of construction and payments on account 5,2 12,4 1,7 3,2 2,7
Total 42,6 57,6 54,2 50,0 56,9
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
A.III Other intangible assets 30,7 35,6 32,5 23,2 21,5
Development costs 21,7 25,8 21,3 13,1 11,8
Industrial patents 2,2 3,2 5,0 3,8 4,3
Licences, trademarksand similar assets 3,9 3,7 0,4 0,3 0,5
Assets in course of development and payments on account 2,7 0,2 3,9 5,4 4,5
Other intangible assets 0,1 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5
Total 30,7 35,6 32,5 23,2 21,5
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Assets similar to goodwill 0,1 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5
Operating intangibles 30,5 33,0 30,6 22,6 21,0
Total 30,7 35,6 32,5 23,2 21,5
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
A.V. Other financial assets 14,2 9,9 4,5 6,2 9,5
Financial credits 13,3 8,9 3,4 5,0 7,6
Security deposits 0,9 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,8
Investments in other companies 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,4 1,1
Total 14,2 9,9 4,5 6,2 9,5
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Operating other financial assets 0,9 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,8
Non-operating other financial assets 13,3 8,9 3,8 5,4 8,8
Total 14,2 9,9 4,5 6,2 9,5
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
B.I Inventories 50,2 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4
Raw materials , supplies and consumables 13,3 11,8 12,4 16,5 13,9
Goods in progress and semifinished goods 2,0 1,9 1,4 1,2 1,8
Finished products and goods 34,9 47,0 40,7 44,5 44,6
Total 50,2 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
B.V Cash and cash equivalents 40,9 26,7 40,4 41,1 68,0
Bank accounts 40,6 26,4 39,6 40,5 66,6
Checks 0,3 0,2 0,8 0,6 0,1
Cash on hand 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 1,3
Total 40,9 26,7 40,4 41,1 68,0
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
B.VI Other current assets 23,0 12,1 14,1 14,9 31,8
VAT receivables from state authorities 18,4 7,8 8,6 9,4 23,6
Advances to suppliers 1,3 1,0 1,2 1,3 1,7
Employees receivables 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Other receivables 0,5 0,8 1,3 0,9 2,3
Accruals (ratei attivi) 0,8 0,3 0,9 0,3 0,2
Checking (risconti attivi) 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,9 3,9
Total 23,0 12,1 14,1 14,9 31,8
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
D.IV Provisions  for contingecies and charges 6,3 6,9 6,4 7,6 8,6
Products warranties funds 0,0 0,9 4,5 4,6 4,1
Supplementary indemnity fund for clientele 0,6 1,1 1,0 0,9 0,9
Non-competition agreement fund 1,9 1,4 0,6 0,8 0,9
Litigations fund 0,4 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,5
Funds for other contingencies and charges 3,3 3,4 0,3 1,3 2,3
Total 6,3 6,9 6,4 7,6 8,6
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
E.I Current debt 39,3 71,1 124,8 99,4 57,6
Short term quota of long term debt 30,0 30,0 40,0 10,0 17,9
Other short term bank financing 9,3 41,1 84,8 89,4 39,6
Total 39,3 71,1 124,8 99,4 57,6
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
E.V Current provisions for contingecies and charges 7,9 7,7 6,4 8,3 18,4
Products warranties funds 7,9 7,7 3,7 4,6 5,0
Provision for investment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Free Product Fund 0,0 0,0 2,1 3,1 3,4
Other short term provisions for contingencies 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,7 10,0
Total 7,9 7,7 6,4 8,3 18,4
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
E.VI Other current liabilities 51,6 42,6 50,3 54,7 50,0
Liabitilities toward employees 5,3 6,7 6,6 10,8 8,1
Debts towards social security and safety 3,2 3,1 3,4 4,3 3,7
Customers advances 7,1 8,7 14,9 12,1 11,2
Liabilities for VAT 15,7 5,0 8,1 7,5 6,0
Other liabilities 3,9 2,0 4,5 3,2 3,5
Prepaid expenses 1,5 1,0 0,9 2,1 3,5
Deferred charges 14,8 15,9 11,8 14,6 14,1
Total 51,6 42,6 50,3 54,7 50,0
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 390,1 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,1
Revenues from sales of product, spare parts, hardware and software 345,6 370,5 368,5 417,8 452,3
Revenues from transportation, installation and post-sale assistance 44,6 41,1 42,5 47,5 58,8
Total 390,1 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,1
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Personnel expenses -81,2 -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0
Wages -63,6 -65,9 -65,5 -72,0 -80,8
Social charges -14,6 -17,2 -17,8 -18,1 -20,5
Retirement costs , plans to predetermined performance -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -2,1
Retirement costs , plans to predetermined contribution -1,9 -1,8 -1,8 -1,8 0,0
Other costs -0,9 -0,5 0,8 0,5 -0,7
Total -81,2 -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Operating personnel expenses -79,2 -83,5 -82,5 -89,7 -102,0
Pension gains and losses -2,0 -2,0 -1,9 -1,9 -2,1
Total -81,2 -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Depreciations, amortizations and impairments -15,7 -16,6 -23,4 -27,0 -20,0
Amortizations of non tangible assets -6,0 -7,5 -11,8 -9,5 -8,8
Depreciation of tangible assets -7,0 -8,8 -9,4 -10,4 -10,6
Other depreciations of assets -0,3 0,0 -0,4 -6,5 0,0
Receivables write-offs -2,4 -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0
Impairments of assets 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,5
Total -15,7 -16,6 -23,4 -27,0 -20,0
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Amortizations of non tangible assets -6,0 -7,5 -11,8 -9,5 -8,8
Development costs -4,2 -5,5 -9,1 -7,5 -6,5
Industrial patents -0,5 -0,5 -1,6 -1,8 -2,1
Licences, trademarksand similar assets -0,4 -0,5 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2
Assets in course of development and payments on account 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Other intangible assets -0,9 -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2
Total -6,0 -7,5 -11,7 -9,5 -8,8
Check 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Goodwill and similar assets -0,9 -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2
Operating intangibles -5,0 -6,5 -10,8 -9,3 -8,7
Total -6,0 -7,5 -11,7 -9,5 -8,8
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Depreciation of tangible assets -7,0 -8,8 -9,4 -10,4 -10,6
Land and buildings -0,1 -0,4 -2,5 -2,7 -2,7
impianti e macchinari -1,5 -1,5 -1,4 -1,4 -1,4
Industrial and commercial equipment -3,7 -3,3 -4,1 -4,8 -4,8
Other equipments -1,3 -1,4 -1,4 -1,5 -1,8
Improvements on third party equipment -0,4 -2,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Assets in course of construction and payments on account 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Total -7,0 -8,8 -9,4 -10,4 -10,6
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -7,7 -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6
Provisions for products warranties -4,5 -3,5 -2,0 -4,2
Provisions for agents bonuses 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2
Provisions for other risks -3,2 -1,5 -1,3 -1,6
Total -7,7 -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 0,0
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -2,6
Other operating costs -3,7 -3,7 -4,4 -6,3 -4,9
License fees and other income taxes -1,5 -1,8 -2,7 -2,3 -2,1
Non deductible VAT -0,2 -0,1 -0,2 -0,2 0,0
Other costs (brasilian taxes e customs duties) -2,0 -1,8 -1,5 -3,8 -2,8
Total -3,7 -3,7 -4,4 -6,3 -4,9
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Financial gains 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,5
positive bank interests 0,3 0,7 0,2 0,1 0,3
other financial gains 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,2 0,1
Total 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,5
Check 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Financial expenses -4,3 -3,1 -3,5 -3,6 -1,7
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Reclassification of balance sheet and income statement 
 
Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Invested Capital)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Working cash* 3,9 4,1 4,1 4,7 5,1
Trade receivables 68,1 61,5 73,0 75,5 84,1
Inventories 50,2 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4
Trade payables -98,1 -88,6 -93,1 -93,2 -93,9
Trade working capital 24,0 37,6 38,5 49,2 55,7
Other operating current assets 23,1 13,7 17,1 16,5 31,8
Other operating current liabilities -64,6 -54,3 -57,5 -69,6 -82,4
Other current assets and liabilities -41,5 -40,6 -40,4 -53,1 -50,6
Net working capital -17,5 -3,0 -2,0 -3,9 5,1
Tangible assets 42,6 57,6 54,2 50,0 56,9
Operating intangibles 30,5 33,0 30,6 22,6 21,0
Total operating fixed capital 73,1 90,6 84,8 72,6 77,9
Operating receivables and other non-current assets 0,9 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,8
Operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 8,2 9,7 21,1 14,9 15,0
Operating non-current liabilities 0,0 -0,1 -5,8 -5,9 -13,5
Operating provisions -6,3 -6,9 -6,4 -7,6 -8,6
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities 2,8 3,7 9,6 2,2 -6,4
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 58,4 91,3 92,5 70,9 76,6
Goodwill and similar intangibles 0,1 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5
Deferred tax asset/(liabilities) on similar intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 0,1 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 58,6 93,9 94,4 71,6 77,1
Non-operating current assets 0,0 0,0 4,1 4,1 0,3
Other non-operating current liabilities 0,0 0,0 -3,9 -4,2 -0,4
Non-operating non-current assets 13,7 10,4 3,9 10,0 12,6
Non-operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating non-current liabilities -13,1 -8,6 -3,1 -5,0 -6,3
Non-operating assets 0,6 1,8 1,0 5,0 6,2
Total funds invested 59,2 95,6 95,4 76,5 83,3
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Reorganized Income Statement
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 390,1 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,1
Other income 19,1 16,5 1,1 0,7 0,7
Change in inventories -2,6 -1,2 -6,1 8,4 0,0
Raw materials, consumables and goods -142,3 -142,1 -152,8 -183,6 -183,4
Other operating costs -3,7 -3,7 -4,4 -6,3 -4,9
Service and disposal of assets -116,9 -142,3 -129,8 -133,5 -139,5
Operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) -265,5 -289,4 -293,1 -315,0 -327,7
Personnel expenses -81,2 -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0
EBITDA 62,6 53,1 34,6 59,5 80,0
Depreciation -7,3 -8,8 -9,8 -16,9 -10,6
Amortization of operating intangibles -5,0 -6,5 -10,8 -9,3 -8,7
Total D&A -12,4 -15,3 -20,6 -26,3 -19,3
EBITA 50,2 37,9 14,0 33,2 60,7
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill -0,9 -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2
Receivables write-offs -2,4 -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0
Impairments of assets 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,5
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -7,7 -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6
EBIT 39,3 31,4 8,0 26,5 57,4
Share of joint venture result 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9
Exchange rate (losses) gains 1,3 -1,6 -2,9 -0,8 -1,3
Financial (expense) income -3,8 -2,5 -3,1 -3,2 -1,2
Net financial result -2,5 -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6
EBT 37,1 27,4 2,2 24,4 55,0
Taxes -11,5 -7,0 -0,5 -18,8 -26,6
Group Net Income 25,6 20,4 1,7 5,6 28,4
Minority result -0,4 -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2
Net Income 25,2 19,6 1,4 5,5 28,2
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NOPLAT calculation 
 
 
 
NOPLAT calculation
 € million
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EBITA 50,2 37,9 14,0 33,2 60,7
Operating taxes* -12,4 -8,4 -2,3 -19,5 -27,3
NOPLAT 37,9 29,4 11,6 13,7 33,4
*Operating taxes calculation
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EBT 37,1 27,4 2,2 24,4 55,0
Income taxes -11,5 -7,0 -0,5 -18,8 -26,6
Actual (blended global) tax rate 31% 26% 22% 77% 48%
Adjustments:
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill -0,9 -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2
Estimated tax rate 31% 31% 31% 31% 31%
Taxes 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,1
Receivables write-offs -2,4 -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0
Estimated tax rate 0% 0% 0% 0% 0,0
Taxes 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -7,7 -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6
Estimated tax rate 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Taxes 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Share of joint venture result 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0
Estimated tax rate 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
Taxes 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,5 -0,3
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9
Estimated tax rate 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
Taxes -0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 0,2
Net financial result -2,5 -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6
Estimated tax rate 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
Taxes 0,7 1,1 1,7 1,1 0,7
Estimated taxes on EBITA -12,4 -8,4 -2,3 -19,5 -27,3
EBITA 50,2 37,9 14,0 33,2 60,7
Estimated tax rate on EBITA 25% 22% 17% 59% 45%
Taxes on EBITA -12,4 -8,4 -2,3 -19,5 -27,3
Adjustments on taxes 0,9 1,4 1,9 0,6 0,7
Taxes on EBT -11,5 -7,0 -0,5 -18,8 -26,6
Reconciliation of NOPLAT to net profit
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NOPLAT 37,9 29,4 11,6 13,7 33,4
Amortization of goodwill and other similar intangibles -0,9 -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2
Impairments of assets 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,5
Receivables write offs -2,4 -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -7,7 -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6
Share of joint venture result 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9
Net financial result -2,5 -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6
Non-operating taxes 0,9 1,4 1,9 0,6 0,7
Minority result -0,4 -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2
Net Income 25,2 19,6 1,4 5,5 28,2
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Free Cash Flow Calculation
 € million
2012 2013 2014 2015
NOPLAT 29,4 11,6 13,7 33,4
Amortization of operating intangibles 6,5 10,8 9,3 8,7
Depreciation 8,8 9,8 16,9 10,6
Gross cash flow 44,7 32,3 40,0 52,7
Change in operating working capital -14,5 -1,0 1,9 -9,0
Net capital expenditures -32,7 -14,8 -14,1 -24,6
Change in other operating assets and liabilities -0,9 -5,9 7,4 8,6
Gross investment -48,2 -21,7 -4,7 -25,0
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles -3,5 10,5 35,2 27,7
Investments in goodwill and other intangibles -3,4 -0,3 1,1 0,0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles -6,8 10,3 36,4 27,7
Investments in non-operating assets -1,2 0,7 -3,9 -1,2
Impairments of assets 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,5
Receivables write-offs -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6
Share of joint venture result 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9
Non-operating taxes 1,4 1,9 0,6 0,7
Change in debt equivalents 0,2 1,0 0,2 -0,2
Non-operating cash flow -5,1 -1,3 -7,8 -3,7
Cash available to investors -11,9 9,0 28,6 24,0
Net financial result -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6
Change in minority interests -0,2 -0,6 -0,6 0,0
Change in shareholders' equity 0,0 -2,4 1,6 4,8
Decrease (increase) in net financial position -16,2 -0,1 25,6 26,2
Beginning net financial position 72,3 88,5 88,6 63,0
Ending net financial position 88,5 88,6 63,0 36,8
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Appendix 2: Comparables reclassification of balance sheet and income 
statement and comparison with Technogym 
Comparison with Nautilus 
 
Comparison with Nautilus Sport Income Statement
milion €
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,1 193,9 218,8 274,4 335,8
YoY % increase 0% 13% 10% 13% 25% 22%
Other income 16,5 1,1 0,7 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Total operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) -289,4 -293,1 -315,0 -327,7 -180,1 -199,8 -240,3 -292,1
Personnel expenses -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EBITDA 53,1 34,6 59,5 80,0 13,8 19,0 34,2 43,7
EBITDA margin 13% 8% 13% 16% 7% 9% 12% 13%
Total D&A -15,3 -20,6 -26,3 -19,3 -3,2 -3,3 -4,0 -3,4
EBITA 37,9 14,0 33,2 60,7 10,6 15,7 30,2 40,3
Amortization of goodwill and other similar intangibles -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Receivables write-offs -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EBIT 31,4 8,0 26,5 58,0 10,6 15,7 30,2 40,3
EBIT margin 8% 2% 6% 11% 5% 7% 11% 12%
Share of joint venture result 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net financial result -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6 -0,2 0,3 0,1 -0,2
EBT 27,4 2,2 24,4 55,5 10,4 16,0 30,2 40,0
Taxes -7,0 -0,5 -18,8 -26,6 0,2 32,1 -9,8 -13,2
Income (loss) from discontinued operations 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,2 -0,2 -1,6 -0,2
Group Net Income 20,4 1,7 5,6 28,9 16,9 48,0 18,8 26,6
Minority result -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income 19,6 1,4 5,5 28,7 16,9 48,0 18,8 26,6
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Comparison with Nautilus Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Invested Capital Calculation)
milion €
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Working cash* 4,1 4,1 4,7 5,1 1,9 2,2 2,7 3,4
Trade receivables 61,5 73,0 75,5 84,1 18,8 15,8 26,3 45,2
Inventories 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4 5,8 6,9 24,9 42,7
Trade payables -88,6 -93,1 -93,2 -93,9 -32,8 -37,2 -47,6 -61,7
Trade working capital 37,6 38,5 49,2 55,7 -6,3 -12,3 6,3 29,5
Other current assets 13,7 17,1 16,5 31,8 0,1 0,1 7,0 6,9
Other current liabilit ies -54,3 -57,5 -69,6 -82,4 -10,4 -10,7 -12,1 -17,8
Other current assets and liabilit ies -40,6 -40,4 -53,1 -50,6 -10,3 -10,7 -5,1 -10,9
Net working capital -3,0 -2,0 -3,9 5,1 -16,6 -22,9 1,2 18,6
Tangible assets 57,6 54,2 50,0 56,9 6,1 8,5 9,6 16,8
Operating intangibles 33,0 30,6 22,6 21,0 14,7 12,6 10,6 73,4
Total operating fixed capital 90,6 84,8 72,6 77,9 20,8 21,1 20,2 90,1
Operating receivables and other non-current assets 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,4
Operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilit ies) 9,7 21,1 14,9 15,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Operating non-current liabilit ies -0,1 -5,8 -5,9 -13,5 -0,2 0,0 0,0 -3,8
Operating provisions -6,9 -6,4 -7,6 -8,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities3,7 9,6 2,2 -6,4 0,2 0,4 0,6 -3,4
Invested capital excluding goodwill  and similar intangibles91,3 92,5 70,9 76,6 4,4 -1,4 22,1 105,4
Goodwill and similar intangibles 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5 2,9 2,7 2,5 60,5
Deferred tax asset/(liabilit ies) on similar intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Goodwill  and other similar intangibles 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5 2,9 2,7 2,5 60,5
Invested capital including goodwill  and similar intangibles93,9 94,4 71,6 77,1 7,3 1,3 24,6 165,8
Non-operating current assets 0,0 4,1 4,1 0,3 0,3 4,4 12,4 9,3
Other non-operating current liabilit ies 0,0 -3,9 -4,2 -0,4 -2,8 -2,6 -3,7 -4,1
Non-operating non-current assets 10,4 3,9 10,0 12,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilit ies) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -1,2 25,7 9,5 -18,4
Non-operating non-current liabilit ies -8,6 -3,1 -5,0 -6,3 -2,0 -1,5 -1,2 -3,1
Non-operating assets 1,8 1,0 5,0 6,2 -5,8 26,1 17,1 -16,3
Total funds invested 95,6 95,4 76,5 83,3 1,6 27,4 41,6 149,5
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Comparison with Nautilus Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Net financial position calculation)
milion € 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Excess cash -22,6 -36,3 -36,5 -62,9 -43,0 -64,1 -69,4 -57,4
Long-term borrowings 40,0 0,1 0,0 42,1 1,3 0,0 0,0 16,0
Adjustment on short term borrowings 71,1 124,8 99,4 57,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 64,0
Net financial position 88,5 88,6 63,0 36,8 -41,8 -64,1 -69,4 22,5
Provision for employee benefit 2,1 3,1 3,3 3,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Debt equivalents 2,1 3,1 3,3 3,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net financial position and debt equivalents 90,6 91,7 66,2 39,9 -41,8 -64,1 -69,4 22,5
Minority interests 1,0 0,7 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Shareholders' equity 4,0 2,9 10,0 43,0 43,3 91,6 111,1 127,0
Total source  of financing 95,6 95,4 76,5 83,3 1,6 27,4 41,6 149,5
Technogym Nautilus
Comparison with Amer Sport Income Statement
milion €
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,1 2064,0 2136,5 2228,7 2534,4
YoY % increase 0% 13% 10% 4% 4% 14%
Other income 16,5 1,1 0,7 0,7 13,5 10,9 11,7 12,1
Total operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) -289,4 -293,1 -315,0 -327,7 -1500,6 -1534,1 -1652,3 -1862,1
Personnel expenses -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0 -398,0 -416,2 -429,2 -429,2
EBITDA 53,1 34,6 59,5 80,0 178,9 197,1 158,9 255,2
EBITDA margin 13% 8% 13% 16% 9% 9% 7% 10%
Total D&A -15,3 -20,6 -26,3 -19,3 -40,2 -42,2 -44,8 -51,1
EBITA 37,9 14,0 33,2 60,7 138,7 154,9 114,1 204,1
Amortization of goodwill and other similar intangibles -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Receivables write-offs -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EBIT 31,4 8,0 26,5 58,0 138,7 154,9 114,1 204,1
EBIT margin 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Share of joint  venture result 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0 -24,8 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest  income (expense) from investments 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net financial result -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6 -31,5 -28,6 -37,1 -36,1
EBT 27,4 2,2 24,4 55,5 82,4 126,3 77,0 168,0
Taxes -7,0 -0,5 -18,8 -26,6 -24,5 -36,0 -21,6 -46,4
Group Net Income 20,4 1,7 5,6 28,9 57,9 90,3 55,4 121,6
Minority result -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income 19,6 1,4 5,5 28,7 57,9 90,3 55,4 121,6
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Comparison with Amer Sport Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Invested Capital Calculation)
milion €
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Working cash* 4,1 4,1 4,7 5,1 20,6 21,4 22,3 25,3
Trade receivables 61,5 73,0 75,5 84,1 516,8 514,2 543,3 563,9
Inventories 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4 336,7 355,1 413,2 482,0
Trade payables -88,6 -93,1 -93,2 -93,9 -192,9 -219,2 -237,8 -275,7
Trade working capital 37,6 38,5 49,2 55,7 681,2 671,5 741,0 795,5
Other current assets 13,7 17,1 16,5 31,8 68,7 117,0 101,4 91,2
Other current liabilities -54,3 -57,5 -69,6 -82,4 -260,2 -254,6 -277,4 -333,9
Other current assets and liabilit ies -40,6 -40,4 -53,1 -50,6 -191,5 -137,6 -176,0 -242,7
Net working capital -3,0 -2,0 -3,9 5,1 489,7 533,9 565,0 552,8
Tangible assets 57,6 54,2 50,0 56,9 162,9 168,3 174,0 206,7
Operating intangibles 33,0 30,6 22,6 21,0 211,4 205,0 204,7 282,1
Total operating fixed capital 90,6 84,8 72,6 77,9 374,3 373,3 378,7 488,8
Operating receivables and other non-current assets 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,8 1,2 4,3 21,5 11,6
Operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 9,7 21,1 14,9 15,0 105,1 89,0 81,5 15,9
Operating non-current liabilit ies -0,1 -5,8 -5,9 -13,5 -21,4 -18,6 -21,9 -25,9
Operating provisions -6,9 -6,4 -7,6 -8,6 -4,6 -1,5 -2,1 -2,5
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities3,7 9,6 2,2 -6,4 80,3 73,2 79,0 -0,9
Invested capital excluding goodwill  and similar intangibles91,3 92,5 70,9 76,6 944,3 980,4 1022,7 1040,7
Goodwill and similar intangibles 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5 289,1 281,2 305,0 346,2
Deferred tax asset/(liabilities) on similar intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,2
Goodwill  and other similar intangibles 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5 289,1 281,2 305,0 350,4
Invested capital including goodwill  and similar intangibles93,9 94,4 71,6 77,1 1233,4 1261,6 1327,7 1391,1
Non-operating current assets 0,0 4,1 4,1 0,3 22,3 51,5 84,0 124,0
Other non-operating current liabilit ies 0,0 -3,9 -4,2 -0,4 -24,2 -32,5 -52,3 -75,6
Non-operating non-current assets 10,4 3,9 10,0 12,6 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,4
Non-operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilit ies) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 55,5
Non-operating non-current liabilities -8,6 -3,1 -5,0 -6,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating assets 1,8 1,0 5,0 6,2 -1,3 19,3 32,0 104,3
Total funds invested 95,6 95,4 76,5 83,3 1232,1 1280,9 1359,7 1495,4
Technogym Amer
Comparison with Amer Sport Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Net financial position calculation)
milion € 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Excess cash -22,6 -36,3 -36,5 -62,9 -121,9 -215,0 -202,4 -306,1
Long-term borrowings 40,0 0,1 0,0 42,1 369,6 515,0 390,3 634,5
Adjustment on short term borrowings 71,1 124,8 99,4 57,6 198,6 183,8 269,0 157,2
Net financial position 88,5 88,6 63,0 36,8 446,3 483,8 456,9 485,6
Provision for employee benefit 2,1 3,1 3,3 3,1 54,0 35,8 60,0 60,2
Debt equivalents 2,1 3,1 3,3 3,1 54,0 35,8 60,0 60,2
Net financial position and debt equivalents 90,6 91,7 66,2 39,9 500,3 519,6 516,9 545,8
Minority interests 1,0 0,7 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Shareholders' equity 4,0 2,9 10,0 43,0 731,8 761,3 842,8 949,6
Total source  of financing 95,6 95,4 76,5 83,3 1232,1 1280,9 1359,7 1495,4
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Comparison with Brunswick  
 
Comparison with Escalade Sport Income Statement
milion €
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 411,6 411,0 465,4 511,1 3717,6 3887,5 3838,7 4105,7
YoY % increase 0% 13% 10% 5% -1% 7%
Other income 16,5 1,1 0,7 0,7 0 0 0 0
Total operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) -289,4 -293,1 -315,0 -327,7 -3354,8 -3490,5 -3424,8 -3672,7
Personnel expenses -85,5 -84,4 -91,6 -104,0 0 0 0 0
EBITDA 53,1 34,6 59,5 80,0 362,8 397 413,9 433
EBITDA margin 13% 8% 13% 16% 10% 10% 11% 11%
Total D&A -15,3 -20,6 -26,3 -19,3 -68,8 -68,7 -78,3 -85,9
EBITA 37,9 14,0 33,2 60,7 294 328,3 335,6 347,1
Amortization of goodwill and other similar intangibles -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -0,2 -4,1 -2,7 -2,9 -3
Receivables write-offs -0,4 -1,7 -0,6 0,0 0 0 0 0
Provision costs for contingencies and charges -5,1 -3,4 -5,9 -2,6 0 0 0 0
EBIT 31,4 8,0 26,5 58,0 289,9 325,6 332,7 344,1
EBIT margin 8% 2% 6% 11% 8% 8% 9% 8%
Share of joint venture result 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,0 2,2 2,5 6,5 5,4
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,1 0,2 0,2 -0,9 -25,8 -21,4 -24,4 -12,4
Goodwill and intangible assets impairment 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0 0 0 0
Equity method investment impairment 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -3,8 -1,9 1,8 3,7
Net financial result -4,1 -6,0 -3,9 -2,6 -81,5 -75,2 -28,7 -25,6
EBT 27,4 2,2 24,4 55,5 181 229,6 287,9 315,2
Taxes -7,0 -0,5 -18,8 -26,6 -33,6 545,6 -93 -87,8
Income (loss) from discontinued operations 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -97,4 -6 50,8 14
Group Net Income 20,4 1,7 5,6 28,9 50 769,2 245,7 241,4
Minority result -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2 0 0 0 0
Net Income 19,6 1,4 5,5 28,7 50 769,2 245,7 241,4
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Comparison with Escalade Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Invested Capital Calculation)
milion €
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Working cash* 4,1 4,1 4,7 5,1 37,176 38,875 38,387 41,057
Trade receivables 61,5 73,0 75,5 84,1 349,2 364,6 386,5 398,1
Inventories 60,6 54,5 62,2 60,4 575,8 599,2 652,3 685
Trade payables -88,6 -93,1 -93,2 -93,9 -334,3 -315,6 -317,4 -339,1
Trade working capital 37,6 38,5 49,2 55,7 627,88 687,08 759,79 785,06
Other current assets 13,7 17,1 16,5 31,8 26,7 31,4 39,5 39,8
Other current liabilities -54,3 -57,5 -69,6 -82,4 -576,2 -561,1 -561,5 -563
Other current assets and liabilities -40,6 -40,4 -53,1 -50,6 -549,5 -529,7 -522 -523,2
Net working capital -3,0 -2,0 -3,9 5,1 78,376 157,38 237,79 261,86
Tangible assets 57,6 54,2 50,0 56,9 510,9 537,1 362,3 401,4
Operating intangibles 33,0 30,6 22,6 21,0 38,1 35,4 45,5 55,1
Total operating fixed capital 90,6 84,8 72,6 77,9 549 572,5 407,8 456,5
Operating receivables and other non-current assets 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,8 70,5 80,7 98 103,8
Operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 9,7 21,1 14,9 15,0 -92,7 377 287,7 227,4
Operating non-current liabilities -0,1 -5,8 -5,9 -13,5 -197,5 -193,6 -203 -160,8
Operating provisions -6,9 -6,4 -7,6 -8,6 0 0 0 0
Total other non-current oper. assets and liab. 3,7 9,6 2,2 -6,4 -219,7 264,1 182,7 170,4
Invested capital excluding goodwill 91,3 92,5 70,9 76,6 407,68 993,98 828,29 888,76
Goodwill and similar intangibles 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5 291,7 291,7 296,9 298,7
Deferred tax asset/(liabilities) on similar intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0 0 0 0
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 2,5 1,9 0,6 0,5 291,7 291,7 296,9 298,7
Invested capital including goodwill 93,9 94,4 71,6 77,1 699,38 1285,7 1125,2 1187,5
Non-operating current assets 0,0 4,1 4,1 0,3 92,3 12,7 113,2 11,5
Other non-operating current liabilities 0,0 -3,9 -4,2 -0,4 -18,4 0 -15,7 0
Non-operating non-current assets 10,4 3,9 10,0 12,6 152,8 85,4 69,1 68,9
Non-operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 18,8 137,6 208 180,5
Non-operating non-current liabilities -8,6 -3,1 -5,0 -6,3 0 0 0 0
Non-operating assets 1,8 1,0 5,0 6,2 245,5 235,7 374,6 260,9
Total funds invested 95,6 95,4 76,5 83,3 944,88 1521,4 1499,8 1448,4
Technogym Brunswick
Comparison with Amer Sport Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Net financial position calculation)
milion € 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Excess cash -22,6 -36,3 -36,5 -62,9 -260,124 -324,125 -529,913 -628,943
Long-term borrowings 40,0 0,1 0,0 42,1 566,5 453,4 454,5 442,5
Adjustment on short term borrowings 71,1 124,8 99,4 57,6 8,2 6,4 5,5 6
Net financial position 88,5 88,6 63,0 36,8 314,58 135,68 -69,913 -180,44
Provision for employee benefit 2,1 3,1 3,3 3,1 552,6 347,3 398,2 347,5
Debt equivalents 2,1 3,1 3,3 3,1 552,6 347,3 398,2 347,5
Net financial position and debt equivalents 90,6 91,7 66,2 39,9 867,18 482,98 328,29 167,06
Minority interests 1,0 0,7 0,2 0,4 0 0 0 0
Shareholders' equity 4,0 2,9 10,0 43,0 77,7 1038,4 1171,5 1281,3
Total source of financing 95,6 95,4 76,5 83,3 944,88 1521,4 1499,8 1448,4
Technogym Brunswick
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